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ABSTRACT 
 
RUMI, THE POET OF UNIVERSAL LOVE:  
THE POLITICS OF RUMI’S APPROPRIATION IN THE WEST 
 
FEBRUARY 2016 
 
FATMA BETUL CIHAN-ARTUN, B.A. BOGAZICI UNIVERSITY 
 
M.A. BOGAZICI UNIVERSITY 
 
M.A. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS-AMHERST 
 
Ph.D. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS-AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor Edwin Gentzler 
 
 
This project—taking the polyvalence of Rumi as a religious figure and the discursive nature of 
Western approach to Sufism as its premises—interrogates the ways in which Jalal al-Din Rumi 
(1207-1273), a thirteenth-century Sufi poet/scholar, has been appropriated in the West. In the 
valorization of Rumi, the engagement of distinct discourses that emerged out of complex 
histories stand out. This study, accordingly, seeks to contextualize the ways in which Sufism, as 
well as Rumi’s works and thoughts, are being read and discussed in relation to discourses on 
Islam, religion, and spirituality so as to explore the “politics of representation” that is embedded 
in those refractions.  
The dissertation analyzes the representations of Sufis, Sufism, and consequentially Rumi 
in a wide variety of texts, from pre-modern proto-ethnographic works to contemporary 
translations and novels, so as to trace the construction and engagement of discourses that 
engender the most significant readings of Rumi. The representation of Rumi’s “Muslimhood” 
constitutes the focus of analysis. For several decades, and due to a variety of reasons that are 
discussed in this study, Rumi was imagined merely as an incidental Muslim in the West, where 
 viii 
the spiritual currents of the second half of the twentieth century cast him as a New Age guru with 
romantic sensibilities. It was only in the early twenty-first century, with the events of 9/11 and 
the consequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Rumi’s Muslim identity has come to be 
acknowledged on a popular level.   
The dissertation interrogates the discursive course of the assessment of Rumi as an extra-
Islamic figure and the contemporary re-evaluation as an Islamic one, and thereby sheds light on 
the post-9/11 discourses on Islam in the West, within which Rumi in particular has been cast as 
an ideal(ized) representative of “good Muslims.” It is argued that that Rumi’s “ideality” is 
largely an effect of the New Age reading of Rumi, which underlines, among other things, the 
compatibility of Rumi’s spirituality with Western values. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Every one became my friend from his own opinion;    
none sought out my secrets from within me.  
                          (Rumi; Masnavi I. l.6) 
 
Jalal al-Din Rumi1 (1207-1273), a thirteenth-century Sufi poet/scholar, has been enjoying 
an unprecedented surge of interest in the Western world, particularly in the United States. 
Hailed as “the poet of love,” Rumi entered, in Franklin Lewis’s term, “the Western 
consciousness,” as early as the sixteenth century but in the last thirty years or so, he has 
gained the status of a universal icon thanks to the translations by prominent scholars, 
poets, Sufis, and even New-Age gurus. 
The most significant aspect of Rumi as he is read today in the Western world is 
his contested Muslim identity. Not long ago Rumi was described as an incidental Muslim 
who promoted pantheistic theosophy, remnant of the supposed Hindu and Greek origins 
of Sufism. Today Rumi is often singled out as the paragon of “the good Muslim,” which, 
as a subjectivity, has been engendered by the post-9/11 discourse on Muslims.2 Defined 
                                                
1 The full complement of names and titles is Mawlana (Mevlana/Maulana) Khodavandgar Jalal al-Din 
Mohammad b. Mohammad al-Balkhi al-Rumi. Rumi, literally meaning “from Rome”, is a toponym and 
refers to the fact that he lived in Anatolia. Although he is known in the Western world as Rumi, in Turkey 
he is known as Mevlana (meaning “Our Master”).  
2 The dichotomization of Muslims as good and bad is analyzed in detail by Mahmood Mamdani in his study 
Good Muslim, Bad Muslim (2005). In opposition to the “good Muslims” stand “the bad Muslims,” who are, 
by and large, defined by their vicious attacks against the United States and other Western countries. Several 
studies, scholarly and non-scholarly alike, explore the category of the bad Muslim. To name a few see 
Unholy War (2003) and The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality (1999) by John L. Esposito, Jihad: The Trail 
of Political Islam (2006) by Gilles Kepel, Political Islam (2011) by Frederic Volpi, Understanding Jihad 
(2005) by David Cook.  
 2 
in opposition to the “bad Muslims,” who are usually called fundamentalists, Islamic 
extremists or jihadists, “good Muslims” owe their goodness primarily to their 
compatibility with the so-called “Western values” that are proclaimed to be universal. 
Largely on account of his appreciation and promotion of these values and more, Rumi 
has earned eminence as an ideal Muslim. 
This project, taking the discursive nature of Western approach to Sufism as its 
premise, interrogates the ways in which Jalal al-Din Rumi has been appropriated in the 
West. I am specifically interested in analyzing the process of assessment of Rumi as an 
extra-Islamic figure and the contemporary re-evaluation as an Islamic one. The “de-
Islamization” and the consequent “re-Islamization” of Sufism, and of Rumi, constitutes 
the framework of my analysis because the Western representations of Rumi in general 
focuses on the extent of Rumi’s agreement with the Islamic tradition.  
By utilizing the terms “de-Islamization” and “re-Islamization,” I do not mean to 
impose a standardized definition of Islam. To the contrary, one of the premises of the 
dissertation is the conceptualization of Islam as a “discursive tradition” (Asad 1986), 
which underlines a continuous restructuring that occurs by means of an unceasing debate 
over the correct practice of Islam, though always in relation to “the founding texts of the 
Qur’an and the Hadith” (14).3 With Asad’s notions about Islam in mind, de-Islamization 
                                                
3 Talal Asad discusses this issue in The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam (1986) and in Genealogies of 
Religion (1993). Islam, argues Asad, “is neither a distinctive social structure nor a heterogeneous collection 
of beliefs, artifacts, customs, and morals. It is a tradition” (1986: 14). In this definition Asad draws on 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s elaboration of the concept of tradition as “an historically extended, socially embodied 
argument, an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition” (222). Asad 
explains what he means by tradition in the same work: “A tradition consists essentially of discourses that 
seek to instruct practitioners regarding the correct form and purpose of a given practice that, precisely 
because it is established, has a history. These discourses relate conceptually to a past (when the practice 
was instituted, and from which the knowledge of its point and proper performance has been transmitted) 
and a future (how the point of that practice can best be secured in the short or long term, or why it should 
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of Rumi in this dissertation refers to the Western identification of Rumi as a person 
whose ideas and beliefs fall above and beyond of, sometimes in contradiction to, Islam as 
imagined, once again, by the Westerners. Re-Islamization, accordingly, refers to Rumi’s 
inclusion into the category of a yet another imagined Islam.    
The re-Islamization, in particular, and its political implications are of concern in 
this dissertation because of the way it resonates in the post-9/11 world. By means of 
exploring Rumi’s gradual transformation into the epitome of the “good Muslim,” I also 
aim to provide an inquiry into the category of the good Muslim, which has not been 
examined from a critical perspective even though the discursive construction of its 
subjectivity requires serious attention. I argue that analyzing the specific case of Rumi 
effectively discloses the contents of the imagined identity of the good Muslim because 
Rumi’s appropriation by the New Age religiosity, specifically through the translations by 
Coleman Barks, is considerably operative in the rereading of Rumi as the ideal Muslim, 
so much so that the more Rumi is domesticated or naturalized, the more exemplary he 
becomes.   
Throughout the dissertation I analyze how Sufis, Sufism, and Rumi are 
represented in a wide variety of texts, from premodern proto-ethnographic works to 
contemporary translations and novels, so as to trace the construction and engagement of 
discourses that engender the most significant readings of Rumi.  This project does not, 
however, offer a close reading of Rumi’s verses. Neither is it corrective; it is not devoted 
to demonstrating the “fallacy” of the representations in question. It seeks, rather, to 
contextualize the ways in which Sufism, as well as Rumi’s works and thoughts, are being 
                                                
be modified or abandoned), through present (how it is linked to other practices, institutions, and social 
conditions) (Asad 1986: 14). 
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read and discussed in relation to discourses on Islam, religion, and spirituality so as to 
discuss the “politics of representation” that is embedded in those refractions. 
The dissertation operates on a meta level, because it focuses on the question of 
representation. The exploration of this question, however, does not necessarily inform us 
about Rumi; most of the time, representation, because of its socio-historical embedment, 
tells more about the subject (representer) than the object of study (represented).4  As a 
culture-infused phenomenon, representation does not function in a vacuum; “any and all 
representations,” says Edward Said, “are embedded first in the language and then in the 
culture, institutions, and political ambience of the representer” (272).5 The most 
appropriate and efficient way to disclose the constellation of power inscribed into any 
given representation is to adopt a discursive approach, basically because representation 
derives its strength from the discourse in which it is entangled. The diverse, sometimes 
contradictory representations of Rumi in the Western world clearly demonstrates the 
defining effect of these discourses. Just as the alleged pantheism of Rumi cannot be 
comprehended without examining the nineteenth-century discussions on pantheism 
prevalent among the German intelligentsia, Rumi’s exemplariness as a Muslim cannot be 
comprehended without referring to the general discourse on Islam as well as on New Age 
religiosity in the United States. Therefore, the dissertation provides analysis of the 
discourses that determine the orientation of Rumi representations.  
  Systematic analysis of the discourses in question is crucial because discourse, as a 
“historically, socially, and institutionally specific structure of statements, terms, 
                                                
4 However, I am, also, aware that representations, through discourses, produce not only meaning but also 
subjectivities.  
5 Numerous works produced within the field of cultural studies, specifically, the works of Stuart Hall and 
Paul Gilroy, deal extensively with the question of representation.  
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categories, and beliefs” (Scott: 35), constructs and governs what is “sayable” and 
“unsayable” in any given historical moment. It determines the boundaries, and networks 
of associations but also, as importantly, conceals power relations that are inscribed into 
it.6 What is more, the extent of a discourse’s exploitation by networks of power 
determines its effect on policy. For instance, the contemporary discourse on Sufis 
revolves around their disagreement with fundamentalist Muslims and the possible 
utilization of this presumed conflict. Numerous newspaper articles as well as scholarly 
inquiries drew attention to this disagreement by means of reporting within, hence 
perpetuating, the same discourse over and over again.7 In 2007 the RAND Corporation 
published a report entitled Building Moderate Muslim Networks on developing possible 
strategies “for the construction of moderate Muslim networks and institutions.” It points 
at Sufis, along with “secularists,” “liberal Muslims,” as “potential partners" in the 
American combat against “radical Muslims” (73).8 The United States and Pakistani 
governments, apparently already in agreement with this report, have sought means to 
                                                
6 Thanks to Michel Foucault, discourse as a site of knowledge production is taken for granted to the extent 
that the deployment of discourse analysis to demystify power-knowledge relationships has almost become a 
standard method in humanities and social sciences.  
7 In a 2008 article that appeared both in smithsonian.com and The New York Times, Nicholas Schmidle 
compares the Sufi tradition defined as “a personal, experiential approach to Allah” with “the prescriptive, 
doctrinal approach of “fundamentalists” such as the Taliban within the Pakistani context. Schmidle 
paradoxically argues that the followers of Sufism, who “generally embrace Islam as a religious experience, 
not a social or political one,” “represent the strongest indigenous force against Islamic fundamentalism.” 
The juxtaposition acquires a more political tone to the end of the article: “Was Pakistan to be a state for 
Muslims, governed by civilian institutions and secular laws? Or an Islamic state, governed by clerics 
according to sharia, or Islamic law? Sufis, with their ecumenical beliefs, typically favor the former, while 
the Taliban, in their fight to establish an extreme orthodoxy, seek the latter. The Taliban have antiaircraft 
weapons, rocket-propelled grenades and squads of suicide bombers. But the Sufis have drums. And 
history.”   
8 In this report Sufis gain significance on account of being one of the primary victims of the Salafis and 
Wahhabis: “Immediately relevant to this study is the fact that Salafis and Wahhabis are relentless enemies 
of traditionalists and Sufis. Whenever radical Islamist movements have gained power they have sought to 
suppress the practice of traditionalist and Sufi Islam, as in the well-known destruction of early Islamic 
monuments in Saudi Arabia. Because of their victimization by Salafis and Wahhabis, traditionalists and 
Sufis are natural allies of the West to the extent that common ground can be found with them” (73). 
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make use of Sufi groups. Both states endorsed, among other things, the formation of a 
Sufi council and a Sufi university as well as holding seminars and musical concerts so as 
to promote Sufism as a counter-ideology to the Taliban.  
Representation, defined as “the production of meaning through language” (Hall 
1997: 16), constitutes one of the foundational concepts that I utilize in my work. By 
“represent” I do not merely mean “to speak about.” The conceptual perimeter of the 
notion of representation is based on the two main definitions of the term which are hardly 
mutually exclusive: (1) the action of speaking or acting on behalf of someone or the state 
of being so represented; (2) the description or portrayal of someone or something in a 
particular way or as being of a certain nature. According to Gayatri Spivak, whose take 
on the term in “Can the Subaltern Speak?” (1988) precipitated a new wave of discussion 
on the link between the two meanings, the semiotic sense of the term (darstellen/ 
representation as aesthetic portrait) cannot be analyzed without taking into account its 
intricate connection with the political sense of the term (vertreten/ representation as 
political proxy). Despite her remark on the relatedness of the two concepts in her critique 
of Foucault and Deleuze, Spivak focuses more on how these two “related but irreducibly 
discontinuous meanings” (70) of representation are conflated by Western intellectuals. I 
agree with Spivak on the discreteness of the two meanings but I am not sure that 
“discontinuous” is the correct word to describe the relationship of the two. Both forms of 
representation are usually enmeshed in same discourses, hence are supported by similar 
structures, networks and power relations. Furthermore, these two forms perpetuate the 
viability of one another. Hence the symbiotic relation of the two meanings necessitates an 
adjective other than discontinuous to describe the porous boundary between the two. In 
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addition, these two forms of representation converge in certain occasions such as 
translation. The translator not only speaks on behalf of the author but also, via 
transposing the text to another context, speaks about it. The choice of words, omissions, 
additions, paratextual matter, which includes introduction, translator’s note, footnotes and 
such, all constitute the act of “speaking about.”9 The convergence of the two forms of 
representation inevitably brings the translator to the fore.  
A number of reasons exist to focus on the translator. Translators do more than 
redirecting pre-existing messages; they give voice to new texts, intervene in them, and in 
so doing, establish a subject-position (Hermans 2009: 96). The translator’s positionality 
becomes part of the text he/she (re)creates. Hence I approach the position of the translator 
as a re-enunciator and discursive subject in the text. This approach has been shaped by 
recent developments in the field of translation studies10  that have successfully illustrated 
that translated texts, as a form of interpretation, engage in a deep and complex relation 
with politics and power structures.  
                                                
9 Tejaswini Niranjana also argues that “the Derridaean critique of “representation” combines Darstellung 
and Vertretung in “translation” [...] in a practice in which we constantly interrogate ourselves and our right 
to speak as and/or speak for” (170).  
10 In 1992 Tejaswini Niranjana criticized translation studies, albeit with good reason, for being “caught in 
an idiom of fidelity and betrayal that assumes an unproblematic notion of representation” instead of asking 
“questions about the historicity of translation” (4). In 22 years so much has changed in this field. As a 
matter of fact, as early as the mid-1980s the field already began to broaden so as to engage with questions 
about ideology, ethics, and culture. By the 1990s, as translation studies increasingly came under the 
influence of poststructuralist criticism and deconstruction, studies on the political intonations of translations 
have become more prominent. Analyses of the social, cultural, and ideological significance of translating 
and translations, the politics that translation is embedded in, the socio-cultural factors affecting translation 
behaviors, and the role of human agency replace comparative linguistic analysis of source and target texts. 
The main questions explored all reveal the political and ideological nature of translation: who translates 
what, when, how, for whom, in what context, with what effect and why? For further discussion on the 
presence of power in translation, see Gentzler & Tymoczko’s Translation and Power (2002). The first 
chapter of Maria Tymoczko’s Enlarging Translation, Empowering Translators (2007) also provides a 
comprehensive survey of contemporary translation studies in the Western world.  
 8 
In my analysis, I take translation as a site of “active interpretation” in the 
Derridean sense. In “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” 
(1966), Derrida claims that the idea of a secure ground, a “center” or a “transcendental 
signified,” which remains outside the system yet guarantees its comprehensibility, is 
merely a philosophical fiction. No univocal signification – hence no text with a fixed, 
stable meaning – exists.11 Accordingly, there are “two interpretations of interpretation, of 
structure, of sign, of play” for those who become aware of the “presence of the absent 
origin:”  
The one seeks to decipher, dreams of deciphering a truth or an origin which 
escapes play and the order of the sign, and which lives the necessity of 
interpretation as an exile. The other, which is no longer turned toward the origin, 
affirms play and tries to pass beyond man and humanism, the name of man being 
the name of that being who, throughout the history of metaphysics or of 
ontotheology has dreamed of full presence, the reassuring foundation, the origin 
and the end of play. (102) 
The second interpretation, that is the joyous affirmation of “the play of the world 
and of the innocence of becoming” actually means the affirmation of a world of “signs 
without fault, without truth, and without origin which is offered to an active 
                                                
11 Derrida’s argumentations, despite challenging the very possibility of translation, opens up uncharted 
venues for translation scholars to explore. Even the idea of equivalence, fidelity and such are dismissed 
altogether because the idea of “origin” is shattered through deconstructionist thought. As aptly put by 
Gentzler “at the foundation of Derrida's thought is the assumption that there is no kernel or deep structure 
or invariant of comparison, nothing that we may ever discern – let alone represent, translate, or found a 
theory on” (147). In “Letter to a Japanese Friend” Derrida notes the centrality of translation to his thinking: 
“The question of deconstruction is also through and through the question of translation” (1985: 1). Derrida 
explored the concept of translation in “Des Tours de Babel” (2007), “Ulysses Gramophone. Hear Say Yes 
in Joyce” (1998) and “What is a ‘Relevant’ Translation?” (2001).  
 
 9 
interpretation” (Ibid). For Derrida this affirmation is crucial in interpreting the world 
because it “determines the noncenter otherwise than as loss of the center” (Ibid). And I 
think it is the act of translation where “active interpretation” becomes most manifest. 
Translation inadvertently discloses the “unlimited semiosis behind texts, inconsistencies 
and fragmentary elements that reveal slippages of thought and belief, polysemous 
language, and the play of words” (Tymoczko 2014: 46).  In acknowledgment of “its 
necessity as impossibility” (Derrida 2007: 197) the “player” (both the translator and the 
reader) does not ask for a fixed meaning; he/she revels in the infinite plays the text 
provides. And the “play of the trace” stands out in this infinitude. The always already 
inscribed “others” within the text peek through/behind the signifier that is chosen among 
many. Gentzler says that the “trace” “can never be presented” for “as one tries to stop its 
movement and grasp it, it disseminates, separates, and continues to move on, crossing 
over to another place” (2001: 160). As such the translated text supplements the original, 
therefore rewrites it to be translated one more time in a different fashion, to supplement 
the original ad infinitum.  In this chain of continuous signification, the difference, or 
rather the hierarchy between the author and the translator blurs. 
Furthermore, translation is inherently a political act on account of its active 
engagement with the “norms” of both the source and the receiving cultures. Analyzing 
existing codes or norms or manifestations of power structures in translation, as well as 
examining what is excluded and hidden in the translational process (Hermans 2007: 90) 
reveal the ideological concerns at stake in the act of translation, which is usually defined 
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by the parameters of the socio-cultural context.12 My analysis of Coleman Barks’s 
“collaborative translations” as well as Elif Shafak’s novel The 40 Rules of Love / Aşk 
(2009) is highly informed by such an approach. I contend that both figures 
metonymically represent Rumi in their translations, confirming Maria Tymoczko’s thesis 
about translation being a metonymic transfer of meaning (1999: 41-61). Tymoczko 
argues that translation “constructs a source text, a literary tradition, a culture, and a 
people,” for the receiving audience, “by picking parts, aspects, and attributes that will 
stand for wholes” (57). Both Barks and Shafak selectively translate Rumi for an audience 
that is barely knowledgeable in Sufism and the aspects they bring to the forefront are in 
agreement with the so-called universal Western values.   
The dissertation consists of two parts. The first part, comprising the first two 
chapters, aims to trace the de-Islamization of Sufism in the Western world by means of a 
genealogy of Western perception(s) of Sufism. A close examination of discourses that 
shape, regulate and control the meaning and connotations Sufism has gained constitutes 
the core of this part. These discourses are significant as they authorize and constrain the 
ways in which Sufism is understood. The focus of this section is confined to European 
representations; it starts with the early modern impressions of travelers and captives to 
the Ottoman lands and ends with the more scholarly approach of the nineteenth-century 
Orientalists whose sources include the works of the former. 
This part of the dissertation demonstrates that Western representations of Sufis(m) 
diachronically constitute clusters that are shaped for the most part by the dominant 
                                                
12 Contextualization of translation inevitably invokes the issue of power which scholars like Niranjana 
Tejeswini and Eric Cheyfitz have compellingly examined in their studies.  More and more scholars, 
specifically of gender and postcolonial studies, have employed poststructuralist criticism so as to discuss 
the power structures and the asymmetrical cultural exchanges involved in translation. 
 11 
discourses about religion in general, hence about Christianity and Islam, as well as by 
impressions about Middle Eastern culture and peoples. Religion, as a historically 
constructed category that has been transformed through time (see Asad 1993), 
unavoidably framed the ways in which Westerners approach Islam, Muslims and Sufis. 
For instance, the Renaissance approach to religion, marked with Aristotelian valorization 
of practice over doctrine, is quite different from the post-Reformation reconceptualization 
of religion that is described and experienced in terms of belief.  Accordingly, the focus in 
relevant texts shifted from Sufis as eccentric Islamic figures to Sufism as a belief 
system/philosophy. 
The endurance of the images developed since the early modern period is hard to 
comprehend. Today, despite the efforts of scholars, Sufism, especially the philosophy of 
Rumi, is believed by many to be of non-Muslim origins and pantheistic in nature. Such 
de-Islamization did not happen overnight.  A careful analysis of its history is required in 
order to fully comprehend the intricacies of contemporary perceptions of Sufism. The 
significance of this part for the dissertation lies, however, not only in the effect of 
analyzed discourses on the twentieth-century readings of Rumi that have been prevalent 
in the West. It will also help us to contextualize new forms of Sufism as experienced in 
the United States. Orientalists on their way to explain Sufism did create a new 
understanding of this specific phenomenon, which in turn began to be comprehended and 
lived according to the explanations provided by them. In other words, Orientalists once 
again have constructed an object that they set out to explain. 
The first issue that needs to be addressed in this regard is the resilience of popular 
perceptions. Admittedly, the resistant nature of alterity discourses has been discussed in 
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numerous critical studies, especially ones on Orientalism. Ziauddin Sardar, for instance, 
indicates that “ways of thinking as well as pervasive images that were formulated in the 
Middle Ages have remained in the Western psyche and have been continuously drawn 
upon, reformulated and reworked into ‘modern scholarship’” (1999: 77). Studies of 
Edward Said, Norman Daniels, and Raymond Schwab among many others have provided 
a multitude of examples of such reformulations but we still do not how this, now almost a 
given, resiliency is maintained.  
Satisfactory answers to these questions are not easy. When the written word is 
involved, one immediately has to consider how every new text reflects and engages one 
way or the other with the extant literature on the subject in question. Therefore, it is 
impossible to trace any sort of intertextuality, but nonetheless certain conceptualizations 
utilized by scholars of literature provide useful tools to understand the transmission of 
images and representations. Edward Said, for instance, employs a distinction he borrowed 
from Freud between the “latent” and “manifest” forms so as to reveal the multi-layered 
structure of Orientalism. According to Said, while “manifest Orientalism” includes 
information and changes in knowledge about the Orient as well as policy decisions 
founded in Orientalist thinking, latent Orientalism, which is static, unanimous and 
essential, embodies the unconscious, untouchable certainty about what the Orient is 
(2006: 222). To put it simply, latent Orientalism constitutes the foundation of manifest 
Orientalism displaying its cumulative feature.  
 A concept comparable to the interactive relation between manifest and latent 
Orientalism is suggested by Nina Berman with the metaphor of palimpsest which she 
utilized in her endeavor to examine “the archive of German images about the Middle 
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East” (2011: 16). The palimpsest, which as a metaphor has already shown its efficiency 
in analyses of historical fiction, perfectly demonstrates the inevitable effect of previous 
layers of “writing” on the current reading of any historical material. The consequent 
interaction of layers of “writing” engenders meanings that are beyond the intentions of 
any writer.  
In my analysis I also utilize palimpsest as a conceptual tool to comprehend the 
intricate relationship between diverse readings of Sufis. The West never ceases to 
produce knowledge about Islam and Sufis, but the previous images or information that 
are imprinted in cultural memory are never totally erased off; from time to time they 
become legible affecting the current reading. Of course, it is not only almost impossible 
to trace each and every reference or allusion to Sufism or Rumi, it is a futile attempt as 
well. For this reason, I make use of texts that have resonated beyond their cultural 
milieux, or sticking to the metaphor, the most legible lines in the palimpsest. The 
accounts of Thomas Herbert and Jean Chardin, for instance, not only informed their 
contemporaries but also continued to provide “valuable” information for respected 
Orientalists such as Sir William Jones and F. A. G. Tholuck. Similarly, the theories put 
forth by Jones and Tholuck regarding Sufism, about its purported, non-Muslim origins 
and its pantheistic nature, are still legible despite the attempted refutations by scholars 
such as A. J. Arberry, Carl Ernst, and William Chittick. 
The palimpsest I am employing in this part consists of four main layers: (1) the 
early modern one, which establishes dervishes to be hypocrites; (2) the late eighteenth- 
and early nineteenth-century layer attributing foreign origins to Sufism. (3) and (4), 
which were written almost immediately after the second layer, ascribe pantheism and in 
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relation to that, Aryan origins to Sufism. The history of Sufism in the West demonstrates 
how none of the layers lose their legibility despite studies arguing otherwise. 
Having exposed the de-Islamization process of Sufism in the West, I move onto 
the third chapter of the dissertation, which specifically deals with one of the 
contemporary representations of Rumi. The central issue at stake in this part regards 
translation, specifically Coleman Barks’s renderings of the poetry of Rumi, which have 
acquainted a much wider audience with Rumi. 
Before Barks came into the scene, the intricacies of Sufi ideas, and particularly 
those of Rumi, were introduced to Western readers through two different strains in the 
twentieth century: scholarly translations of Rumi’s poetry by R. A. Nicholson and A.J. 
Arberry that have become highly influential in the field of Rumi studies but are mostly 
limited to academic circles13 and the popular movements and spiritual practices that are 
designated generally as New Age spirituality. With regard to the latter, the works of a 
number of modern advocates of the Perennial Philosophy, including René Guénon (d. 
1951), Louis Massignon (d. 1962), Titus Burckhardt (d. 1984) and Frithjof Schuon (d. 
1998) became influential albeit only to a certain extent. They introduced a specific 
interpretation of Sufism to a wider audience with a more popular appeal. They were all 
familiar with the works of Rumi but did not actually attribute special importance to his 
thoughts, yet their interpretation of Sufism affected the way Rumi would be read by later 
spiritual seekers. Also, as importantly, they were, for the most part, more active, hence 
instrumental in dissemination of Sufism, in Europe. As influential as the Perennialists 
                                                
13 Nicholson’s extensive study, which was published in eight volumes between 1925 and 1940, is the first 
critical Persian edition and the first full translation into English. The translations of Arberry and Nicholson, 
in fact, deserve to be examined in detail on their own. I believe “translator’s alter ego as historiographer” 
(Niranjana, 1992) is more apparent in their translations.  
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were figures such as George I. Gurdjieff (d. 1949) and his leading disciple, P. D. 
Ouspensky, who helped spread the sama to a Western audience, whether or not that 
audience was conscious of its origins (Lewis: 514). Contemporaneous with Gurdjieff, 
Hazrat Inayat Khan (d. 1927) founded the Sufi Order of the West, now the Sufi Order 
International, leadership of which has passed on to his grandson Zia Inayat Khan from his 
son, Pir Vilayat Inayat Khan (d. 2004). While Hazrat Khan triggered the emergence of 
popular forms of Sufism in the US, Idris Shah gave mass-market appeal to Sufism in the 
UK at a time when many young Westerners turned to Eastern philosophy and religion 
(particularly Hinduism and Buddhism, and only to a lesser extent to Sufism) (Lewis: 
516).  
As regards the translations of Rumi’s works into Western languages, one can 
definitely detect an increasing number of translations, specifically since the late 1940s, 
but none of these translations has enjoyed the popularity of Coleman Barks’s series of 
translations from Rumi’s corpus. The “New Ageization” of Rumi, also, had not occurred 
at a significant level until the translations by Barks (and Deepak Chopra) drew the 
attention of a new generation of spiritual seekers. Barks’s renderings accompany yoga 
sessions or help maid-of-honors to polish their toasts at weddings. Again, thanks to 
Barks’s translations, Rumi has become the best-selling poet in the United States.14 In 
short, many English-speaking people get to know Rumi through Barks’s refractions.  
Analyzing Barks’s representation of Rumi is significant on various levels. First of 
all, even though Barks’s translations are not as “thick” as those of Nicholson and 
                                                
14 In 1994 Publishers Weekly and in November 1997 the Christian Science Monitor proclaimed Rumi to be 
the best-selling poet in the United States. Barks owes his popularity, more than anything, to The Essential 
Rumi, which was first published in 1995 and sold 110,000 copies in three years. 
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Arberry, the paratextual matter that Barks provides, nonetheless, creates an image of 
Rumi that overlaps, to a certain extent, with a specific reading of Rumi that is highly 
informed by New Age religiosity as conceptualized in the United States context. This 
individualistic and hybrid form of religiosity15 without a creed, dogma, sacred book or 
prescribed forms of rituals, feeds exponentially from a great range of religious beliefs and 
practices, enabling the seekers to create personal yet somehow supposedly universal 
sensibilities that are marked by spirituality. 
Like all translators (or readers for that matter) Barks is embedded in discourses, 
that govern, structure and mold his work. The underlying ideological framework of his 
translations, I believe, can be discussed by analyzing the unique engagement of these 
discourses that can be gleaned from his translations as well as from the paratextual 
matter. The long history of the perception of Sufism in the Western world as outlined in 
the first two chapters exposes how Sufism came to be understood as an extra-Islamic 
tradition from the Islamic world. Barks’s representation of Rumi in translations as well as 
in interviews, introductions, and prefaces to his books and personal statements inevitably 
engages with this history but additionally implants Rumi within the discourse of post-
institutional “New Age religiosity,” which liberally accommodates diverse religious, 
ethical, spiritual and mystical traditions and, at the same time, by virtue of its inclusivity 
and the potential validity for everyone, claims to be universal. Once a religion or belief 
system enters the realm of this religiosity, it is modified and transformed so as to make it 
more accessible for spiritual seekers who, for the most part, are disillusioned with 
institutional religions. For Rumi to become a part of this tradition he has to be taken out 
                                                
15 Robert Bellah labels the extreme privatization and personalization of religion as “Sheilaism” after a 
respondent he met by the name Sheila who claimed to have her own personal religion (King 1999: 12). 
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of his Islamic context. He had already been de-Islamized to a certain degree but did not 
get into the New Age canon until Coleman Barks’s renditions came to the fore. I contend 
that Barks’s success in making Rumi such a “harmless” mainstream figure partly lies in 
his “Americanization.” Barks has kept up the de-Islamization tradition, but not through 
an appeal to history. He utilizes a form of license endowed by the act of translation, 
through which he produces  “valid poems in American English” (Lewis 2008: 590).16 The 
“Americanization” is not limited to stylistic issues; the “content” is appropriated as well, 
revealing its universal message through de-contextualizing and de-Islamizing the text. 
This method, as can be expected, enhances the role of the translator as a re-enunciator 
and discursive subject in the text. Barks gives a new voice to poems by a historical figure, 
supplements and recreates the originals, intervenes in them, and in so doing, establishes a 
subject-position. 
One of the aims in this chapter is to interrogate Barks’s positionality in relation to 
his translation strategies. Yet I should note at the onset that linguistic analysis is not of 
primary concern here. In this section rather than focusing on issues of fidelity or betrayal 
in the translational process, I examine acts of mediation, representation and the 
discourses with which these refractions engage. One of the main issues regards 
examining what is excluded and hidden in the translational process and, more 
importantly, to what effect. The main questions that will be explored in this part are as 
follows: in what context, how, for whom and with what effect does Barks translate Rumi? 
                                                
16 Because Barks cannot read Persian, he works from “literal, scholarly transcriptions” of the poems, which 
he either receives from his Persian-speaking friend John Moyne, a professor emeritus of linguistics, or from 
scholarly translations such as those of Nicholson and Arberry, who are not given credit on the cover of the 
book. 
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What are the converging points of the New Age Rumi and Barks’s Rumi? To what extent 
do they feed on each other?   
The last chapter of the dissertation deals with the representation of Rumi as an 
exemplary Muslim in Elif Shafak’s best-selling novel The Forty Rules of Love: A Novel 
of Rumi (Aşk [Love] in Turkish; 2009). As mentioned above, Sufism and, in particular 
Rumi, has been positioned vis-à-vis fundamentalist Islam yet I suggest that the 
canonization of Rumi as the exemplary Muslim has been processed through the lens of 
New Age religiosity.  
Shafak’s novel, which she first wrote in English and then edited the Turkish 
translation, interweaves two parallel but historically and geographically remote stories of 
self-realization-via-love. The novel was a huge success in Turkey, re-popularizing not 
only Rumi but also Shams to the point that even though the Forty Rules that gives the 
book its title is a fictional attribution of Shafak to Shams, many people have taken it for 
real and began to quote these rules on social media as if stated by Shams.17 
The importance of the book, in addition to its impact on popular readings of Rumi 
in Turkey,18 lies in its depiction of Rumi as the good Muslim as portrayed by a discourse 
which Barks, among others, contributes. In this chapter, I analyze the congruency of 
Shafak’s portrayal of Sufi way of life, which both Aziz and Rumi as characters in the 
book endeavor to embody, with that of New Age religiosity. I particularly aim to analyze 
                                                
17 A wandering mystic from Tabriz in north-Western Persia. Shams means “sun” in Arabic. His name 
Shams al-Din Tabrizi means “the Sun of Faith/Religion from Tabriz.” What Shams left behind is a body of 
notes taken down by Rumi’s disciples from his lectures. They were never widely disseminated or 
published. Some manuscripts of these discourses of Shams are entitled Kalemat (Sayings) or Ma’aref 
(Gnostic Wisdom) of Shams. By scholarly convention these notes are now generally referred to as the 
Maqalat-e Shams Tabrizi (Discourses of Shams Tabrizi). (Lewis: 135) 
18 As the history of the reception and various representations of Rumi indicate, Rumi and to a lesser degree, 
Shams wer figures already circulating within various discourses but no other literary figure has managed to 
make Rumi in Turkey such a mainstream figure as Shafak did.  
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Shafak’s work as a form of cultural translation. 
 The significance of this study lies in its potential contribution to a hitherto 
neglected aspect of Rumi studies in addition to cultural and translation studies in general. 
A thorough research on the contested field of Rumi, I believe, will cast a light on the 
convoluted mechanism of politics of representation in literature and translation. Some 
remarks are now in order about Sufism, as well as Rumi himself, so as to provide a 
historical context for this discussion.   
 
Sufism 
Jalal al-Din Rumi is widely known as a quintessential Sufi, but due to Sufism’s 
pluralistic, divergent and protean history, the connotations the word “Sufi” prompts differ 
variously across time and cultures. As a term, “Sufism” is coined at the end of the 
eighteenth century, probably as a counterpart of the Arabic term al-tasawwuf, which very 
broadly refers to an experiential exploration of “Truth” (al-Haqq) within Islam, itself 
being a contested field of praxis and belief since the earliest times.19 
Admittedly, Sufism is more than that, but no definition can actually cover the 
exact sense of the term because, as modern studies on Sufism indicate, no single, 
monolithic, homogenous doctrine or philosophy of Sufism exists. Any interpretation of 
tasawwuf is context-bound to the extent that some of them even contradict each other. 
Ahmet Karamustafa argues that despite the increasing imposition of essentialism and 
                                                
19 In his article “Islam: A Civilizational Project in Progress?” (2003), Ahmet Karamustafa underlines that 
inevitable contestedness by suggesting to understand Islam as a civilizational tradition, in which Islam 
emerges as “a dynamic, evolving phenomenon, one that cannot be reified or fixed in any way” (109). For 
further discussion on this issue, see Shahab Ahmed’s What is Islam? The Importance of Being Islamic 
(2015).  
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universalism on mystical and spiritual dimensions of any religion, “the exact content and 
meaning of such dimensions should not be conceived as unchanging essences; instead, 
the mystical and the spiritual need to be discovered, described and analyzed in particular 
contexts” (2007: vii). It is not, however, the intention of this dissertation to provide a 
comprehensive contextualization of the history of Sufism; this job has been performed in 
many superior studies.20  
Sufism, which is traditionally defined as the “mystical dimension of Islam” 
(Schimmel 1977: 1), or “the religious philosophy of Islam” (Nicholson 2009: 1), is 
believed to have emerged from within renunciatory modes of piety (zuhd) that were 
prevalent in Baghdad and Basra in late eighth century onwards.21 In the course of the 
initial phase of the “movement,” the focus of Sufi life was the khanaqah,22 or small 
residential center that evolved around murshids or shaykhs (Sufi masters) who developed 
unique methods of spiritual pedagogy and training.23 During this period with the 
increasing attention given to “the cultivation of the inner life,” there emerged new 
                                                
20 See Ahmet Karamustafa Sufism: The Formative Period (2007), William Chittick Sufism: A Short 
Introduction (2000), A. J. Arberry Sufism: An Account of the Mystics of Islam (1950), Annemarie 
Schimmel’s Mystical Dimensions of Islam (1977), Carl Ernst Words of Ecstasy in Sufism (1985), Hamid 
Algar’s Sufism: Principles and Practice (1998), and The Cambridge Companion to Sufism edited by Llyod 
Ridgeon (2014). 
21 During the first century of Abbasid rule, renunciation was a widespread form of piety in Muslim 
communities. Due to lack of documentation the earliest mystical approaches that appeared in the eighth 
century remain largely obscure but, nonetheless, scholars generally point at Hasan al-Basri (d. 728) and his 
circle as the progenitors of Islamic mysticism due to the stress he made on the notion of ascetic piety 
(zuhd). It is highly improbable to talk about the existence of a unified, coherent movement; renunciants 
(zahid) and pietists (abid, nasik) of this period were believed to be disparate and heterogeneous in nature. 
(Karamustafa 2007: 1).  
22 Known under various names such as khaneqah (among eastern Iranians), zavie (cloister or shrine), rebat 
(mostly in the Arabic speaking world), or takye (a support for the poor, or religious institution; a Persian 
word mostly used however among Turks, where it is pronounced tekke along the Muslim world, the Sufi 
lodge accommodates the sheikh and his family, together with traveling Sufis or disciples. It usually also has 
a library for religious and mystical literature, as well as room(s) for lectures, worship, and devotions (Lewis 
2008: 27). 
23 The roles played by shaykhs within their communities evolved from 'master of instruction' (shaykh al-
ta'lim) to 'master of training' (shaykh al-tarbiya) (Karamustafa 2007: 116).  
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discourses on spiritual states, stages of spiritual development, closeness to God, and 
divine love.24 Many believed that the ultimate goal for a mystic would be the perfect 
tawhid, that is, the existential confession that God is One. In order to attain this 
understanding the adept has to enter the mystical path, that is, the tariqa, which spans 
various mystical stages (ahwal) and spiritual stations (maqam). The adept who truly 
repents upon entry to the path leads through these stations reaching gnosis (ma‘rifa), 
ultimately leading to fana, annihilation in God and the realization that only God truly 
exists. 
The characteristic features of the formative period include fusions, mergers, and 
mainstreaming in which Sufis operated. Initially only a few renunciant mystics were 
known as “Sufis.”25 By the second half of the ninth century, the disparate, heterogeneous 
mystics and the small communities formed around them blended with similar elements of 
religiosity to form a distinct type of piety (Karamustafa 2007: 5). Although the “original” 
Sufis constituted a specific portion of the new synthesis of mysticisms, the members of 
                                                
24 Mojaddedi notes that among the concepts introduced walaya, or “friendship with God,” in particular, 
constitutes the “basis of mysticism in Islamic context” (2012: 5). Also, with what is now called the “inward 
turn,” some prominent renunciants and pietists “began to direct their energies increasingly to the cultivation 
of the inner life” (Karamustafa 2007: 2). This shift led to “a clear emphasis on 'knowledge of the interior' 
('ilm al-batin) acquired through ardent examination and training of the human soul” (Ibid). For instance, 
while the first female mystic Rabi’a (d. 801) brought to the fore the idea of sincere love (muhabba) of God, 
Shaqiq al-Balkhi (d. 810) argued for tawakkul, the mystic state of abandonment into God’s will and is 
believed to have described the various stages of worship. Another significant contribution was made by the 
Egyptian Dhu al-Nun (d. 860) through his conceptualization of ma‘rifa, mystical intuitive knowledge. 
Again the idea of divine light, from which derives the luminous spirit of prophet Muhammad, and the 
virtue of dhikr, that is, the constant recollection of God, were introduced into the Sufi discourse in the ninth 
century.   
25 The etymology of the word “Sufi” itself had been a subject of debate, since, at least, the 10th century. The 
word Sufi was first coined as early as the 8th century to refer to some renunciants and pietists who wore 
wool as opposed to other renunciants and the majority of Muslims who wore linen and cotton. … 
“However, the words zahid, nasik, and 'abide continued to be the primary signifiers of renunciation. 
(Karamustafa 2007: 7) In the eighth century the term Sufi designated several different social types, or, more 
properly, “it was the name of a particular orientation towards piety marked by the socially unconventional, 
and thus remarkable, habit of donning woolen garments”. From the middle of the ninth century, the term 
Sufi came to be used increasingly as a technical term to designate a group of people who belonged to a 
clearly identifiable social movement in Baghdad that was based on a distinct type of piety.  
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this Baghdad-centered movement came to be known as sufis and the new movement itself 
was given the name sufiyya (Ibid).  
Also concurrent with the Baghdad-centered mystical currents, mystics in 
Khurasan (north-eastern Iran) and Central Asia developed their own mystical approaches 
— though not born out of renunciation— among artisan and merchant classes. During the 
tenth century, due to reasons that will not be discussed here, they blended with the 
Baghdad mystics, and in time, like them, they too came to be identified as Sufis (Ibid: 1). 
The third merger occurred by means of a deliberate process of standardization and 
systematization of mystical ideas in tenth and eleventh century. Whether produced by 
scholar-Sufis or traditionalist, a surge of literary production on Sufis and Sufism occurred 
which helped to “draw normative boundaries around 'true Sufism' in order to differentiate 
it from 'fake', 'false', or simply 'misguided' mystical movements” (Ibid). Usually written 
as “accessible introductions,” Mojaddedi argues, such endeavors most of the time stresses 
“Sufism's compatibility with the juridico-theological Islamic system that was 
consolidating its dominance at the time they were written” (2012: 5).26 Just as the merger 
between the mysticisms of Khurasan and Baghdad engendered a new synthesis, the 
                                                
26 One of the misconceptions about Sufism regards the presumed hostility between tariqa and sharia. Anne 
Marie Schimmel in her elaborate explanation puts emphasis on the dependency of tariqa to the sharia, 
which is defined as the main road from which paths branch out (1977: 98). The differentiation results from 
the Sufis’ thirst to go beyond orthodox law and orthopraxy without devalorizing the sharia. They argue to 
interpret not only the content but also the spirit of the Qur’an. Jamal Malik notes that “mysticism can be 
considered as the internal (batin) view of Islam, focused on the latent mystery of the Qur'an. And since the 
experience is acknowledged as an inspiration of divine perspective, Sufis consider the law (shari'a) and the 
path (tariqa) not necessarily as opposites but necessary complementaries” (Malik 2008: 3). Despite the 
respect Sufis displayed towards sharia, some members of the ulama regarded the Sufi way of interpreting 
the Quran and the relationship they were trying to nurture with God unacceptable, if not heretical. The 
disagreements between the ulama and the Sufis lessened significantly around the tenth century. 
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engagement of the ulama with Sufi teachings and practices further elaborated the 
movement.27  
 Lastly, the dissemination of the Sufi mode of piety was further precipitated by the 
confluence of the rise of popular sainthood with Sufi sainthood. Though both concepts of 
sainthood take granted the closeness of the saint (awliya) to God, the popular 
understanding of sainthood mostly focuses on the supposed intermediary function of the 
saint. Furthermore, the saints venerated by the common masses were not necessarily 
identical with the ones deemed awliya by the Sufis (Karamustafa 2007: 131), which led 
to discontent on the part of Sufis and scholars alike. Nonetheless the saint cults flourished 
from the twelfth century onwards regardless of any condemnation (Ibid). 
 During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, more explicitly defined devotional 
paths were developed as "ways" to be followed (Trimingham). First in the form of 
mystical groups (taifa) then in the form of orders (tariqa, pl. turuq) the initially loose 
mystical circles gained distinguishing identities.28 In this phase, the position of the sheikh 
was further refined and his moral authority was further enhanced by means of appealing 
to words attributed to God (hadith qudsi).29 The sheikh regulates all the activities of his 
disciples, paying utmost attention to correct etiquette (adab). The spiritual chain (silsila) 
became a conventional device to affiliate the sheikh to one of the first four caliphs, 
                                                
27 “Marriage of scholarly and mystical modes of piety” was theorized by scholar-Sufis like Qushayri (d. 
1072), Hujwiri (d. ca. 1071), Farmadhi (d. 1055) and Ahmad Ghazali (d. 1123 (Karamustafa 2007: 174). 
Also, as an alternative to the “academically tendered Sufism” another vein of Sufism continued to develop 
within more traditional circles hailed by Sufis such as Makki (d. 996), Abu Mansur (d. 1027) and Ansari (d. 
1089). For further info on this subject, see Karamustafa Sufism: The Formative Period (2007). 
28 Most of the orders are named after their founders (such as Qadiriyya, Naqshbandiyya) but also toponyms 
of connotation (Kubrawiyya, Suhrawardiyya, Chishtiyya, etc.) were deployed as well. 
29 As distinguished from words of the Prophet (hadith nabawi). 
 24 
specifically to Ali.30 Through the deputies and successors (khalifas), as well as the 
followers and students (murids) of the sheikh a continuous uninterrupted chain of 
succession was guaranteed (Malik 2008: 5).  
 Through the orders, Sufism became much more widely known and practiced 
throughout different levels of society. In a few centuries what had started as an urbanite 
ascetic movement among the renunciants and pietists of Iraq evolved into an extremely 
elaborate and sophisticated “way of life.” Through its fusion with various mystical 
currents as well as with what is defined as “orthodox Islam” and with popular religiosity, 
Sufism gradually spread to all social strata, became socially more mainstream and 
acquired widespread popularity. Distinctive rituals of initiation and special practices were 
adopted among different orders that follow distinct lineages. Therefore, by the time of 
Rumi’s birth a visible Sufi identity, demarcated by public appearance, place of residence, 
distinct daily routines and specific rituals had already been delineated (Karamustafa: 
175).  
Rumi 
 Born in Balkh, part of greater Khurasan in today’s Afghanistan, Mevlana Jalal al-
Din Rumi migrated to Konya with his father Baha al-Din Walad who was one of the 
prominent preachers, jurisprudents, and Sufis of the times. In Konya, Baha Walad was 
                                                
30 With the “invention” of the notion of “spiritual lineage”, that is, the idea that those “who studied under a 
particle master shared a common spiritual heritage in the form of the master's unique 'path' or 'method' 
(tariq or tariqa)” were connected with one another, even across time and space, into a far-flung spiritual 
family. Muhammad is actually the first link in the spiritual chain of Sufism, and his ascension through the 
heavens into the divine presence became the prototype of the mystic’s spiritual ascension into the intimate 
presence of God. According to the tradition, esoteric wisdom was transmitted from Muhammad to his 
cousin and son-in-law Ali, the fourth of the righteous caliphs (d. 661). Other members of his family and his 
friends, according to legend, were endowed with mystical insight or pursued mystical practices.  
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appointed by the Seljuk ruler ʿAla ad-Din Kayqubad (r. 1219-36) as teacher and preacher 
to one of the madrasas.31 Soon after Baha Walad’s death, Rumi, who by then gained a 
reputation as an authority in the exoteric sciences, was asked to assume his father’s duties 
as a preacher and jurisprudent.   
Although Mevlana Jalal al-Din Rumi lived the first phase of his life as a respected 
theologian and jurist, he was well versed in the works of eminent Sufis including the 
Persian mystic poets Farid ud-Din Attar (d. 1193) and Sanai (d. 1130) and the great 
theosopher Ibn al-Arabi (d. 1240). He was, in fact, formally trained in Sufism under 
Borhan al-Din Tirmidhi, a high-ranking disciple of Rumi’s father. And yet, his 
supposedly “latent” Sufi inclinations came to the fore after his encounter with the 
profound mystic Shams al-Din Tabrizi. As noted by Chittick, Shams Tabrizi’s influence 
upon Rumi was decisive, for outwardly he was transformed from a sober jurisprudent to 
an intoxicated celebrant of the mysteries of Divine Love (1983: 3). Shams probably 
guided him to the realization of certain stations of perfection to which Rumi had not 
already gained access. 
Rumi was immediately drawn to Shams and welcomed him to his house as his 
master, a surprise to his own students. Despite the accusations of some of the students, 
Rumi considered Shams to be the most complete manifestation of God. Their 
companionship got interrupted after a year and a half when Shams left Konya. Annemarie 
Schimmel argues that this disappearance initiated Rumi’s transformation into a mystical 
                                                
31 As the Mongols advanced Westernwards, Anatolia became an increasingly attractive destination for the 
inhabitants of central parts of the Middle East who wished to flee. A number of important Sufis and 
influential scholars chose this option. The Seljuk sultans welcomed the famous scholars and mystics from 
Turkestan and Iran, fleeing before the Mongol invasion. Thus the Seljuk cities such as Konya, Kayseri, 
Aksaray or Sivas became the centers of mystical thought in the Islamic world.  
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poet. Shams came back after a while due to Rumi’s appeals, but shortly thereafter, he 
once more vanished in 1247, never to be seen again. According to general belief and 
some reports, Shams was murdered by some of the jealous and resented disciples of 
Rumi who feared that their highly respected master was risking his reputation by 
accompanying with someone so unworthy in their eyes. 
Upon the disappearance of Shams, Rumi remained in Konya but discontinued 
teaching or preaching for the general public. He decided to devote his attention to the 
training of Sufi initiates and most important of all expressing his philosophy through 
mystical poetry. Rumi left, in addition to three collections of his talks and letters, two 
extensive compilations of poems, namely the Divan which bears the name of Shams, and 
his masterpiece, the Masnavi, which he completed soon before his death in 1273. The 
multi-layered poems have been read in numerous ways which, partly due to the fact that 
“in all of Rumi’s poetry, […] the outward form is but a veil over the inward meaning” 
(Chittick 1983: 4). 
Shortly after Rumi’s death, his works, especially his Masnavi became known all 
over the Muslim world (Schimmel 1977: 324). Rumi’s heritage was not limited to his 
works though; he also elaborated the Mevlevi sama (literally hearing, listening), which is 
composed of two controversial acts in the eyes of Islam, that is, listening to music and 
dancing.32 It is believed that Rumi recognized sama as one of the most effective means to 
attain mystic ecstasy, when the Sufi gets closest to God.33 
                                                
32 Although the Mevlevi order is the only order in which this whirling movement has been institutionalized, 
the sama has actually been practiced throughout the world of Islam from early times (Schimmel 1977: 
179). 
33 Rumi is intimately involved with sama on a regular basis. Carl Ernst notes that in Rumi’s time their 
gatherings were less structured events, with food and drink served along with the music, and the musicians 
 27 
Soon after his death, Rumi’s son Sultan Walad established the Mevlevi order 
which gained its institutionalized form in the fifteenth century when the tariqas in 
general become highly developed hierarchical associations. The order spread Rumi’s 
word and music through the just-emerging Ottoman Empire. The center of the order was 
always the “Seat of the Pir” in Konya, a central lodge consisting of dervishes’ cells built 
around the mausoleum containing Rumi’s tomb. Soon many smaller tekkes (lodge) were 
established all over the Ottoman lands, including Egypt and Syria. The leader was called 
by the honorific titles Molla Hunkar and Chelebi who, since the fourteenth century, had 
been chosen from Mevlana Rumi’s descendents.   
The Mevlevi order, like other Sufi orders in general, had become a significant 
actor in the social, political and economic networks, specifically after the sixteenth 
century but it was at the same exceptional in certain aspects. Its exceptionality lies in the 
relationship it nurtured with the Ottoman court; several chelebis were given the privilege 
to gird the Sultan with the sword during the coronation ceremony. Numerous studies 
mention that Ottoman sultans such as Selim III (r. 1789-1809) and Abdulaziz (r. 1861-
76), many high-ranking statesmen including viziers and sadrazams such as Fuad Pasha 
(d. 1869) were quite sympathetic towards the order, if not followers of it. Not only the 
statesmen but also many court poets such as Nef'i (d. 1635), and Nabi (d. 1712), 
musicians such as Itri (d. 1712) and Dede Efendi (d. 1897), as well as calligraphers and 
miniaturists were known to be Mevlevis. 
                                                
were professionals rather than dervishes. As the order developed, a formal performance structure 
developed, in which the Persian poetry of Rumi was put to music along with poems in praise of the Prophet 
and Qur’anic recitations. The sama ceremony attained its present form by the seventeenth century (Ernst 
1997: 192). Contrary to today’s perception, however, the Sufi can undertake sama only after he has attained 
a certain state of mystic development following years of spiritual poverty, fasting, retreats and such (Lewis 
2008: 28). 
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The fate of the Mevlevi order, however, would be decided by actors outside its 
ranks. With the nineteenth-century reform movement of the Ottoman Empire, the hitherto 
fiscally and administratively autonomous Sufi orders became, by and large, answerable to 
committees established and controlled by the central government. These committees 
passed regulative ordinances with which Ottoman Sufi orders had to comply, resulting in 
the gradual evaporation of their institutional and economic independence.34 The final 
blow came soon after the establishment of the Republic and the forceful closure of all 
orders, including that of the Mevlevis. 35 After the 1925 Kurdish rebellion led by Sheikh 
Said, it was made clear that in such an age, corrupt, superstitious and truly anti-Islamic 
organizations could not be tolerated.36 Soon the negative image had intensified at an 
                                                
34  One of the factors that prompted the state to regulate the Sufi orders had largely to do with the harsh 
criticisms directed against the Sufi orders not only by the ulama but also by the “modernist” Islamists and 
“positivist” intellectuals who deemed Sufi lodges to be nests of superstition, sloth, corruption and idolatry. 
There have, in fact, always been disagreements, at best, between some Sufi orders and certain segment of 
the ulama largely due to the common misconception regarding Sufis’ attitude toward sharia and orthodoxy 
but the significance of the nineteenth-century attack lies in the fusion of criticisms from these various 
sources. Long story short by the second half of the nineteenth century, it was decided that the Sufi orders 
need to be reformed by means of rational structuring and control. For more info on this issue see Mustafa 
Kara’s Turk Tasavvuf Tarihi Arastirmalari and Brian Silverstein’s Islam and Modernity in Turkey, which 
have provided detailed accounts about the extent of the impact of the reforms on Sufi orders.  
35 The whole premise of the Republican reforms was based on the exclusive power of the state over its 
citizens. Any other source that could potentially challenge the state by creating alternative loyalties was 
discarded. The deep-rooted Sufi orders, however, have been significant actors in the social, political, and 
economic networks at least since the sixteenth century (Ismail Kara 2005: 547). Ataturk himself was well 
aware of the function of Sufi orders and was on quite friendly terms with many Sufi leaders during the War 
of Independence. In 1919 he asked for their support in his venture against the Allied Forces.  In 1919 on his 
way to Ankara he paid a visit to the central lodge of the Bektashis at Hacibektaş in order to seek the support 
of Bektashi sheikhs. In Ankara he visited the tomb of Haci Bayram Veli, another prominent Sufi sheikh 
(Soileau: 245). In another instance he visited the tomb of Mevlana Rumi. Furthermore, there were 
numerous Sufi affiliated representatives such as Mevlevis, Halvetis, Bektashis, and Naqshibandis at the 
first national assembly. However, by 1925 Ataturk not only criticized them for cultivating associations and 
sensibilities that the Republic not only deemed antagonistic to the ideals of “civilization,” progress, and 
science but also considered as rival.  
36 Atatürk, himself, reveals the presumed antagonism between Sufism and progress in his famous Nutuk: 
The object of revolution … is to give the citizens of the Republic a social organization completely modern 
and progressive in every sense. It is imperative for us to discard every thought that does not fall in line with 
this true principle. All absurd superstitions and prejudices must be rooted out of our minds and customs. It 
is shameful for a civilized nation to expect help from the dead. Let the worthy occupants of … tombs rest in 
the happiness which they have found in a religious life. I can never tolerate the existence, in the bosom of a 
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unprecedented level in modern Turkey so much so that Sufism and religious orders 
simply became a target of contemporary Turkish thought (Ismail Kara 2005: 545).37 
Today, while Sufi orders are still technically illegal, most of the restrictions are not 
enforced.  
Even though the Mevlevi order did not remain outside the effect of anti-Sufi 
invectives and the official edicts and laws, in time, thanks to the cultural significance of 
Mevlana, it has come to occupy a somewhat privileged position among Sufi orders and 
enjoyed a few exemptions: in 1927 the tomb of Mevlana in Konya was converted into a 
state-run museum, and in 1954 Mevlevis were permitted to perform once year in Konya 
during the Mevlana festival on December 17, (anniversary of Mevlana’s death). By the 
1970s, because Mevlevis had become mainly tourist attractions and representatives of 
“Muslim yet modern” Turkey, they were permitted to travel to the West. Today, one can 
see whirling dervishes not only in Mevlevi-related occasions but also at shopping centers, 
                                                
civilized Turkish society, of those primitive-minded men who seek material or moral well-being under the 
guidance of a sheikh, possibly blind and hostile to the clear light of modern science and art. Comrades, 
gentlemen, fellow countrymen! You well know that the Republic of Turkey can never be a country of 
dervishes and sheikhs, their disciples [and deranged people]. The only true congregation [order] is that of 
the great international confraternity of civilization. To be a real man it is necessary to do what civilization 
commands. The leaders of the tekkes will comprehend this truth, which will lead them voluntarily to close 
those institutions as having already fulfilled their destiny. (Gettleman & Schaar: 124) 
37 While modernist Islamists opposed Sufi orders for degenerating Islam, non-Islamists focused on the evils 
of Sufism and even mysticism in general, by portraying Sufi lodges as “nests of sloth” responsible for 
keeping the masses ignorant, bigot and indolent. These ideas, however, had already been expressed by the 
same figures even before the War of Independence. The difference between the pre-Republic and post-
Republic defamations regards the conceptualization of Islam. In the pre-Republican ones, modernist 
intellectuals claim that these orders harm first and foremost Islam, which is based on reason and morals. 
Whereas in the Republican era Islam had lost its importance and visibility, and the focus of the vilifications 
shifted towards the incompatibility of the orders with higher “civilization.” Today, the anti-Sufi sentiment 
is still quite alive, specifically among the secularists. In 1996, Necmettin Erbakan's, the Islamist prime 
minister of the period, instigated an uproar among the secularists when he hosted a Ramadan dinner (iftar) 
for the sheikhs of prominent Sufi orders at the official residency of the ministry. That specific dinner was 
later used as evidence of anti-secularist and Islamist agenda of Erbakan's Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) both 
when the coalition government of Erbakan was forced out of power by the Turkish military in 1997 and 
also in the 1998 case at the Constitutional Court of Turkey against Welfare Party that resulted in its ban 
from politics. 
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commercials, and pop-music clips.38 
 Like the order founded after him, Mevlana occupies a unique position in the 
Turkish cultural arena. His representations are inevitably affected by the changing status 
of Sufi orders but this effect is based on a negative differentiation, meaning that even 
though Mevlana was a Sufi and has effectively founded the much-appreciated Mevlevi 
order, he is juxtaposed, throughout modern Turkish cultural history against the vast 
majority of other Sufi figures. In other words, the whole discourse on Mevlana is shaped 
around his exceptionality. 
 Very few cultural figures have enjoyed the attention Mevlana has garnered. Even 
though there is no consensus on the nature of his worth, almost everyone agrees on his 
greatness.  Depending on the lens of the representer he could be hailed as the great 
humanist poet/philosopher who is above and beyond any religion or dogma,39 or the great 
                                                
38 The exceptionality becomes also apparent in semantics: In Turkish, “Sufism” is synonymous with 
tasavvuf, and by definition includes all Sufi tarikats, that is, Sufi orders, but the word “Sufism” in Turkey 
seems to refer, especially in the last 20-30 years, exclusively to the Mevlevi order while tarikat is reserved 
for other orders such as the Nakshibendis. This has to do with the pejorative sense the word tarikat has 
gained in Turkish that can be understood with reference to a specific form of Islamophobia that has existed 
in Turkey almost since the proclamation of the Republic. 
39 Turkish/Anatolian Humanists regarded Mevlana’s “humanism” as the most important characteristic of his 
poetry. They promoted Mevlana’s alleged supra-Islamic message regarding the sacredness of human beings 
and the brotherhood of all people. They were extremely influential in the transformation of Mevlana into an 
almost secular cultural icon. Even though the authority of Anatolian humanists in the state-dominated 
cultural sphere waned with the ascent of Democratic Party in 1950 their cultural legacy is embraced till this 
day. The ascribed humanism (humanizm, humanizma) is significant because it enabled them to analyze 
Rumi's poetry independent from the Islamic and Sufi tradition. In other words, by being identified as 
humanist, he was transplanted into another “interpretive framework” that stands out with its non-religious 
character. I do not mean to suggest that Rumi's poetry does not talk about tolerance, sacredness of human 
beings, peace, love, and brotherhood that are usually associated with humanism. On the contrary, they are 
quite central, specifically the concepts of love and tolerance, but they were employed and interpreted in a 
different framework. Therefore, I agree with Soileau on the ahistorical nature of the imposition to label 
Rumi as humanist which as a concept has organically evolved out of European history.  
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“Turkish”40 sage influential in the Islamization of Anatolian Turks.41 Today's popular 
reading of Mevlana is a medley of diverse readings.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
40 The supposed Turkishness of Rumi still constitutes a topic of debate. In fact, all early Republican 
literature on Mevlana without an exception focused on his ethnicity. Until the early 1990s it had continued 
to be discussed at the national and international Mevlana conferences held in Konya as well as the official 
conferences of the Turkish History Association. It is claimed that by virtue of being from Khorasan, 
Mevlana must be ethnically Turkish, just like Avicenna and Omar Khayyam who simply had to write in 
Persian, the lingua franca of the time. As supporting evidence, they referred to the verses of Mevlana 
which reads “Don’t take me for a stranger; I am from this district / I am searching for my own house in 
your lane. / I am not an enemy, even if I appear like an enemy; / Although I speak Hindi, my origin is 
Turkish.” The extent of Turkification efforts went as far as discussing the ethnicity of Rumi's second wife 
Kera. It is generally accepted that Kera was a Greek orthodox who converted to Islam but in his 
introduction to the translation of Eflaki's Ariflerin Menkibesi Tahsin Yazıcı makes up a Turkish origin 
explanation for her name, suggesting that Kera was not Greek at all. Among the commentators on Mevlana, 
only Asaf Halet Çelebi mentions the futility of discussing the ethnicity of Rumi. 
41 This claim was, in fact, voiced by Atatürk at one of his famed parties when some of the guests attempted 
to hinder the burgeoning carrer of Hasan Ali Yücel, one of the promising young bureaucrats of the time, by  
disclosing the Mevlevi affiliations of Yücel. Atatürk surprised his guests by his positive reaction and 
initiated a “discussion” on Mevlana and the Mevlevis. After stating his appreciation for Mevlana, Atatürk 
asked his guests what “Mevlevilik” (Mevleviyya) was. Egeli notes that while some regarded this question as 
a chance to denounce the recently abolished Sufi orders, some others recounted “weird” (tuhaf) stories and 
anecdotes regarding the Mevlevi order. At last one of the guests said: “Mevlevilik is among the attempts 
that make religion seem ridiculous and degenerate Islam by introducing musical instruments into religious 
practice” (70). Atatürk’s response to this specific comment was much harsher than anyone in that room had 
expected: “You fool! Don't speak about issues that your pitiful mind can't grasp. … To the contrary, 
Mevlana is a great reformer (reformator) who adapted Islam to the Turkish soul. Islam, as a matter of fact, 
is a modern and tolerant religion in the most expansive sense of the word. Arabs understood and practiced 
it according to their own nature. To make ablutions and to pray five times a day is an extremely progressive 
step for Bedouin Arabs (Badiye Araplari) who lived in a hot climate, scarcely found and used water, and 
spend their lives in general inactivity. The religion of Prophet Muhammad is based on prompting people to 
act. … Islam as it was practiced in the desert can be considered too inactive for Turkish people. A religious 
practice limited to ablution and daily prayer (namaz) was too inactive for a Turk who horse-played in the 
mountains, and bathed with melted snow. Mevleviyye is the perfect example of the permeation of Turkish 
tradition into Islam. Mevlana is a great reformer. The idea of getting closer to Allah by whirling on your 
feet is the most natural manifestation of the Turkish genius. On one side you have the accompaniment of 
beautiful music. On the other side beautiful-voiced people sing hymns while beautifully-donned people 
raise their hands to the heavens in an imaginary whirl. ... The aesthetics of this is marvelous.” (70-71). 
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CHAPTER 1 
WESTERN PERCEPTIONS OF SUFISM: THE FOUNDATIONS 
 
Franklin Lewis and Carl Ernst note that until the late eighteenth century, when Sir 
William Jones and his friends opened up an epistemological field of Sufism, few works 
either on Sufism or Rumi existed except for a couple of brief notes now and then in 
various travelogues (Lewis 2008: 499; Ernst 1997: 3). Even though I agree with Lewis 
and Ernst to a certain extent, I believe such cursory notes deserve to be reviewed given 
the weight of influence of these travelogues and proto-ethnographic studies of the East on 
the public as well as on the intellectuals and belletrists of consequent eras. Also, while 
such casual notes about Sufism may seem incidental, a thorough study of them discloses 
the framework in which they all operate.  
The Western encounter with Sufis goes back at least to the fifteenth century. In 
this chapter I analyze the early-modern European representations of the Sufis that one 
would read in travelogues, captivity accounts and proto-Orientalist scholarly studies. 
Even though Sufis never constituted the focus of such accounts, numerous descriptions 
and commentaries on the strange and exotic behavior, charisma, clothing, and 
paraphernalia of the Sufis abound. A close examination of the portrayals in question 
demonstrates their embedment within discourses that were prevalent during that time 
about conceptualization of religion, Christianity, and Islam, as well as offers impressions 
about Middle Eastern culture and peoples. These discourses shape, regulate, and 
constrain the meaning and connotations Sufis have gained in the Western world. The 
chapter demonstrates that the representations were heavily defined by the prevalent idea 
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of religion in Europe at the time as well as the political developments that were also 
interpreted from a theological point of view. 
 The analysis I pursue in his chapter on the early European accounts on Sufis is 
comprised of two parts. The first one concentrates on a constellation of portrayals that 
focus on the deceptiveness of Sufis, which manifests itself in the “evils schemes” they set 
into motion but detected by the perceptive Christian. The second part aims to demonstrate 
the representation of Sufis and Sufism in the early modern Orientalist efforts such as 
D’Herbelot’s Bibliotheque orientale (1697) and Jean Chardin’s travel account. The 
significance of their analysis for the purposes of this study lies in the referential status 
these works enjoyed for a long time.  
 
(i) Early Modern Period: “Angels seem to be” 
“Others with words and pleasing looks 
thou may’st deceive; but me 
 thou shalt not, for I know thee 
a rank Hypocrite to be” 
Thomas Herbert (1667: 331) 
 
In the early modern accounts of various sorts, Sufis – under the appellation of dervishes, 
santons, abdals, and fakirs – are described within a general discourse on Islam – or, as it 
was called then, “Mohammedanism.” The prevalent interpretation of the time, that is, 
dervishes of any kind, no matter how “alluring” or “angelic” they seem, being mere 
hypocrites, is engendered by a context rather than being deduced from original sources. 
Therefore, the approach of the early modern Westerner to the Sufis is a view derivative of 
the general public opinion about Islam.  
 Interaction between Christians and Muslims is as old as Islam itself; both parties 
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have always engaged with the other within certain discourses dictated by their immediate 
socio-historical situation. Christian interest in Islam, which is documented as early as the 
eighth century,42 increased in time, as the existence of Islam had become “the most far-
reaching problem in medieval Christendom” (Southern: 3). Islam was not only 
theologically but was also politically the archenemy of the Christian world largely 
because Europe’s relationship with the Muslim powers in the Middle East was 
fundamentally shaped by the Christian claim to sovereignty over the Holy Land and its 
surroundings that was an essential element of “a Christian eschatological understanding 
of space and time” (Berman: 57).43  
 During the Middle Ages a large number of treatises on Islam were produced both 
by ecclesiastics and laymen whose varied interests shape the content of their works. On 
the one hand, apologists and missionaries such as Abbot Peter of Cluny (d. 1145) and 
Ricoldo da Monte di Croce (d. 1329) informed their rather limited reading public through 
their attacks on the Qur’an so as to refute its doctrinal basis.44 On the other hand, 
pilgrims, crusaders and travelers to the Holy Land and former captives of Muslims 
provided more descriptive accounts usually to embellish their adventures in the Middle 
East with “tales of wonder and disgust” which were already “part of the baggage they 
                                                
42 Among the earliest accounts on Islam the work of St. John of Damascus (d. 749), who claims to provide 
the basic information about Muslims and their faith, had stood out for centuries. St. John’s account, which 
became in time one of the classical sources for Islam, focuses mainly on Mohammad as a prophet; the 
religion of Abraham; the revelations made to Muhammad; the nature of the Qur’an and the content of 
revelation, that is, one God. For further information, see Daniels Chapter 1. 
43 Margaret Hodgen notes that Jerusalem was comprehended for a long time as “the center of the world” 
(68). 
44 During the high Middle Ages not only the first translation of Qur’an (1143) was made upon the request 
of Peter the Venerable, Abbot of Cluny by Robert of Ketton but also scientific and philosophic texts, both 
authentic studies as well as translations of the important works of classical antiquity gradually began to be 
consumed in European intellectual circles. Around 1180, the first corpus of Avicenna’s philosophical 
works was put into circulation in Europe (Rodinson: 16).  
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took with them into the East” (Chew: 542).45 The latter group reached a far wider 
audience than the first group largely because their doctored impressions spread via 
stories, poems, folktales, and sermons, mostly through word-of-mouth.  
 Nonetheless, despite the variety of sources that the overall hostile reaction to 
Islam fed on, eventually there developed a “communal mode of thought” (Daniels: 303) 
which, in due course, created its own canon that served as a data basis for all Europeans 
to “draw their collective perceptions of the ‘other’ and to choose those elements that 
informed his or her personal opinion” (Blanks & Frassetto: 2).46 The power of the 
prejudices embedded in the communal mode of thought was so strong that “the themes of 
hostile mediaeval misinterpretation of Islam,” says Norman Daniels, “were constantly 
reiterated with the total assurance with which one would teach the alphabet or 
multiplication tables, and by major writers using old information, often without direct 
reference to such sources as were available” (307).  
 While the earliest written travel accounts on the Middle East, produced by 
ecclesiastics, focus more on the religious aspect of the journeys, more ethnography-
                                                
45 Ian Netton argues in his study Seek Knowledge that there was “a radical dichotomy between the 
impression of Islam gained by the ignorant layman or lowly crusading soldier and that received by the 
learned clerk, at least the kind of clerk or scholar who revered accuracy and abhorred deception whether of 
the self or others” (4). It might not be, however, accurate to make such a clear-cut distinction between 
travelers and scholars, since there are various travelogues written by scholars.  
46 Norman Daniels notes that in the formative period the Western view of Islam was based on a sound 
knowledge of Islam and the essentials of Islamic belief were known to those scholastic and other educated 
authors who took a serious interest in the subject”; however, the same view remained for the most part 
distorted because of the willingness to “accept a great deal that is now seen, was seen by many then too, to 
be nonsense” (302). Only a reader who was already well informed would have been able to pick out the 
statements that were true. In a similar vein Nina Berman notes “in spite of broad cultural, political, and 
economic exchange and in spite of close contact in Spain and Sicily, knowledge of Islam was rudimentary 
in most areas of Europe” (30). For detailed analysis of European perceptions of Islam, see also David 
Blanks and Michael Frassetto, eds. Western Views of Islam in Medieval and Early Modern Europe (1999) 
and Maxime Rodison Europe and the Mystique of Islam (1987).  
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oriented accounts began to be produced in the late thirteenth century.47 This shift matured 
throughout the fifteenth century due to various factors, which include but are not limited 
to the dissemination of humanist thinking, the “discovery” of hitherto unknown lands, 
evolving missionary activities, the invention of printing, and the increasing power of the 
Ottoman Empire, which conquered the city of Constantinople in 1453.48  
The noticeable inflation in the number of proto-ethnographic texts was not limited 
to those concerning Turks or Muslims. From the sixteenth century onwards, various sorts 
of texts of cultural description, which bore the name “cosmographies” or works “on the 
customs, laws, and rites” of different peoples, proliferated in Europe. The authors of such 
collections drew on a wide range of classical and patristic sources, among which Isidore 
of Seville’s Etymologiae served for a long time as the main model.49 The collection of 
                                                
47 Accounts written by the ecclesiastics usually served as guides for future pilgrims and provide information 
about relics, holy places such as the Holy Sepulcher, etc. For examples of pilgrimage texts see John 
Wilkinson et al. eds. Jerusalem Pilgrimage 1099-1185 (1988). see also Margaret Hodgen, pp. 84-87. These 
texts became more geography-oriented during the Crusades.  
48 It should also be noted that during the fifteenth-century, partly due to the diffusion of humanist thinking 
and rediscovery of ancient texts, the sanctity of political institutions and providential history began to be 
questioned. The shattering of the authority of the Roman Catholic Church was felt in every aspect of life, 
including the conceptualization of the world and history, that got crystallized most clearly in the works of 
Eusibius (275-339) and Saint Augustine (354-430) who interpreted history as the unfolding of God’s will, 
and believed the Christian church to be predestined to triumph over its enemies. As a matter of fact, 
scripture-based explanation for the successive Muslim victories in the Middle East was popularized in the 
late twelfth century by Abbot Joachim of Fiore (d. 1202) who interpreted the rise of Islam as a sign of the 
imminent coming of the Antichrist. Adam Francisco notes that Joachimist tradition of explaining Islam in 
relation to apocalypse was quite influential and “secured itself in the later medieval biblical commentaries, 
particularly in the work of the Franciscan exegetes” (21). Yet, this tradition lost its predominance in the 
sixteenth century as the Apocalypse did not happen, Turks continued to gain lands in Europe, and a more 
secular view of the world, history and politics began to predominate.  
49 In the Etymologiae, Isidore categorized the data available to him: the earth, with its three continents 
(Asia, Europe, and Africa) and islands; cities; public buildings and sacred buildings; information on 
mineral deposits and agriculture; military matters, ships and smaller fabricated objects including 
instruments, tools, and clothing. Isidore’s choice of describing the world in its geographical expanse is said 
to be following pre-established models in the Mediterranean world set by classical authors such as 
Herodotus, Pliny, Solinus, etc. In the following centuries the Franciscan John of Plano Corpini’s Ystoria 
Mongalorum, and Vincent de Beauvais’s Speculum Historiale further developed the genre (Johnson: 21-
23). 
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manners and customs that would set the pattern for early modern ethnographers, 
however, according to Margaret Hodgen, was the German humanist Johann Boemus’s 
(c.1485-1535) pocket-size compilation Omnium Gentium Mores, Leges et Ritus ex Multis 
Clarissimis Rerum Scriptoribus (1520).50  In order to make accessible to the ordinary 
reader an already considerable amount of knowledge garnered during the age of 
exploration and inform his readers concerning the laws and governments of other nations, 
Boemus arranged a vast body of knowledge “on a broad geographical plan, with the 
geographical features subordinated to the ethnological” (Hodgen: 131). The resulting 
study of Boemus displays the major constituents of “culture” as conceived in early 
modern Europe. Boemus’ categorization “with the clear intention of isolating the major 
social institutions for inspection, and with some degree of orderliness,” placed special 
emphasis on “divergences in marriage and the family, divergences in social organization, 
in religions, funeral rites, weapons, warfare, justice, diet and apparel” (138).  
The effect of this study is indisputable; any given travelogue written after Boemus 
is arranged in a manner so similar to it that usually the order of the categories follow the 
same structure. This specific compilation also inspired another influential genre that was 
revived in early modern Europe, namely, cosmography. Specifically, Sebastian 
Muenster's Cosmographia: beschreibung aller lander (1544) set the structure for future 
cosmographers who incorporated sometimes detailed yet erroneous ethnological 
information into the history-meets-geography type studies.  
                                                
50 The book proved to be a huge success by Renaissance standards. Following the 1536 revised and 
expanded Latin edition, at least 23 other re-issues in five languages – nine in Latin, five in Italian, four in 
French, three or four in English, and one in Spanish- were published in less than a century (Hodgen: 132).  
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I will not get into the details of the development of these genres; Margaret 
Hodgen’s meticulous study on the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century “anthropological” 
texts, Joan-Pau Rubiés’s Travellers and Cosmographers (2007), and Carina Johnson’s 
brief yet insightful analysis in the first chapter of her Cultural Hierarchy in Sixteenth-
Century Europe (2011), among others, expound on the evolution of such proto-
ethnographic studies. The sections allocated to religion in such cosmographies and 
compilations of manners are of interest to us in this chapter and suffice it say that specific 
developments having occurred in the intellectual realm possibly had an effect on the 
presentation of religion in accounts dealing with the Muslim orient.  
One such development is the humanist thinkers’ revaluation of Aristotelian and 
Ciceronian preference of practice over doctrine and faith in their discussions on religion. 
Carina Johnson notes that while texts like Speculum Historiale marked out doctrinal 
divergences as error, Aristotle, who argued that civilized states must contain a degree of 
organization in religious practice and institutionalized structure, did not show interest in 
the details of doctrines and religious faith (23). In a similar vein, Cicero put emphasis on 
the practice of worship rather than adherence to particular beliefs in De natura deorum 
and De officiis (Johnson: 24). The Renaissance reverence for Aristotle and Cicero 
inevitably revealed itself in cultural descriptions. As a corollary effect of the novel 
appreciation of ethnography, discussion of religion in travel narratives began to allocate 
more space for practices, which were presented next to other aspects of culture, such as 
trade, governance, family, and costumes (Johnson: 23).   
Alongside such transformations within the intellectual realm of Europe, the 
political reconfigurations on the eastern borders of Latin Christendom required the 
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immediate attention of Europeans. The Westward expansion of the Turks, particularly the 
conquest of Constantinople in 1453 that terminated the Byzantine (Eastern Roman) 
Empire, inevitably drew Europeans’ attention to Turks – and to a certain extent to 
Persians, albeit as potential allies. As a consequence, treatises and accounts, both 
theological and ethnographic, mostly about Turks, began to be produced  
These works, reflecting the confusion on the part of Europeans, hardly present a 
coherent picture. On the one hand Turks, just like Persians and Arabs, inherited “the 
traditional disparaging Christian tropes regarding Islamic culture” (Kaiser: 8) and were 
generally known as superstitious barbarians, or simply “the terror of the world.” On the 
other hand, from the fifteenth century onwards, praises of positive traits such as frugality, 
humanity, sobriety, cleanliness, hospitability, and, most important of all, stable social 
order began to appear especially in the first-hand reports of various sorts, usually from 
German-speaking countries.51 In time, it had almost become a tendency to present more 
“objective” descriptions as the need to explicate the current prosperity of the Ottoman 
Empire and the increasing number of Christian conversion to Islam.  
This confusion, I think, can be explained with reference to contemporary situation 
of Europe. While the superiority of Christianity over Islam along with the communal 
mode of thought mentioned above regarding the falseness and veraciousness of Muslims 
were taken for granted, the political stability and the military supremacy of the Ottomans 
as opposed to the conflict-ridden European countries of the time were viewed with 
                                                
51 For studies on the image of the Turk see Robert Schwoebel The shadow of the crescent: The Renaissance 
image of the Turk (1453-1517); Aslı Cırakman From “The Terror of the World” to the “Sick Man of 
Europe”; Nina Berman German Literature on the Middle East; Orhan Burian’s “Interest of the English in 
Turkey as Reflected in English Literature of the Renaissance”; Iver B. Neumann “Making Europe: The 
Turkish Other” in Uses of the Other: The "East" in European Identity Formation; C. D. Rouillard The Turk 
in French History, Thought and Literature (1520-1660); 
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admiration. The most transparent crystallization of this confusion is evident in the 
accounts written by German-speaking people who vocalized, as pointed out by Nina 
Berman, “a host of attitudes about the Ottomans ... on a spectrum as ranging from 
‘Turkenfurcht’ (i.e. Turkish fear) to ‘Turkenhoffnung’ (Turkish hope)” (71). Even Martin 
Luther touches upon the “Turkish hope” in his “Vom Kriege wider die Türken” (1529); 
Luther acknowledges that there exist those who "actually want the Turk to come and rule 
because they think our German people are wild and uncivilized - indeed that they are 
half-devil and half-man" (1915: 75). 
Furthermore, the theological strife dividing the Christian world complicated the 
nature of interaction with the Muslims. Having found a common ground against their 
great enemy, Protestants and the Ottomans sought various forms of cooperation and 
rapprochement, which in turn is registered as an ambivalent approach to the Ottomans 
during this period. Daniel Goffman argues that the equivocality is somewhat visible in 
Luther’s "On War Against the Turk" (110). On the one hand, Luther believed that "the 
Turk … is the servant of the devil, who not only devastates land and people with the 
sword … but lays waste the Christian faith and our dear Lord Jesus Christ." (1915: 75). 
On the other hand, he never labels the Ottoman sultan an Antichrist, as he does the Pope, 
or Turks as devils incarnate, as he does Jews. In his appraisal of Islam Luther also 
underlines the similarities in the rejection of idols between Islam and Protestantism  
No single monolithic European perception prevailed in those accounts. Depending 
on the country, story and the profession of the author, the content and the tone of the 
accounts in question display considerable divergences. The variations in perceptions and 
attitudes, first of all, owe to the differences in the intensity and form of engagement 
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among European countries; the Venetians, Hungarians and Austrians got to know 
Ottomans on a more personal level, either through trade or war, but the English52 and 
French were bound to the information provided by the aforementioned countries into the 
“barbarian Turk” – usually used interchangeably with Muslim – stereotype of the 
period.53 Only by the second half of the sixteenth century accounts of Turks began to be 
produced first in France then in England. Specifically, the battle of Mohacs in 1528 and 
the first siege of Vienna in 1529 aroused a new wave of European interest to which 
increased number of travelogues attest but it was for the most part the diplomatic envoy 
sent to Constantinople in 1536 by François I and the establishment of the Levant 
Company in 1581 that induced the production of English and French accounts about the 
Turks.  
 With regard to Persian speaking lands, as observed by various scholars, there is 
no significant work until the late-fifteenth century when Europe recognized the “value” 
of Persianate kingdoms, namely the Aq Qoyunlu (1378 to 1508) and the Safavids (1501 
to 1722), as crucial allies against the threat imposed by Turks.54 The first initiative to 
form alliance with the Persians was carried out by Venetians after it became clear that the 
holy alliance among the Christian states of the period would not be secured. Following 
                                                
52 As noted by Samuel Chew, because of the remoteness of the Ottoman threat there was no such immense 
body of historical and propagandist literature on the subject as we find in “Germany” (104). By that time, 
England’s policy was to stand aloof so far as possible from the struggle with Muslims. Moreover, between 
1566 and 1581 the trade through Russia into Persia, despite all the dangers it presented, was on the whole 
more profitable than a Turkish route (Chew: 151). 
53 The prevalence of Latin as lingua franca set aside, translation activities facilitated the circulation of ideas 
and images. Nina Berman points out “translations, often word for word, were common and document the 
high degree to which Europeans shared this textual archive across linguistic boundaries” (78). 
54 There were couple of missionary accounts (e.g. Guillaume de Rubrouck’s report of his visit to the 
Mongols in 1253) but in general there was a general neglect of Persia on the part of Europeans. It is even 
noted by S. Chew that until the second half of the sixteenth century no Englishman had ever visited Persia 
(205). 
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the fall of Constantinople, Venice sent two separate envoys to the court of Uzun Hasan, 
the chief/king of the Aqqoyunlu that was established in eastern Anatolia and Persia, so as 
to induce Uzun Hasan to take up arms against the Ottomans.55 In the early sixteenth 
century, when a new dynasty, the Safavids, in Persia proclaimed its sovereignty, most 
European countries sought alliance either for trade purposes (e.g. Portugal and England) 
or for military purposes in order to relieve Ottoman threat in Europe (the Habsburgs and 
Venetians). In addition to the “secular” envoys sent over to Persia, Catholic missionaries 
began to show interest in the peoples of this region as potential converts. One of the 
outcomes of these developments is the increasing number of accounts of Persia.  
 In the traveler accounts of the Ottoman and the Persian lands, which aimed to 
enlighten and warn people, mostly about Turks, we come across the depictions of various 
dervishes that were found throughout the Ottoman Empire and Persia in the early modern 
period. The novel interest of the travelers in “practical” aspects of Islam, I think, supports 
Carina Johnson’s point on the Aristotelian influence in discussions of religion in cultural 
depictions of this period, that is, the shift of focus from doctrines to practices. Unlike 
medieval texts on Islam which aim to refute Islam on a doctrinal basis, the new type of 
accounts intend for the same result through “authentic” depictions of the practices of 
Muslims that include “places of worship, priests, and rites and ceremonies”. In fact, as 
Johnson notes, the word used for these chapters, that is, “religio,” indicates the prevalent 
distinction of the time from fides or doctrina (29).  
 Because dervishes belong to the realm of religio, they were usually either briefly 
                                                
55 The first ambassador M. Caterino Zeno succeeded in his mission but Uzun Hasan was defeated by 
Mehmet II in 1473 and could not receive the support he asked for, again via M. Caterino Zeno, from 
Christian princes. Giosafat Barbaro (1471-1487) and Ambrogio Contarini (1473) succeeded Zeno but could 
not convince the Aqqoyunlu ruler. 
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mentioned in memoir-style accounts as sort of Muslim equivalents of Christian monks 
who were given to superstition and were deemed to be holy/sacred by the masses (e.g. 
Giosafat Barbaro’s travel account (1487), Ogier Ghiselin Busbecq’s Itinera 
Constantinopolitanum et Amasianum [known as Turkish Letters] (1581)) or were 
discussed in more descriptive works, occasionally in a separate chapter, yet attention 
diverted to their eccentric looks, paraphernalia and the distinctive rites and customs (e.g. 
Giovanantonia Menavino’s Trattato de costumi et vita de Turchi (1548), Guillaume 
Postel’s Des Histoires Orientales (1560;1575), Bartholomeus Georgievic’s De Turcarum 
ritu et caeremonlis (1544)). Notwithstanding the differences in the depictions, either way 
the dervish in question is presumed to be an impostor who undeservedly receives the 
respect of the “ignorant folk.”  
 The consistent depiction of various sorts of dervishes as impostors and frauds, I 
would argue, stem from the above-mentioned communal mode of thought, which 
imagined Prophet Muhammad as “the son of Satan” who was able to attract followers by 
means of black magic and demonic miracles.56 The efforts of the early modern writers to 
explicate the allure of dervishes in demonical terms should be considered in view of the 
Christian apprehension of the time regarding the seductive force of Islam for Christians 
living under the Ottoman rule. The religious challenge posed specifically by the Muslim 
Turks, along with the ongoing military threat, constituted one of the issues troubling early 
modern Europeans and the answer provided by first-hand observers utilizes the same-old 
trope about the demonic powers and superstitiousness of Mohammad and his followers.57  
                                                
56 For detailed information on the Christian perception of prophet Muhammad see Norman Daniels’s Islam 
and the West and John Tolan’s Saracens: Islam in the Medieval European Imagination. It should be noted 
that this trope continued to be effective well into the nineteenth-century.  
57 Martin Luther was among the important figures addressing this issue in their writings. 
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Nicolas de Nicolay (1517–1583), for instance, whose representation “dwells on the theme 
of sexual depravation” (Keller: 27), starts his chapter “des quatre religions des turcs,” 
with a claim of revealing the “evidente hypocrisie et damnable superstition” of “des 
religions, ermites et pelerins, turcs et maures mahometistes” through descriptions of the 
mendicant dervishes of the period.58 
 Another diplomatic traveler to the Levant, Ogier Ghiselin Busbecq (d. 1592), 
unlike de Nicolay, did not provide a systematic catalogue of religious orders and 
personalities, yet found the “Turkish beggars” and “wandering monks” interesting 
enough to mention in his letters. On his way to Amasya the envoy he joined stopped at a 
Tekye, i.e. dervish lodge (“a famous establishment of Turkish monks, whom they call 
Dervishes” (192754) where he learnt that a saint these dervishes highly revere named 
Chederle (read Hidrellez) was in fact identical with St. George, “to whom they ascribed 
the same achievements” (55). Yet, apparently unlike Christians, the dervishes ascribed 
“laughable” tales and “ridiculous” past to this saint. Busbecq took notice of the 
appearances of dervishes as well. In his discourse on the superstitiousness of Turks he 
mentions another “Turkish wanderer and monk” (208) he encountered at some point in 
his journey. While this certain dervish arouses the respect of the beholder with his 
appearance, that is, “a white cloak reaching to his feet” complemented with “long hair, 
much as our painters depict the Apostles,” Busbecq was vigilant and evidently “rational” 
enough to realize that ‘the heart of an impostor was hidden under this respectable 
exterior’ (208). Again, he notes that “the Turks respected him as a famous worker of 
                                                
58 “Si la croyance et la foi des religions, ermites et pelerins, turcs et maures mahometistes aussi bonne, 
sainte et veritable comme elle est en fausse appearance, coloree de evidente hypocrisie et damnable 
superstition” (187). 
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miracles” (209) even though the impostor’s fraud was revealed when he burned himself 
while trying to show that his body was not affected by the pain incurred by fire. 
 In more systematic accounts, more detailed descriptions of dervishes were 
provided, usually preceded by explanations about the basic tenets of Islam such as the 
kelime-i shahadat (the Islamic creed), certain rituals such as circumcision, marriage and 
fasting as well as elucidations on the different functions of the main religious officials. 
The comprehensiveness of these accounts notwithstanding, it can be confidently asserted 
that more or less the same image was conveyed in these accounts, partly due to the 
unchecked transmission of knowledge,59 and partly due to the unusual appearances of the 
depicted dervishes (usually Qalandars, Jamis and Abdals), who, by the way, attracted the 
attention of not only the Western travelers but also Muslim scholars and travelers as 
well.60  
 At this point we should open a parenthesis and insert a little historical information 
about these deviant dervishes. Ahmet Karamustafa notes that the mendicant dervishes 
that emerged concurrently in Afghanistan, Syria, and Asia Minor “represent a kind of 
renunciation that emerged and spread in Islamdom during the Later Middle Period (ca. 
1200-1500)” (1994: 2). According to Karamustafa, the emphasis of this new movement, 
which was in no way homogenous, on “deliberate and blatant social deviance” (Ibid: 3) 
gives an account for various dervishes’ adoption of “anarchist and antinomian practices 
as nudity or improper clothing, shaving all bodily and facial hair, and use of 
                                                
59 Adam Olearius, a seventeenth-century German scholar, criticizes contemporary geographers for copying 
from one another in the oft-quoted remark “errante uno, errant omnes”. In fact, some of the accounts I have 
examined translated or copied previous accounts word-by-word and presented as their own observations.  
60 For a brief analysis of the historiography on deviant dervishes see the Introduction of Ahmet T. 
Karamustafa’s God’s Unruly Friends (1994).  
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hallucinogens and intoxicants as the only real methods of renunciation” (Ibid: 2-3). 
 Understandably enough, such deviant acts and living conditions of the mendicant 
dervishes attracted the attention of travelers, most of whom reduced the Sufi orders of the 
period, some of which, as matter of fact, condemn the practices of the deviant dervishes, 
to these four groups. Georgius de Hungaria and Giosafat Barbaro61 in the late fifteenth 
century, Bortholomaeus Georgevic62, Giovanantonia Menavino63, Guillaume Postel64 and 
Nicolas de Nicolay65 in the sixteenth century provided similar descriptions of such 
dervishes for their audience, who were ready to incorporate the new “exotic” image into 
the stock of Oriental eccentricities.  
 Among many noteworthy points regarding the depictions, the use of the word 
                                                
61 Venetian ambassador to the Aqqoyunlu ruler Uzun Hasan (1471-1487). On his way to Uzun Hasan’s 
court he encountered couple of mendicant dervishes. See Travels to Tana and Persia, Part 1, pp. 47, 48-9, 
96-97. It is noteworthy that he calls “suffi” one of the dervish groups he met in Adana.  (p. 47)  
62 A captive to the Turks for thirteen years between 1526 and 1535. Published five works based on his 
observations: De Turcarum ritu et caeremonlis (1544), which provides information about the religion, 
customs and the army of Turks; De affectione tam captivorum quam etiam sub Turcae tributo viventum 
christianorum (1544) on the plight of Christians captivated by Turks; Exhortatio contra Turcas (1544) 
which calls for arms against Turks; Prognoma sive praesagium Mehemetanorum (1545); Pro fide 
christiana cum Turca disputationis habitae (1547). See Melek Aksulu, Mohac Esiri Bortholomaeus 
Georgievic (1505-1566) ve Turklerle Ilgili Yazilari (1998).  
63 A Genoese captive who served as a palace official in Constantinople for several years until his escape in 
1513. His account Trattato de costumi de Turchi had remained one of the main sources on Turkish customs 
and rites for early modern Western readers.  
64 French linguist, cabbalist, astronomer and religious universalist. In 1536 he was appointed by Francois I 
as the official interpreter of the French embassy of Jean de la Foret to Istanbul to negotiate an alliance 
against the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V. Upon his travel he penned De la Republique des Turcs but 
changed the name of the book in the second edition in 1575 to Des Histoires Orientales ... In the seventh 
chapter of the second book entitled “Des diverses religions” he briefly talks about some dervish groups: “Il 
y a là un très grand nombre de caymans qui ont quatre noms et appartiennent à quatre sectes: les 
derviches, les seichlar, les torlaqui, les calender, qui ...” (148-9). See Jacques Rollet’s 1999 edition of the 
1575 edition.  
65 The French royal geographer and spy, who wrote a book about his stay in Constantinople that he visited 
in 1551 as part of Henry II of France's embassy to the sultan. Unlike its predecessors, the written text of Les 
quatre premiers livres de navigations et peregrinations orientales (Lyon; 1567) was accompanied with 
engravings (60 in total) by Louis Danet that were based on Nicolay’s original in situ drawings. The 
engravings formed the stock images of Turks in the Western imagination for many years and its impact on 
the European popular imagination and aesthetic conceptions of Islam is deemed indisputable (Brafman: 
154). Nicolay’s account was most recently published as Dans l'empire de Soliman le Magnifique by 
Stephane Yarasimos (1989). 
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“dervish” - though in various spellings - should be underlined because of the confusion it 
carries along. None of the earlier accounts address Sufism, either as a movement or as a 
system, and in most of them the word dervish is reserved for a specific deviant group 
without being acknowledged the disputed position of such groups within Sufism in 
general.66 Dervishes as a subgroup appear in the detailed descriptions of Giovanantonia 
Menavino and those who liberally cite him, Nicolas de Nicolay and the anonymous 
author of Viaje de Turquia (1557), to name a few. They focus on the unusual appearances 
and unorthodox ways of behavior of four main dervish groups, namely, torlaks, deruis, 
giomailer, and calenders that, according to Ahmet Karamustafa, refer respectively to 
qalandars, abdals, and jamis. Still some others such as Bartholomaeus who calls 
“deruisler” [i.e. dervishes] monks and briefly described three main dervish groups in De 
Turcarum ritu et caeremonlis (1544), use the term to refer to all sorts of dervishes.  
 With regard to the present subject, the specificities of the usages of the term 
dervish require such attention because of the gradual semantic narrowing of the term to 
denote the mevlevis, i.e. the whirling dervishes. Hence the semantic field of the term, 
together with being an impostor and hypocrite, was directly transferred to that of the 
Mevlevis. For example the French traveler Jean de Thévenot (1633-1667) concludes his 
seemingly positive description of Mevlevi dervishes with the same old image, that is, 
                                                
66 By early sixteenth-century the word “sufi” – in various spellings, again – began to be used albeit to refer 
to the Shah of the Safavid dynasty. Although the Safavid family initially emerged as a Sufi order the rulers 
never used the title “Sufi”. The misnomenclature probably arose from the Persian pronunciation of the 
Safavid, that is, Ṣafawīyān, which can be read as “Sufuyan” as well. According to Margaret Meserve, 
Marino Sanudo first used the word in 1502 to refer to Shah Ismail (2008: 232). By mid-sixteenth century 
the title became so standard that even Queen Elizabeth addressed Shah Tahmasb as “the Great Sophie” in a 
letter dated 1562. In time, couple of travelers and scholars attempted to clarify the misunderstanding. 
Anthony Jenkinson, for instance, who headed the 1562 English delegation to Persia, states in his account of 
the journey that the Shah himself would not approve such addressing due to the, again wrongfully assumed, 
meaning of the word sophy/sufi in Persian, that is, “beggar” (1886: 432).  
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dervishes being mere hypocrites.67 
 Despite the increasing number of references to dervishes, Mevlevis remained 
quite absent in early modern texts. The main reason of this absence, of course, has to do 
with the relative absence of the Mevlevis in Istanbul. The first Mevlevi lodge in Istanbul, 
Galata Mevlevihanesi, was founded in 1491, but it soon turned into a Halveti lodge to be 
transformed back into a Mevlevi lodge only in the 1640s. In the sixteenth century, 
Istanbul Mevlevis had not yet assumed the visibility they would gain in the seventeenth 
century. With regard to the Mevlevis living outside Istanbul, it might be conjectured that 
they did not attract the attention of travelers probably because they were not among the 
wandering dervishes. But nonetheless a fifteenth-century account written by a former 
captive, who resided out of Istanbul, constitutes an exception with the detailed 
description of a – probably Mevlevi – sema’ ceremony it provides.  
    The work of Georgius de Hungaria68 (c. 1422-1502) stands out not only on 
account of providing the first known European depiction of Mevlevis, but also due to the 
popularity it gained.69 Tractatus de moribus, condictionibus et nequicia Turcorum,70 
published anonymously in 1481, is deemed to be “one of the most important if not the 
most important source for the Lebensverhältnisse in the Ottoman Empire in the fifteenth 
century” (Francisco: 25). The account is also significant for its effect on Desiderius 
                                                
67 See below. 
68 Georgius fell captive to the Turks in 1438 and managed to escape after eight unsuccessful attempts in 
1458. 
69 Albrecht Classen points that seven manuscripts from ca. 1481/82 up to the early sixteenth century, twelve 
imprints from 1481 to 1550, eleven German translations from 1482/83 to 1531 as well as the wide 
dissemination of this narrative through secondary sources indicate the book’s popularity (258).  
70 Critical edition of the treatise together with a German translation was published by Reinhard Klockow. 
For further analysis of the treatise see Albrecht Classen, “The World of the Turks Described by an Eye-
Witness: Georgius de Hungaria’s Dialectical Discourse on the Foreign World of the Ottoman Empire” 
(2003) and Adam Francisco’s Chapter I of Martin Luther and Islam (2007).  
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Erasmus, and Martin Luther’s perceptions of Islam. The latter wrote a forward for the 
1530 Latin edition and considered Georgius’s account as the best description of Ottoman 
religion and culture and deployed Georigius’s argument regarding the reasons behind 
Christians converting to Islam in his criticism of the Church (Francisco: 1).  
 Georgius is no different from his contemporaries in the sense that his account 
betrays his amazement at the administrative structure of the Ottoman Empire, and Turks’ 
respect for their religion, but at the same time exudes his hostility towards Islam and 
Turks. Through his personal experience, which made him “an extraordinary authority on 
the enemy’s culture” (Classen: 265), he explicates why Islam emerges as a seductive 
force for Christians living under the Ottoman rule, hence addresses one of the issues 
troubling Europeans at the time.71   
 Although Georgius is convinced of a Joachimist explanation of the existence as 
well as the victories of Turks,72 he was nonetheless concerned about the increasing 
number of Christian converts to Islam. In his lengthy analysis, he suggests the military 
success of the Turks as divine approval of their religion, the contrast between the 
Ottoman and Christian culture “which made the decaying corpus Christianum with all its 
political corruption and clerical abuses seem completely disgraceful”, and “the 
sophisticated simplicity of Ottoman culture” of which he cited numerous examples, as the 
possible causes for Christian conversion to Islam. (Francisco: 27) 
                                                
71 Similar to other captivity narratives Georgius’s account also reflects the fear of “turning Turke”, which 
“means either deteriorating in character from a supposedly Christian moral rectitude, or being forcibly 
converted to Islam, as was the common fate of European captives of the Ottomans” (Kamps & Singh: 4). 
Therefore, the whole account can be read as his justification of his years in Muslim lands. 
72 Georgius put an excerpt of Joachim of Fiore’s Exposition in Apocalypsim as an appendix and “explained 
the apocalyptic nature the [Muslim] threat, ‘what has made this sect so great is evident in the image of 
Apocalypse 13’. The beast with two horns like a ram but speaking like a dragon (13:11), he suggested, was 
the Turkish Empire, and its religion was the ecclesie Antichristie, which, working alongside its political 
machinery, sought the damnation of all men” (Francisco: 26). 
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 Apparently Georgius himself was impressed with the above-mentioned aspects of 
the Ottomans because at some point in his captivity – probably within the despair he felt 
upon the futility of his escape attempts – he doubted his faith in Christianity and started 
learning the rituals of Islam (incepi addiscere orationes et ceremonias eorum) to the 
point of participating in dervish ceremonies, which he explains in detail (301). In the 
chapter “On the supernatural and religious reasons” (De motiuis supernaturalibus et 
religiosis) he expounds on the alluring yet “diabolical illusions” of Islam, one of which 
happens to be the supernatural powers of the “perfidious Turks” (272).73 The dervish 
orders he provided descriptions for are those that belong to the above-mentioned 
renunciatory movement. Georgius contends that it is the supernatural powers of these 
dervishes that constitute an appeal for Christians but his restored faith in Christianity, 
Georgius argues, is the proof of the erroneous nature of Islam and its followers.74  
According to Georgius’s interpretation, depending on the specific nature of their 
external appearance, a special demonic power is immanent in these dervishes, some of 
whom wear no clothes on their back, but run around naked and some others show great 
strength in fasting (Ibid).75 Georgius explicitly avows his admiration for the 
“supernaturalibus” deeds of these figures and adds there is no one among them who does 
not have any kind of spiritual experiences (experientie spirtualis). He also notes that 
these men belonging to the Orders are called “deruischler” [i.e. dervishes] (275).  
                                                
73 Here Georgius specifically refers to the dervishes of various kinds.  
74 After about six months, his faith in Christianity was restored as he recognized the “demonic” aspect in 
the allure of Islam. 
75 Another point Georgius explicates in relation to the external appearances of dervishes is on how to 
differentiate different orders by their dresses (275).  
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 While explaining the dervish way of life he mentions “tekye” (i.e. hospice) as 
their houses (domus) and also relates a specific festivity that included czamach [sic. 
sama] which is identified as the Mevlevi sama by Franklin Lewis (2008: 500) and 
Reinhard Klockow (Georgius: 279, note 113) even though Georgius does not identify 
Rumi or the Mevlevis by name.76 Another interesting point that actually reinforces the 
argument for the Mevlevi sama is the description of a feature of this specific celebration. 
Georgius notes that these “dancing” dervishes also recite “poems that are handed down to 
them from their predecessors ... in a state of rapture or ecstasy under inspiration (in raptu 
uel in extasi erant, in spiritu locuti sunt)” (281).77 These poems, according to Georgius, 
are eloquent, written in rhyme, and easy to remember (qui suauis sunt facundie et 
rigmatice prolati et faciliter mente retinentur). Their length varies according to the 
subject they treat and they give the ceremonies and rites a spiritual sense (et trahunt 
omnes ceremonias legis Turcorum et ritus ad sensum spiritualem) (281). Georgius 
confesses to have either written or memorized a large number of these poems, which he 
enjoys reading. Yet what is interesting is that he believes these poems tend to confirm 
Christianity rather than the “religion of the Turks” (eo quod magis Christianam 
religionem confirmant quam Turcorum).  
Not only the poems recited during the sama but also the form of the ceremony, 
that is “dancing,” did not lose its appeal for Georgius even after his soul was saved. 
                                                
76 Sama in the form of whirling was not peculiar to the Mevlevis, hence Georgius’ description of the sama 
could as well be referring to another Sufi order: “who sway their entire body in a regular and well-
measured manner, with a decorous, dignified, and very chaste movement of their limbs, matching the 
rhythmic modulations of the musical instruments, creating finally a whirl of dizzying velocity, a rotation 
and revolution, in which the power of these performances consist” (trans. by  Lewis 2008: 500) 
77 The two poems he attached to the end of the text actually belong to Yunus Emre, a Sufi contemporary of 
Rumi’s. However, it was plausible for Mevlevis to recite poems of Yunus Emre as well.  
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Georgius himself was lured by this specific demonstration of ecstatic rapture like 
everyone else: inter ceteros actus sue ostensionis nullus est tam prouocatiuus deuotionis 
seu feruoris sicut ipse ludus eorum supradictus (282). Yet he finds nothing contradictory 
in this dance to Christianity because, Georgius argues, even the holy prophets in ancient 
times performed such dances at their religious ceremonies.78 Such an early Christian 
attribution to elements of Sufism is quite noteworthy, for in the preceding centuries it 
would become one of the main arguments regarding the origin of Sufism. However, at 
this stage Georgius does not suggest such an ascription.   
In the following passages Georgius recounts a few sudden ecstatic dances he 
witnessed at the house where he lived. He was enticed not only by the spiritual 
experience of these dances, but also the dervishes themselves who “are so exemplary in 
all their words and actions, and also place in behavior and appearance of such a devotion 
during the day that they not men but angels seem to be” (non homines, sed angeli 
videntur esse) (282). Georgius says it is quite possible to recognize the spirituality on 
their faces even if one had never seen one before.79  
But the angelic feature, as it would turn into a trope, is to remain just on the 
outside; it has nothing to do with the true inner self, which in the case of dervishes, is 
claimed to have been possessed by the devil.80 Warned by St. Augustine in the nineteenth 
chapter of the twentieth book on the theocracy, Georgius contends that these dervishes 
were able to perform miraculous feats such as remaining unaffected by the cold (274) or 
                                                
78 “Nam et sancti prophete antiquitus huiusmodi ludis utebantur in suis festiuis officiis, sicut habetur de 
Dauid, quod ludebat ante archam domini, et de multis aliis veteris testamenti” (282). 
79 “Nam in facie eorum quandam spiritualis representationis notam habent, vt, si nunquam amplius vidisses 
eum, quod solius uultus intuitione eum statim cognoscere posses” (284).  
80 “Nam tanta est potentia diaboli in eis, ut uideantur potius diaboli incarnati quam homines” (272). 
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ruining the house of a person simply through cursing (284) only by strength given from 
the Devil. In short, as the examples he has given demonstrate, dervishes, Georgius 
concludes, are angels of Satan transformed into angels of light (“angelum sathane se 
transformare in angelum lucis”) (284).  
The appeal of this trope for a Western audience becomes clear as one encounters 
it in almost all of the early modern accounts dealing tangentially or directly with 
dervishes of any sort. In fact, as the palimpsest metaphor suggests it never gets lost; by 
the seventeenth century the dervish figure (in various spellings and names) gained 
widespread circulation in accounts about Muslims, and the trope of fraudulence was 
prevalent in the literature of the period despite the emergence of more “scholarly” 
accounts of non-Western cultures.81  
The last example I would like to examine briefly in this section was written by a 
seventeenth-century French traveler, Jean de Thévenot (1633-1667), who traveled for the 
mere pleasure of seeing other worlds (Behdad: 83). Thévenot’s travelogue has been the 
subject of numerous studies on account of being one of the exemplary texts exoticizing 
and eroticizing the Muslim Orient, but it is also among the first Western texts describing 
a Mevlevi sama. Thévenot discusses dervishes in the chapter “Des Ministres de la lot des 
Turcs” of Relation d’un voyage fait au Levant (1665) after introducing officials such as 
“moufti”, “moulla”, “cadis”, “imams”, “muezins” and “hodgias”. He starts his description 
by making it clear that there are several sorts of orders in the Muslim world, but that 
                                                
81 The extremely popular account of Sir Thomas Herbert could be examined as one of such accounts with 
the more systematic descriptions of the dervish orders it presents. Herbert’s book, which first appeared in 
1634, was reprinted and augmented five times, the last edition coming out in 1677.  A Dutch translation 
appeared in 1653 and a French one in 1668. Different from other travelers Herbert provides historical yet 
inaccurate explanation for the existence of numerous sects he lists and explains in the third edition of his 
book.  
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dervishes (read Mevlevis here) constitute “the most familiar and polite” of them (Ils on 
aussi plusieurs fortes de Religieux, parmy lesquels les Deruiches sont les plus familiers & 
plus polis; ie parleray des autres en discourant d’Egypte) (102). According to his 
description, dervishes live in common; have superiors just like Christian orders (leurs 
Superieurs comme nos Religieux); dress humbly and wear on their heads a cap of white 
felt like nightcaps. Thévenot  apparently visited their lodge and watched a sama 
ceremony which he found quite “agreable à voit” (102).82 What makes Thévenot ’s 
account more important is the information he provides about the “autheur de cette 
danse”, that is, “Hazreti Mewlana Deruiche, qui est tenu parmi eux pour Saint”. 
Thévenot  does not provide further information about Mevlana or his sainthood but 
concludes his description, interestingly enough without giving any kind of explanation, 
by noting how hypocrite dervishes and saints in general are: they seemingly devote 
themselves to contemplation of God, but in fact were given to all kinds of vices (103).83  
 
(ii) Early Orientalists and the Sufis: The Introduction of Original Texts 
Accounts replicating the content of those mentioned above did not vanish from 
the scene in the ensuing decades but did begin to be consumed side by side with new 
                                                
82 From the eighteenth century onwards, Mevlevi ceremonies would become one of the main attractions for 
any Westerner visiting Istanbul but very few of these travelers would give information about Rumi or his 
works. Their impressions, for the most part, do not go beyond describing the form of the ceremony, which, 
in most accounts, is presented as one of the exotic features of the Muslim orient. Despite the lack of interest 
on the part of Western travelers in Rumi or literature produced in Ottoman lands, Rumi’s name began to 
circulate in intellectual circles by the end of the eighteenth century, though usually without any reference to 
Mevlevis. The cause of the change, however, should not be sought not in the accounts of Ottoman culture 
or history. It evolved, rather, out of a nascent interest in seventeenth-century orientalists in Persian 
literature and philosophy.  
83 Tous le Deruiches & Santons generallement sont de grands hypocrites, car ils se sont passer pour des 
gens addonnez entierement à la contemplation de Dieu, & cependant ils sont accomplis en tous vices sans 
exception. 
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forms of studies in “Oriental” cultures and languages, which can be described as more 
informed, relatively more accurate, and definitely more systematic on account of being 
written by those knowledgeable in Oriental languages. The changes regarding the content 
as well as presentation of the more detailed and nuanced works on the Muslim Middle 
East, of course, began to appear as a concomitant of the developments in the field of 
Islamic and Oriental studies. 
The origins of Orientalism as a professional study have been a topic of debate 
since the publication of Edward Said’s groundbreaking study Orientalism (1978). Said, 
just like Raymond Schwab, points at Anquetil Duperron (1731-1805) as the first 
orientalist and Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798 as the decisive event in Orientalism. 
Recent studies in Orientalism, however, beg to differ; Urs App in The Birth of 
Orientalism (2010) and Ina Baghdiantz McCabe in Orientalism in Early Modern France 
(2008) present convincing arguments that take into account the studies undertaken in 
previous eras. The most significant development triggering such a change in the nature of 
books on “the Orient(s)” was engendered, argues McCabe, by the conflict between 
European humanists with ecclesiastics and the proceeding gradual transfer of the study of 
Oriental languages and cultures from religious to royal patronage. The court patronage of 
Oriental studies during the reign of François I (1494-1547) in France, for instance, 
opened up a new phase in that his court emerged as “a safe haven for humanists 
challenging the Church’s monopoly on the production of knowledge in France” 
(McCabe: 22). The endeavors of the proto-Prientalists such as Guillame Postel resulted in 
the production of scholarly studies on Middle Eastern languages and cultures along with 
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immensely popular travelogues that are filled with adventure and “Oriental 
peculiarities,”84 as well as works of fiction with oriental themes.85  
A cursory glance at the Oriental studies of the period following Postel, in fact, 
reveals the increasing scholarly interest in the Orient.86 The establishment of Arabic 
chairs at the College de France (1587), Leiden (1613), Cambridge (1632), and Oxford 
(1636), the printing of Arabic texts at the royal printing presses in France, Holland and 
Rome, the scholarly activities of André du Ryer (1580-1660) and the de le Croix family 
in France, of Frans van Ravelingen (Latinized to Franciscus Raphelengius; 1539-1597), 
Thomas van Erpe (Erpenius; 1584-1624), Jacobus Golius (1596-1667), Louis de Dieu 
(1590-1642), Hieronymous Megiser (ca.1554-1618) and Angelus St. Joseph [Joseph 
Labrosse] in Holland, of William Bedwell (1561-1632), Edmund Castell (1606-1685), 
Edward Pococke (1604-1691), his son Edward (1648–1727) and Simon Ockley (1678-
1720) in England, of Giambattista Raimondi (1536-1614), Antonio Giggei and Filippo 
Guadagnoli (1596-1656) in Italy, of George Gentius (1618-1687) and Adam Olearius in 
Germany paved the way for future Orientalists.87 The “republic of letters” composed by 
                                                
84 e.g. Sir Anthony Sherley: his Relation of his Travels into Persia (1613) by Sir A. Shirley. Anthony 
Nixon's account of the Sherley's adventures was dramatized in 1607. 
85 L’Histoire des trois freres, princes de Constantinople (1632) (novel) by De Logeas; Mayret’s Soliman ou 
la mort du Mustapha (1630), Sir John Denham's Sophy (1642) and Robert Baron's Mirza (1647); Tamerlan 
ou la mort de Bajazet (1647) (play) by Magnon; Bajazet (1672) (play) by Racine; Asterie et Tamerlan 
(1675) (novel) by Mme de Villedieu; Thomas Southerne's The Loyal Brother, or the Persian Prince (1682); 
Galland’s Paroles remarquebles des Orienteaux (1695); Zulima ou l’amour pur (1695) (novel) by Le 
Noble, etc. 
86 See Nicholas Dew’s Orientalism in Louis XIV’s France (2009); Robert Irwin’s For Lust of Knowing 
(2007); Alastair Hamilton & Francis Richard’s André du Ryer and Oriental Studies in Seventeenth-Century 
France (2004); Pierre Martino’s L’Orient dans la littérature française (1906). 
87 André du Ryer is known for his translation of the Qur’an into French (1649) which was translated into 
English the same year, but he also rendered nearly half of Sadi’s Gulistan into French as L’empire des 
roses, compose par, Sadi, prince des poetes turcs et persans (1634) and also published a Turkish Grammar 
Book Latin (1630). The de la Croix family served for three generations as the Arabic interpreter of the 
French court. The most accomplished one is François Pétits de la Croix (1653–1713) who was sent by his 
father to the Levant at the age of seventeen for the purpose of acquiring Oriental languages. Upon his return 
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such figures not only produced the first grammars and lexicons of Arabic, Persian and 
Turkish but also were in charge of collecting manuscripts from the Muslim orient.  
Such intellectual endeavors, at least for the most part, were not pursued for the 
sake of mere intellectual curiosity. For a long time “oriental” studies had been “the 
handmaiden” of Biblical studies. It had been a custom for missionaries to learn the 
language of the land they were intending to pursue proselytization. So already in 
medieval Spain and the Vatican, Arabic was integrated into the curriculum of Semitic 
                                                
he served at the ambassadorial envoys to Tunisia, Algiers and Morocco. In 1692 he was appointed to the 
Arabic chair in the College Royal de France. De la Croix’s most important work is considered to be the 
translation of Sharafuddin Ali Yazdi's Zafar Nama or History of Timur (ca. 1425), which was published 
posthumously in 4 volumes in 1722. Frans van Ravelingen held the chair in Hebrew at Leiden from 1587, 
but was also knowledgeable in Arabic and Persian. His Arabic-Latin dictionary, which was posthumously 
published in 1613, is considered to be first of its kind. Thomas van Erpe was Joseph Scaliger’s pupil and 
became the first full professor of Arabic at Leiden. He published an Arabic grammar (Grammatica 
Arabica; 1613), Rudimenta linguae Arabicae (1620), Grammatica Ebraea generalis (1621), Grammatica 
Chaldaica et Syria (1628), and Historia Saracenica (1625) based on George Elmacin (a.k.a. Ibn al-'Amid, 
1205–1273). Jacobus Golius was the pupil of van Erpe and held the chair of Arabic and Math at the 
University of Leiden after Erpe. His Lexicon Arabico-Latinum, (1653), which, based on the Sihah of Al-
Jauhari, considered to be the best in existence until the nineteenth century. Golius also prepared a Persian-
Latin dictionary but it was published in 1669 after his death. Louis de Dieu published the first functional 
Persian grammar (Leiden, 1639). Hieronymous Megiser published the first Turkish grammar (Leipzig, 
1612) to appear in Europe. Joseph Labrosse was one of the earliest Christian missionaries to Persia. His 
Persian grammar with dictionary in Latin, French, and Italian (Gazophylacium linguae persarum; 1681) 
though with much attention paid to medical terms, was praised by F. Bernier, F. Petits de la Croix and J. 
Chardin. William Bedwell’s most well known published work is A Discovery of the Impostures of 
Mahomet and of the Koran (1615) but he also prepared Arabic lexicon in 7 volumes, to be shadowed by the 
publication of a similar work by Jacobus Golius in 1653. Professor of Arabic at Cambridge, Edmund 
Castell spent eighteen years on his Lexicon Heptaglotton Hebraicum, Chaldaicum, Syriacum, 
Samaritanum, Aethiopicum, Arabicum, et Persicum (1669). Edward Pococke was the first chair of Arabic 
at Oxford. In 1650 he published Specimen historiae arabum, a short account on the origin and manners of 
the Arabs, taken from Bar-Hebraeus (Abulfaragius). The son Pococke translated Ibn Tufail’s twelfth-
century philosophical novel Hay ibn Yaqzan into Latin as Philosophus Autodidactus (1671). Simon Ockley 
was a Professor of Arabic at Cambridge. His most well-known study is The History of the Saracens (2 vols, 
1708-1718), which was based on Futúh al-Shám (supposedly penned by Al-Waqidi), which is considered 
to be more of a historical romance than history. Ockley also translated Ibn Tufail’s Hayy ibn Yaqzan into 
English as The Improvement of Human Reason: Exhibited in the Life of Hai Ebn Yokdhan (1708). 
Giambattista Raimondi was in charge of the Medici printing press in Rome and produced a series of 
important publications in and on Arabic from 1590 to 1610 (Hamilton & Richard: 13). Antonio Giggei, 
using the manuscript collection assembled in Milan by Cardinal Federigo Borromeo, published an Arabic-
Latin lexicon in 1632 which is considered to be not as good as Golius’ but certainly better than 
Raphalengius’s (Ibid). Filip Guadagnoli issued an Arabic grammar in 1642, which contained one of the 
first attempts in Europe to analyze the metrics of Arabic poetry (Ibid). George Gentius translated Sadi’s 
Gulistan into Latin as Musladini Sadi rosarium politicum, sive amoenum sortis humanae theatrum (1651).  
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studies due to the desire to bring the Eastern churches under Vatican control (Rodinson: 
40). The missionary movement of the new religious orders, predominantly of the 
Capuchins and the Jesuits, revived the practice of their predecessors and established 
missions almost all over the world.88 But the new wave of interest in Arabic in sixteenth-
century Europe was, to a large extent, text-based. Most of the names mentioned above 
showed interest in Oriental languages, specifically in Arabic, in order to examine 
different versions of the Bible. Their ultimate aim was to strengthen their position vis-à-
vis the Protestants by improving the official Catholic Latin translation, the Vulgate 
attributed to St. Jerome.  They were of the contention that the acquisition of knowledge 
of Arabic, which is so close to Hebrew, as well as of manuscripts written in Arabic might 
not only help them to better understand the Old Testament but also enable them to 
unearth “a text earlier and purer than the one traditionally used by the rabbis” (Hamilton 
& Richard: 15). More importantly, it was thought that Arabic version of the New 
Testament “might reflect an early Syriac version closer to the original than anything in 
the existing translations” (Ibid).89 
Not all of the figures listed above were Catholic biblical scholars; some of the 
early Orientalists such as Joseph Justus Scaliger were interested in the acquisition of 
Oriental languages inasmuch as Oriental sources could shed light on the natural history of 
the world (Irwin: 77). Or still some others got the chance to read the works of medicine, 
                                                
88 The letters and reports of Jesuit missionaries sent to Europe from China, Levant, India, America, and 
elsewhere are compiled under the title Lettres édifiantes et curieuses. The letters were published in 34 
volumes between 1702 and 1776 and played a major role in the development of the Enlightenment. The 
great minds of the era such as Voltaire, Montesquieu and Leibniz are known to have praised the letters. 
89 The preoccupation of biblical scholars with the grand project of polyglot Bible is also one of the causes 
of the increasing interest in Arabic. For more information on polyglot Bible studies, see Robert Irwin’s For 
Lust of Knowing (2007), pp. 73-76. 
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philosophy, mathematics, and astronomy – by medieval scholars such Avicenna and 
Averroes – in Arabic and Persian that were published at the newly established printing 
houses capable of printing Arabic script (Rodinson: 41; Javadi: 39-40).   
Regardless of the motivations of the scholars, such pursuits began to operate, first 
and foremost in seventeenth-century France, within a much more complex structure that 
burgeoned with the rise of mercantalism and the expansionist policies of Jean-Baptiste 
Colbert (1619-1683), Louis XIV’s Minister of Finance. In addition to establishing 
colonial companies in China (1660), the East Indies (1664) and the Levant (1670), 
Colbert financed French travelers in their overseas journeys. More importantly, he helped 
these travelers publish their travelogues (Behdad: 82).90 It had been a custom for those 
attending diplomatic missions to publish their travelogues (e.g. Busbecq and Postel), but 
patronage of this sort is considered to be a key moment in the history of Orientalism. As 
noted by Maxime Rodinson, the new relatively organized nature of patronage at high 
levels also promoted a certain degree of specialization that was in contrast to the 
individualistic encyclopedism of the Renaissance (41).  
 Among the scholars Colbert appointed one certain orientalist by the name of 
Barthélemy d'Herbelot (1643-1695) stands out. The new “scholarly approach” probably 
reached its peak with the publication of his over-ambitious project, one took him more 
than twenty years to complete. Even though d’Herbelot could not witness the publication 
of his masterpiece, the monumental study Bibliotheque orientale (1697), which is said to 
be largely based on an equally immense bibliography, Kashf al-Zunun of Katip Chelebi 
                                                
90 For a detailed analysis of Colbert’s patronage of “the Republic of Letters” see Nicholas Dew Orientalism 
in Louis XIV’s France (2009).  
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(a.k.a. Hadji Khalifa; 1609-1657),91 became the standard reference work for Orientalists, 
from Sylvestre de Sacy and William Jones to F.A.G. Tholuck, throughout the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. In this posthumously published “universal dictionary” of the 
“Orient” d’Herbelot provides information on the people, history, traditions, legends, 
religions, politics, government, laws, customs, wars, and literature of the Muslim Orient 
in 8600 alphabetically arranged, cross-referenced entries.   
 Despite the richness of the encyclopedia, Rumi’s name is neither among the 
Persian poets or the prominent Sufis to whom d’Herbelot devotes separate entries. 
Nonetheless Rumi is mentioned under the rubric of the “maulavi” and “mathnaoui” as 
“Gelaleddin Mohammad.” In the “mathnaui” [i.e. Masnavi] entry he explains that this is 
the name given to one of the most famous books of the Orient written in Persian on a 
great number of subjects in religion, history, morals and politics. After giving brief 
information about Rumi, d’Herbelot explains that an order of dervishes, which is “more 
spiritual than others,” was established in Konya with the name Meulevis. He also 
mentions the existence of Persian and Turkish commentaries on the book, including the 
one by Anqaravi, a Mevlevi himself.92   
                                                
91 Kashf al-zunūn ‘an asāmī al-kutub wa-al-funūn, ("The Removal of Doubt from the Names of Books and 
the Sciences") is a bibliographic encyclopedia, written in Arabic, and lists more than 14500 books in 
alphabetic order.  
92 “C'est le nom d'un des plus fameux Livres de l'Orient composé en vers Persiens fur un grand nombre de 
différentes matieres de Religion, d'Histoire, de Morale & de Politique. Un a été composé par Gelaleddin 
Mohammed, fils de Mohammed al-Balkhi al-Konoui, environ l'an 600 de l'Hég, Les surnoms de Balkhl & 
de Konoui sont donnés à cet Auteur, parce qu'il étoit natif de la Ville de Balkh en Khorasan, & qu'il vint 
s'établir ensuite dans celle de Cogni en Anatolie. Ce fut dans cette même Ville qu'il institua un Ordre de 
Derviches plus spirituels que les autres, lesquels on appelle ordinairement Meulevis, qui font leur capital 
de l'Ouvrage de leur maître, auquel ils ne portent guere moins de respect qu'à l'Alcoran. C'est pourquoi on 
donne aussi souvent au Mathnaoui le surnom de; Meulevi. II y a un grand nombre de Commentaires 
Persiens & Turcs fur ce Livre, dont la poésie est estimée si excellente, que tous ses vers font cités comme 
autant de sentences, plusieurs desquelles sont rapportées en divers lieux dans cet Ouvrage.” 
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 Bibliotheque orientale is significant at another level for the purposes of this 
dissertation: d’Herbelot provides a quite grounded clarification about the concepts and 
terms of Sufism. He reserves separate entries for “Sofi,” “Dervish,” “Faqir,” “Zahed,” 
and “Tasaouf” (i.e. Sufism).93 According to d’Herbelot “tasaouf” is “Exercices de 
Dévotion, ou de Spiritualité” but Muslims call it “Elm al-Tassaouf,” that is the science 
showing them how to attain perfection in accordance with the nature of the devotee.94 Not 
all the information d’Herbelot provided is correct; for instance, he states that “sofis,” 
whose profession is “tasaouf,” take their title from Abou Hafchem al-Sofi (d. 150 A. H.). 
But such errors are insignificant compared to those made by Herbert and others. 
Except for d’Herbelot, Sufism did not get the attraction of Orientalist scholars 
residing in Europe. Some of them did not even show any interest in Islam. Despite the 
negligence of linguistics-oriented orientalists, the history and present state of oriental 
societies were of interest to diplomats and merchants as the patronage of Colbert attests. 
In the accounts written by non-scholars we come across depictions of dervishes. Different 
from the previous eras, however, this time some of these figures, who penned accounts 
(not necessarily travelogues) after spending a considerable amount of time in the Orient, 
used primary sources in order to explain the relevant aspects of the culture in question. 
Most of these texts are presented as histories. While some preferred to translate already 
                                                
93 “Le mot de Sofi se prend en Perse pour un Religieux Musulman, qui porte aussi le nom de Dervisch, cest-
à-dire, de Pauvre, aussi bien en Turquie qu'en Perse, & que les Arabes appellent Fakir, dans la même 
signification, titre & surnom que les Sofis, ou Derviches portent particulièrement dans les Indes.” In these 
entries, d’Herbelot even refers to the Western misuse of the word “Sofi” in references to the Shah of Persia 
as the great Sophi: “Les Ancêtres de la Race qui règne aujourd'huy en Perse, tels que sont Scheïkh Sefi & 
Scheïkh Haïdar, ont porté le surnom de Sofi, & Schah Ismaël, fils de ce dernier, qui est sorti de la Vie 
privée & qui a le premier jetté les fondements dé cette Dynastie ou Monarchie, retint ce Surnom & se 
faisait appeller Ismaïl Sofi. C'est, de-là que plusieurs de nos Historiens, &de nos Voyageurs donnent le 
nom de Sophi & de Grand Sophi, aux Rois de Perse.” 
94 “La Science qui fait monter l'homme de fêtas purement humain à celui de la félicité, en faisant passer de 
degré en degré jusqu'à la plus haute perfection autant qu'il est possìble à sa nature.”  
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existing authentic sources into European languages (e.g. Thomas van Erpe’s Historia 
Saracenica, Francois de la Croix’s Zafar Nama, Edward Pococke’s Specimen historiae 
arabum), still some others chose to compose original histories. Paul Rycaut (1628–1700), 
for instance, spent six years, on and off, in Istanbul (1661-1667) as a secretary in the 
English embassy and eleven years in Izmir (Smyrna) as the official consul of the Levant 
Company. In 1687 he published The History of the Turkish Empire from 1623 to 1677, 
containing the reigns of the last three emperors (Amurath IV–Mahomet IV) as a 
continuation of the first major Ottoman history in English, General Historie of the Turkes 
(1603) by Richard Knolles. Before this volume, however, he had already published his 
most important work, which was used for a long time as the major reference book for 
those interested in Ottoman history and culture. The book, The Present State of the 
Ottoman Empire, containing the Maxims of the Turkish Politie, the most material points 
of the Mahometan Religion, their Military Discipline, a particular Description of the 
Seraglio … illustrated with divers pieces of Sculpture, representing the varieties of 
Habits among the Turks, in three books (1668), is based on the materials he collected 
during his appointment in Istanbul.95 Yet utilization of original materials does not 
guarantee correct information. We do not know what kind of sources Rycaut used, but the 
section where he discusses “the religion of the Turks” is quite problematic due to its 
mixture of correct information with factual errors. It is obvious that Rycaut’s account of 
the religious sects is an enlarged and for the most part corrected, yet still erroneous, 
                                                
95 Even though Dudley North, a contemporary of Rycaut who engaged in foreign trade with the Ottomans, 
condemned the work as “superficial” and “erroneous”, and Bespier pointed out a few direct misstatements, 
such as that Muslim women have no hope of heaven, it was nonetheless consumed as a faithful picture of 
Turkish manners. It long proved a useful companion to Knolles's ‘History,’ and is even quoted by Gibbon 
in his account of the rise of the Ottomans. It ran through several editions and was translated into French, 
German, and Polish within the same century.  
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version of Thomas Herbert’s account. After discussing various “modern” and “ancient” 
“Turkish sects and heresies,” (47-53) Rycaut describes “dervishes” (54) that constitute 
one of the religious orders, which were established “in imitation of the Christians.” He 
argues that the Turkish histories – yet, we do not know which Turkish history – point at 
Orhan (the founder of the Ottoman Empire) as “the first Institutor of these religious 
orders” despite the disputable claim of some to trace them back to the time of prophet 
Muhammad (54). According to Rycaut’s account, there are two main branches, namely 
Calvette (read Halveti) and Nacksbendec (read Naqshibandi) from which a variety of 
orders, e.g. Nimetulahi, Edhemi, Kadiri, Kalenderi, etc, stem. Among the sub-branches of 
the Naqshibandi, Rycaut points at the Mevlevee (read Mevlevis) as the most famous 
among the Turks. He notes that “Mevlevees are otherwise called Dervises (signifying as 
much as poor),” have their “principal foundation at Iconium, consisting of 400 Dervises” 
and “commands all the rest of the same Order.” It was correct that by the time Rycaut 
was residing in Istanbul the most powerful orders were Halvetis and the Naqshibandis, 
but no Ottoman account would make the mistake of classifying the Mevlevis under 
Naqshibandis, an equally influential yet distinct Sufi order.  
Similar problems are encountered in other “histories” of the time. Like Rycaut, 
Jean Chardin (1643-1713) spent a significant portion of his life in the Orient, specifically 
in Persia and acquired a better grasp of Persian than many Orientalists of his time. A 
jewel trader by profession, Chardin spent ten years, between 1664 and 1677, in Persia in 
two separate journeys and published a ten-volume account in 1711 (Voyages de monsieur 
le chevalier Chardin en Perse et autres lieux de l'Orient) after publishing an account of 
his second travel in 1686 under the title Journal du Voyage de Chardin en Perse et aux 
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Indes Orientales. While the latter follows the pattern set by J. Boemus, the ten-volume 
edition, different from similar texts, presents an incredibly comprehensive study of 
Persian culture of the time.96 Again, unlike his predecessors, but befitting to his own 
milieu, Chardin drew considerable a amount of information from authentic sources such 
as Mahmud Shabistari’s (d. 1340) Gulshan-i Raz (1311), Sadi’s Gulistan, and Firdawsi’s 
Shahnameh.97  
For the purposes of this chapter, Chardin’s book is important for two reasons: 
firstly, he introduces Sufis as philosophers and secondly, he shows interest in Persian 
poetry to the point of inserting his translations of Hafiz and Sadi into the section on the 
literature of the Persians. Starting with the second point, we should note that Chardin 
does not constitute an exception in showing interest in Persian poetry. Adam Olearius 
(1599-1671), for instance, who visited Russia and Persia as the secretary of the trade 
envoy sent by Frederick III, Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, to the Shah of Persia, came back 
to Germany with enough knowledge and appreciation of Persian poetry. Following his 
travels (1633-39), he published Beschreibung der Muscowitischen und Persinischen 
Reyse (1647), an extensive travel narrative enriched with charts and numerous drawings 
of the author.98 Olearius was extremely influenced by the status poetry enjoyed in Persian 
culture and notes that “There is no nation in the world more addicted to Poetry than the 
                                                
96 For an introduction to Chardin’s Voyages see R. W. Ferrier A Journey To Persia: Jean Chardin's Portrait 
of a Seventeenth-Century Empire (1996).  
97 Translated into English as The Garden of Mystery, Gulshan-e Raz is a mystical poem, written in the form 
of mathnawi. Structured in question-and-answer form it provides basic information about the doctrines of 
the Sufis.  
98 For analysis of Olearius’s drawings see Visions of Persia (2004) by Elio Brancaforte. 
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Persians” (251). He was specifically fond of the verses of Sadi and published the 
translation of Sadi’s Gulistan (Rose Garden) (1259) as Persianischer Rosenthal in 1650.  
Like Olearius, Jean Chardin (1643-1713) noticed the significance of poetry in 
Persian culture.99 He agrees with Olearius on poetry being “the particular and proper gift 
of Persians” and argues that oriental philosophers have preferred poetry to express their 
wisdom “in order to make it more venerable, agreeable and easier to learn” (257). Just 
like the old times, says Chardin, poetry being moralistic in intention embodies all the 
teaching of philosophy. Chardin names poets and inserts translation from Cheic Sahdy 
(read Sadi) and Afez (read Hafiz) but even though he makes the connection between 
philosophy, morals and poetry he does not see or make any particular link between poetry 
and Sufis that he introduced in a chapter on philosophy in the same volume of Voyages.100 
And this brings us to our second point, that is, the depiction of Sufis in Voyages.  
The Sufis or dervishes of any sort are mentioned in Western accounts, 
understandably enough, as an interesting aspect of Islam – which they insisted on calling 
“Muhammadanism” further into the twentieth century. Chardin is no different; Volume 9 
of Voyages is almost exclusively on “the religion of Persians,” and at some point in this 
extremely detailed presentation of different aspects of Islam, Chardin mentions dervishes 
as “beggars” (mendicant). Chardin notes that “dervish” as a generic term designates 
anyone who chooses poverty and detachment from the world and there are different sorts 
of dervishes, descriptions of most of whom, however, fit into the stereotype of the era. 
                                                
99 See Chapter XIV of Voyages, Volume V (1711) 
100 Hasan Javadi notes that Chardin’s translations of Sadi and Hafiz were relatively popular. Joseph 
Addison, the editor of the Spectator, published adaptations of a couple of stories and poems by Sadi as they 
were rendered by Chardin. Javadi adds that Chardin’s translations are something of a mixture, containing 
many stories and phrases not found in the original, but are on the whole derived from the poet’s own work 
(37-38).  
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Chardin’s report (82-84) repeats more or less, including the hypocrisy of dervishes, what 
others have said so far; therefore, I am not going to focus on such depictions. What is 
noteworthy here is that he introduces “Soufys” as a subsection of dervishes who 
constitute an exception.101 
The emphasis on the exceptionality of Soufys is not limited to the volume on 
religion. In Volume 5, which is on Persian arts and sciences, Soufys are introduced as 
members of a secret society teaching the philosophy of Pythagoras, which is, according 
to Chardin, “la grande & universelle Philosophie des Indiens, & de tous les Peuples 
Idolâtres de l'Orient” (153). Little known about this “ancient” and “celebrated” sect 
because, Chardin contends, “its doctrine is entirely mysterious & that those who profess 
it make an agreement never to reveal its very discreet funds so that the religion of the 
country will not be troubled” (Ibid).  
The fact that Sufis like Ibn Arabi were knowledgeable in ancient Greek 
philosophy was no secret, but reducing “the philosophy of Sufis” to Pythagoreanism is 
quite misleading, which would be pursued in the following decades by the new 
generation of Orientalists. Furthermore, it is correct that the Safavid shahs, specifically 
Shah Abbas I (1588-1629), attempted to eliminate the Sufi orders prevalent in Persia, 
first those of Sunni affiliation and then those with Shi‘ite loyalties (Algar: para. 10). But, 
as observed by Chardin, Sufis, or as Chardin calls them dervishes, remained in the 
religious scene either as “individual or loosely organized practitioners of popular or 
antinomian religion” (Ibid). Therefore, again, it might be correct that, for the time being, 
                                                
101 “Il faut excepter de cette règle générale une sorte de Dervich, de la secte des Soufys, qu'on appelle 
Moreidon” (84).  
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Sufi orders might have to operate in secrecy, but this quite recent development in the 
history of Persian Sufism does not transform all Sufi orders into “mysterious Cabals.”  
Chardin’s report on Sufis definitely goes beyond such a dry description. He 
outlines the different theories regarding the etymology of the word Sufi, specifies the 
time of the origin of the sect – probably around 200 After Hegira – and tries to explain 
the basic beliefs of Sufis, specifically the doctrine of vahdat-i vujud, or the unity of being, 
based on his reading of Gulshan-i Raz. Although he describes Gulshan-i Raz as the 
“Somme Theologique” of Sufis, he admits that even that book does not make it easier to 
grasp the sentiments and the discipline of the Sufis because of the nature of the “sect”: 
“this is a cabal into which it is difficult to get and where secrecy is the first and most 
important and precept” (Ibid).  
Chardin also describes how Sufi ceremonies were conducted; his overall 
impression of them, however, is fairly negative. After describing the ecstatic Sufi 
ceremonies, he notes that such state is not different from the dizziness (étourdissement) 
of the false prophets mentioned in the tenth chapter of the first book of Samuel.102 Also, 
as mentioned by Ferrier, Chardin seems to be appreciating certain aspects of the Sufi 
philosophy (Ferrier: 133), but nonetheless their methods such as fasting, seclusion, and 
meditation utilized to achieve the state of union with God (Chardin: 158-159) are not 
among the deeds that a devout Protestant such as Chardin would approve. He believes 
that such methods make them neglect the care of the things people are obliged to attend 
                                                
102 “Ils disent qu'ils entrent encore d'une autre manière dans le transport ou le ravissement; qui est de se 
tenir la têt droite inclinée, & de se regarder fixement le bout du nez; cependant ils se servent plus 
communément du Chant, de la Danse, & de la Musique, disant qu'ils produisent plus surement leur extase, 
par laquelle il faut entendre un étourdissement, de même qu'en ces faux Prophètes, dont il est parlé au 
dixième Chapitre du premier Livre de Samuel, qui me paraissent tout-à-fait semblables aux Soufys” (158). 
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in a society, and that is the reason behind Persian people’s hatred of Sufis. These men, 
says Chardin, easily give in to ideas of revelation, union with God, and ecstasy as 
opposed to “the necessary application to the needs of life” because they are “naturally 
inclined to negligence and laziness” (160). Furthermore, Chardin contends that the 
visions Sufis claim to have as a result of their austere methods are merely “a thousand 
chimeras formed in their poor empty brain” (mille chimères formées dans leur pauvre 
cerveau creux) (158). He has never seen anyone proving what he claimed to be capable 
of (e.g. foretelling the future, knowing the heart and thoughts of people) and is not 
convinced by their argument that their religion, which is, according to Chardin, “a sect 
full of stupid people,” is felt better than it sounds and cannot be understood by human 
inventions such as science or physics that can only cover the light instead of discovering 
it (159). 
The information imparted by Chardin has permeated into the deep veins of 
Oriental studies; his account was used as a principal source by orientalists further into the 
twentieth century. Thomas Salmon in his over-ambitious study Modern History or the 
Present State of all Nations (1727) directly quotes from Chardin –without any kind of 
acknowledgment – in his section on Sufis in Persia (484). Unlike Salmon, Sir William 
Jones and F. A. G. Tholuck express their appreciation of Chardin in their works on 
Sufism, which determined the destiny of perception of Sufism in the Western world.  
The overall effect of the discourses analyzed in this chapter on the following 
generations’ understanding of Sufism is incalculable. The late eighteenth-, early 
nineteenth-century Orientalists immensely made use of the material provided by early 
modern texts on the Middle East. Be it their hypocrisy or secrecy, Sufis for a long time 
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retained the labels, sometimes inappropriately attached by such texts. Abdolonyme 
Ubicini, for instance, single-handedly presents the three quintessential assumptions made 
in the West about Sufis and Sufism in his 1856 travelogue Letters on Turkey.103 The 
rhetoric of hypocrisy is used even then alongside information provided by the Orientalist 
studies of the time that will be analyzed in detail in the following chapter. Needless to 
say, such studies liberally utilized the knowledge reviewed in this section.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
103 Ubicini’s work was by no means scholarly; it is merely a blend of what he read about the Muslim world 
and observed during his residency in Istanbul sometime between 1848 and 1850. On Sufis he notes that,  
“The doctrines of the Dervishes took their rise in the Sofiism, which existed in the East long before the time 
Mohammed, and which perhaps might be traced back through the secret schools of the Pythagoreans and the 
Neo-Platonic philosophy of Alexandria, to the remotest theocracies of Egypt and India. [...] The essence of 
the Sofi doctrine is neither more nor less than pantheism, defined in the following exclamation of Mawlana-
Djelaleddin, addressing his spiritual master: "O my master! you have completed my doctrinal instruction by 
teaching me that you are God, and that all is God. [...] The pernicious character of such a system is increased 
by disguising its corruption under a plausible exterior, specially adapted to lead astray the finest minds” (87-
93).  
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CHAPTER 2 
SUFISM’S DIVORCE FROM ISLAM 
Some have supposed that Sufiism was imported from India after 
the time of Mahommad; some that it was a development of the 
doctrines of Zoroaster which the Prophet's successors silenced but 
did not destroy. […] A third theory is that the origins of Sufiism 
are to be looked for in the philosophy of the Greeks, strangely 
distorted by the Eastern mind, and in the influence of Christianity. 
 Gertrude Bell, Poems from the Divan of Hafiz, pp. 32-33 
 
In 1897 Gertrude Bell expresses the need for a study on “the history of Sufiism” 
in the introduction to her Poems from the Divan of Hafiz, simply because the theories 
hitherto put forth cannot explain “the sources from which it arose” and “that it should 
have found a home in Mahommedanism, the least mystical of all religions” (32).104 The 
theories Bell was referring to are those that suggest Indian, Zoroastrian and Greek origins 
for Sufism. By the time Bell composed her book, however, as Titus Burckhardt notes and 
Bell herself acknowledges, such diverse attributions have ended by canceling one 
another, and people such as Bell were still waiting for an erudite orientalist to come up 
with a solid explanation of the origins of Sufism.   
Such “absurd views in wild confusion,” to use Annemarie Schimmel’s words 
(1975: 8), were the suppositions presented in the studies made during the golden age of 
Orientalism. What had accumulated hitherto in European stock of knowledge on Islam, 
Sufis, and Persian literature were synthesized in an unprecedented manner by the 
                                                
104 Gertrude Bell (1868-1926), an English archeologist, is known foremost as “the woman who made Iraq.” 
She gained reputation not through her archeological studies but instead through her role as an extremely 
influential British imperial officer in the Middle East. In addition to exploring and mapping the Greater 
Syria, Mesopotamia and Arabia, she played, together with T. E. Lawrence, a crucial role in establishing the 
Hashemite dynasties in what is today Jordan as well as in Iraq. 
 71 
renowned Orientalists of the time. Within a century, Jean Chardin’s attribution of 
Pythagoreanism to Sufi philosophy had evolved to the complete absorption of Sufism 
into religions and philosophies other than Islam.105  
According to Schimmel, this has to do with the unavailability of authentic sources 
from the earlier periods of Islam, which in turn caused the Orientalists to “agree that 
Sufism must be a foreign plant in the sandy desert of Islam, the religion that was so little 
known and even less appreciated and that could not possibly be related to any finer and 
higher spiritual movement” (9). Titus Burckhardt also touches upon this point in his 
Introduction to Sufism, but argues the reason to be the perplexity the orientalists 
experienced in trying to resolve the “double aspect of Sufism”: “because orientalists are 
anxious to bring everything down to the historical level it could hardly be expected that 
they would explain this double aspect of Sufism otherwise than as the result of influences 
coming into Islam from outside” (1995: 16). 
 Notwithstanding the validity of these two points I believe that the change in 
Western approaches to Sufis, which include the invention of “Sufism” itself, is a 
resonance of the conundrums preoccupying some of the great minds of the Western 
world. Particularly discussions on natural history & ancient theology stand out with the 
unforeseen repercussions they generate. Furthermore, I should note at the onset that the 
invention of Sufism grew out of an interest in Indo-Persian history and culture, not 
Islamic studies per se.  
 The unprecedented level of increase in the eighteenth century regarding 
                                                
105 Though it would be ahistorical to ignore the influence of non-Islamic philosophies and religions on 
Sufism, it would be equally inaccurate to trace Sufism to these traditions.  
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knowledge about Islam and the Muslim world is analyzed in numerous studies on 
Orientalism.106 As mentioned above throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
numerous Middle Eastern manuscripts were brought into European libraries and personal 
collections. Nina Berman points out that by the early eighteenth century three to four 
hundred Middle Eastern manuscripts were available to scholars in the city library of 
Leipzig alone (121). What is more, centers for Orientalist studies were opened in Paris, 
Leiden, Leipzig, and Antwerp, among other cities. Yet, significant portion of the research 
done in these centers were, for the most part, limited to materials written in Arabic. On 
the other hand, the eighteenth century also witnessed an unparalleled flow of production 
of stories set in the “exotic” and “erotic” Muslim Middle East, a flow initiated by Antoine 
Galland’s remarkably popular series of translations between 1704 and 1713 of One 
Thousand and One Nights. 
 Neither the popularity of all sorts of “oriental” tales nor the quantitative increase 
of available material, however, ensured qualified research, especially in the realm of 
Persian studies. Sir William Jones himself complains in the preface to his Persian 
Grammar (1771) about the lack of scholarly interest in Persian language and literature 
despite the availability of materials:  
[I]t must seem strange that the study of this language should be so little cultivated 
at a time when a taste for general and diffusive learning seems universally to 
prevail; and that the fine productions of a celebrated nation should remain in 
manuscript upon the shelves of our public libraries, without a single admirer who 
                                                
106 See Edward Said Orientalism (1978), Michael Curtis Orientalism and Islam (2009), Nina Berman 
German Literature on the Middle East (2011), Todd Kontje German Orientalisms (2004), and Maxime 
Rodinson Europe and the Mystique of Islam (1987). 
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might open their treasures to his countrymen, and display their beauties to the 
light. (i) 
 The longed-for scholarly interest in Persian culture burgeoned only by the end of 
the eighteenth century; the studies of not-quite-professional Orientalists serving the 
British Empire at the East India Company in Calcutta introduced the rich literary culture 
of Persia to the Western world. Interestingly enough, this introduction was itself an 
incidental one; it constituted only a minor part of the grand project of Sir William Jones 
to ascertain the history of the ancient world.   
 
(i) Sufis (among) the Inheritors of the Ur-religion 
 William Jones was a man of his time: he was born into the age of reason, which 
saw the rise of deism and natural religion, along with the rise of the historical spirit and 
the comparative method of inquiry. Jones, of course, does not need any kind of 
introduction; his genius and extraordinary accomplishments have already been reiterated 
numerous times in studies on linguistics, law, philology and literature but in the context 
of Sufi studies he stands out as a gifted Orientalist whose competence in Persian and 
Arabic alongside Greek, Latin, Hebrew, and several modern European languages had 
bestowed him a reputation already when he was a student at Oxford.107 At the age of 22, 
Jones’s reputation in Oriental studies even reached the King of Denmark, who insisted on 
Jones undertaking the translation of a Persian book on the life of Nadir Shah into 
                                                
107 Before embarking on his career in law, Jones spent considerable time and effort on studying Persian and 
Arabic classics as well as reviewing the available studies on any aspect of Middle Eastern culture. 
Furthermore, thanks to the friendship he established with Count Karoly Reviczky (1736-1793), another 
self-taught Orientalist, Jones’s interest in classical Persian poetry evolved. For further info, see The Life, 
Writings, and Correspondence, of Sir William Jones by Lord Teignmouth (1807). 
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French.108 Upon the commendation his translation received Jones composed another work 
in French, a Traité sur la Poésie Orientale (1771), accompanied by a translation of some 
of the odes of Hafiz. In 1771, Jones published two major works: A Grammar of the 
Persian Language, which meant to be not only a grammar but also an introduction to 
Persian literature, and “Dissertation sur la littérature Orientale,” in which he criticized the 
translation and assumptions of Anquetil Duperron regarding Zendavista.109 In 1772 Jones 
was elected a Fellow at the Royal Society as a linguist and an Orientalist. 
 As this brief summary of his accomplishments illustrate, there was no doubt about 
Jones’s credentials in Oriental studies. But Jones was definitely more than that; alongside 
his interest in classical wisdom of all sorts, he was interested in the questions bothering 
the intellectuals of his time, specifically the origins of mankind, languages, and the 
natural history of the world.110 The overwhelming need to explain the non-Abrahamic 
peoples together with their customs and beliefs, the challenge raised by scientific 
developments as well as intellectual developments all forced the leading minds of the 
Western world including Jones to revisit the Bible-based interpretation of the world and 
its history.111  
                                                
108 Jones first declined the project but changed his mind after learning that otherwise a Frenchman would 
translate it. The translation appeared in 2 volumes in 1770.  
109 In the Grammar Jones has explained the principal rules through the examples he chose, in the first place 
from Hafiz, then from the other poets. The Grammar became so popular that by 1828 it had gone through 
nine London editions.  As a standard work, for years it taught Persian to future Orientalists. 
110 Bruce Lincoln notes that during his studies on law the only non-law book Jones let himself to revel in 
was Jacob Bryant’s A New System or Analysis of Ancient Mythology (1774–76) in which Bryant attempted 
to incorporate diverse myths to the stories recorded in Genesis. 
111 For centuries, Genesis 10 and 11 were held as the answer to the question of how all the nations and 
languages emerged and where the origin of all civilization was – Israel the cradle of civilization and 
Hebrew the original language. Starting in the late Middle Ages, however, alternatives to Hebrew, such as 
Dutch, German, Belgian, Scythian, etc., as the Ursprach were proposed. For further info, see Bruce 
Lincoln’s Theorizing Myth (1999). Lincoln notes that first Troy emerged as an alternative to Israel. It was a 
theory highly esteemed especially by Nordic people who pointed at the lexical resemblances between their 
languages and ancient Greek. In the following eras Dutch, German, and Belgian were proposed as 
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While lexical studies claimed origins of languages other than Hebrew, numerous 
scientists and intellectuals including the distinguished members of the Royal Society of 
London brought forth theories about the natural history of the world that clashed with the 
Biblical version.112 It goes without saying that the Enlightenment critique of revealed 
religion did not remain unanswered. Deists merely constituted a faction among others 
who tried to rise to the scientific as well as to the ethnographic challenges. Missionaries, 
Jesuits in particular, sought scenarios to incorporate ancient Asian cultures and religions 
into the Bible-based universe, and hence diverted their attention to the histories and 
religions of non-Abrahamic peoples. Urs App’s comprehensive study The Birth of 
Orientalism (2011) demonstrates that the reports of Jesuit missionaries on Japan draw 
surprising similarities with Christianity, something unnoticed in the sixteenth-century 
reports from Africa, India, and America (9). What needs to be pointed out in this regard 
is that such fashioned descriptions are intertwined with a specific interpretation of 
                                                
Ursprach. While such theories remained, for the most part, unpopular, Marcus Zuerius Boxhorn’s (1612-
53) “Scythian theory” gained wide acclaim to the point of becoming the “standard form in which claims of 
northern origins and privilege were encoded” (77-81). In opposition to such Nordic claims, another theory 
again in contradiction to the Biblical account gained momentum in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries: India, Kashmir, and Tibet came to the fore as the possible cradles of humanity (App 2009: 4). 
112 With the advent of the new science and its transformation into an “attitude of mind,” everything, from 
Aristotle to the Bible, began to be reexamined. It was religiously argued that only through a scientific 
method based on experiments the natural history of the world could be ascertained. Specifically, the attacks 
of the “radical deists” of the seventeenth century and the philosophes of the eighteenth century constituted 
the major charge against a Bible-based understanding of history and universe. Revealed religion in 
particular was one of the main targets of deists due to their belief in the supremacy of reason, which does 
not recognize the validity of miracles or miraculous occurrences, such as the revelation. In order to 
strengthen their stance deists “invoked the support of all who, in time or space, had ever shown that it was 
possible to live a good life without knowing anything about revealed religion” (63). Among those cited 
were the Chinese, the Egyptians, the Greeks and the Romans, and the Italian rationalists. The Birth of 
Orientalism (2011), the extensive study of Urs App, points at the role played by the flux of information 
coming from the newly “discovered” lands such as Japan, Americas and China in fortifying the case of 
deists through casting a hard-to-erase doubt on the Bible-based worldview not only by the mere existence 
of people hitherto unbeknownst to them but also by means of texts such as Chinese annals that might be as 
old as, or even older than, Noah’s flood. For instance, Charles Blount in his attack on Christianity in 
Oracles of Reason (1693) drew on ancient sources as well as on the religious documents of Islam, 
Hinduism, and Zoroastrianism (Herrick: 6). 
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religion, namely the distinction made between esoteric and exoteric forms of religion, 
which parallels the distinction between faith and ritual. The significance of this 
distinction for the purposes of this chapter is quite noteworthy because a similar approach 
predominated the late eighteenth-century descriptions of Sufism.113 Certainly, the “two-
religion theory” 114 is not a novelty; ancient Greeks viewed Egyptian religion consisting 
of two sets of teachings because of their belief that the Egyptian priests had encoded 
secret esoteric teachings in hieroglyphs while conveying only the exoteric teachings of 
religion to the masses. The same distinction was used in early Christian literature in the 
attempts to understand and explain heathen creeds around the Mediterranean. The 
distinction gained popularity in the Renaissance when the “hermetic texts,” that is texts 
ascribed to Hermes Trimegistus, were translated into Latin and presented as “vestiges of 
ancient Egyptian ‘esoteric’ monotheism” (App 2011: 2). Especially the Renaissance 
invention of  “prisca theologia” (ancient theology), which began with the “provocative 
paganism” of Georgius Gemistus Pletho (1360-1454) and developed by Marsilio Ficino 
(1433-1499), created a strand of early modern thought that would re-emerge in 
subsequent centuries.115 Thanks to the much discussed incorporation of the prisca 
                                                
113 Sufis themselves adopted such a two-tiered approach to Islam. However, the Sufi approach shows 
significant differences with the “two-religion theory” upheld by Jesuits and  the like.   
114 Burton Feldman and Robert Richardson describe this theory basically to be positing “one high religion 
for the wise and the initiated and one vulgar, priest-ridden, superstition-filled religion for the herd” (4) 
115 Pletho’s claim that Plato was an heir to a long tradition of truth, that of Zoroaster and the Pythagoreans 
was taken by Ficino who argued for a single “fountain of truth from which run two parallel streams,” that 
is, philosophy and theology (Schmitt: 508). While the Scriptures form the basis of true religion and the 
writings of Plato the basis of true philosophy, nonetheless, Ficino argues, even before Plato there had 
already been a long development of philosophical truth, which is found principally in the prisca theologia, 
a long religio-philosophical tradition – through Zoroaster, Hermes Trimegistus, Orpheus, Aglaophemus and 
Pythagoras – dating back to Moses. One of the most significant outcomes of the Renaissance discussions 
on prisca theologia is the invention of philosophia perennis (eternal philosophy), which according to 
Wouter Hanegraaff was basically the reconceptualization of prisca theologia in the sixteenth century, 
specifically by Agostino Steuco (1497–1548), a humanist Biblical scholar (390). The major work of 
Steuco, De perenni philosophia (1540), which was dedicated to Paul III, is based on the idea that “there is 
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theologia tradition, missionaries were able to incorporate non-Abrahamic Eastern 
religions, starting with Japanese to be followed by Chinese and Indian, into the Biblical 
universe.116 Such missionary reports, to use App’s words,  “created patterns of 
understanding whose effects are shown to be pervasive in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries and did not abate in the nineteenth century” (10). 
Joseph-Francois Lafitau (1681-1746) was among such Jesuit missionaries who 
sought ways to incorporate non-Abrahamic religions and people into Mosaic history. 
Lafitau’s Moeurs des sauvages Ameriquains comparees aux moeurs des premiers temps 
(1724), the book he wrote after completing his mission in Sault St. Louis with the 
Iroquois, shared the perspective inherent in the grand project William Jones undertook in 
India (App 2009: 23). What Lafitau’s research taught him was that not only “peoples that 
are called barbarians have a religion” but also “this religion shows connections of such 
great conformity with that of the most ancient times ... that one feels due to this similarity 
                                                
one principle of all things, of which there has always been one and the same knowledge among all peoples” 
and aims to demonstrate the harmony of classical philosophy with the central tenets of the Catholic faith 
(Schmitt: 517). This single truth pervades all historical periods and though it may not be well known in all 
periods, it is accessible to those who search for it. According to Steuco, knowledge, which was handed 
down to man by God, soon became dissipated and scattered and now it seems to people like a mere story or 
dream. The thread of truth, however, runs through history, preserved most fully, in the tradition of the 
prisca theologia (Schmitt: 517-8). The nineteenth-century occultists reconstructed this view under the 
influence of “the oriental renaissance” and comparative religion, to be finally adopted in the New Age 
movement (Hanegraaff: 390). For the historical development and analysis see Charles B. Schmitt’s 
“Perennial Philosophy: From Agostino Steuco to Leibniz”, Daniel P. Walker’s The Ancient Theology, 
Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann’s Philosophia Perennis: Historical Outlines of Western Spirituality in 
Ancient, Medieval, and Early Modern Thought.   
116 For instance, the teachings of Zen Buddhism in Japan such as “quiet meditation, passivity, nothingness, 
all-oneness” were taken as tenets of the “esoteric” aspect which, according to mid-sixteenth-century 
reports, constituted the “real” teachings of Buddhism’s founder Xaca, whose creed, it was believed, had 
come from India via China to Japan. While the so-called esoteric aspects of Buddhism do not, to say the 
least, contradict Christianity, the ones committing it, such as transmigration, were considered to be “outer” 
or “provisional” teachings of the founder (App: 10). Comments on Japanese religion did not constitute an 
exception. App notes that early European perceptions of Japanese religion were extremely influential and 
also shaped the perception of Chinese religions (from the 1590s) and Indian religions (particularly by 
Roberto de Nobili in the first decades of the seventeenth century) (Ibid). 
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that everywhere the same principles and the same fundamentals are present” (Ibid). 
Lafitau did not base his argument on the distinction between esoteric and exoteric 
teachings of religion, but what he comes up with describes a similar phenomenon. He 
basically proposes that “the same principles and the same fundamentals” indicate the 
existence of an Ur-religion, “a formed and public cult consisting of many traditions, 
principles of virtue, observances, and legal ceremonies” (App: 25). Lafitau maintained 
that the pure Ur-religion was far older than Moses yet had been “altered” by various 
nations (24-25). As such the pure and universal teachings are comparable to esoteric 
teachings while the “corrupt” and provisional ones are to exoteric teachings. 
Lafitau was by no means an idiosyncratic figure; pure monotheism as Ur-religion 
had been endorsed by many in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: the Cambridge 
Platonist Ralph Cudworth (1617-1688) ventured to prove that all ancient religions and 
philosophies display manifestations of an original monotheism that had morphed in 
various ways (App 2009: 30); renowned deists John Toland and John Trechard argued 
that Christianity and pagan religions alike represented corruptions of the simple primal 
religion (Feldman & Richardson: 4); Michael Andrew Ramsey (1686-1743) held the 
esoteric essence of Egyptian religions to be pure monotheism that was transmitted to 
ancient Greeks and represented by Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, Socrates, Plato, Democritus 
of Abdera, Epicurus and Lucretius (App: 36); Jean-Sylvain Bailly (1736-1793) claimed 
that “humanity’s initial pure monotheism and enlightened philosophy had soon 
degenerated into materialism and gross cults” and advanced a hypothesis of a wise 
primeval “instructor people” (App: 49). Such arguments need to be mentioned because, 
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as the studies of Urs App and Bruce Lincoln demonstrate, Jones was heavily influenced 
by these figures, specifically by Ramsey, in his conceptualization of natural history.  
It was not only the Western intellectuals who endeavored to prove the existence 
of a primeval religion. Quite a similar approach to history of religions was promoted 
during the same time in India by a Zoroastrian author incorrectly identified by William 
Jones as Mohsin Fani, a learned Kashmiri Sufi of the seventeenth century.117 The book 
Dabestan-e Mazaheb (School of Religions), which is believed to have been written 
sometime between 1645 and 1658, is a comparative examination of religions and sects.118 
While Dabestan constitutes one of the major sources of Jones in his studies on religion 
and history, the book relies heavily on Dasatir, another Zoroastrian tract penned by Adar 
Kaivan. Not long after Jones’s extreme approbation of Dabistan the credibility of 
Dabistan as well as Dasatir was questioned by orientalists, whose research has revealed 
these texts to be “products of a heterodox Parsi sect” (Lincoln 2002: 13). Azar Kaivan (d. 
between 1609 and 1618), a Zoroastrian high priest who founded the above-mentioned 
heterodox sect – Ishraqi or Illuminative School – produced the texts with his followers 
presenting a made-up primordial prehistory so as to “dignify and legitimate their own 
brand of Zoroastrianism over all other religious traditions” (Ibid). This rather obscure 
                                                
117 The book Dabestan-e mazaheb is actually anonymous and the author refers to himself only as “the 
author” (nāma-­ negār) and “the writer of the acts” (kerdār-gozār). Three different theories regarding the 
identity of the author have been proposed so far.  Jones’s identification is among the three but it was 
rejected by Captain Vans Kennedy and William Erskine. Some historians and authors of biographical 
dictionaries identified the author as Mir Du’l-feqar Ardestani (ca. 1617-70), better known under his pen 
name Molla Mowbad or Mowbadshah, and this attribution is now generally accepted. It is said that the 
author composed most of the Dabestan during the reign of Shah Jahan (1628-57), traveling to various parts 
of India in order to study different religious creeds. For further information, see 
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/dabestan-e-madaheb.  
118 The Dabestan consists of twelve chapters, further subdivided into several sections. Each of the chapters 
explains the beliefs of a different religious group: respectively Parsis, Hindus, Tibetans, Jews, Christians, 
Muslims, Sadeqis, Wahedis, Rowshanis, Ilahis, Philosophers, and the Sufis. 
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text, which came to the attention of Jones via a Bengali informant in 1787, immediately 
aroused Jones’s enthusiasm on account of explaining the missing parts in Jones’s scheme. 
Its content, says Jones, “at once dissipated the cloud, and cast a gleam of light on the 
primeval history of Iran and of the human race, of which I had long despaired, and which 
could hardly have dawned from any other quarter" (182).  
 What does all this have to do with Sufism? The answer to this question lies in 
Jones’s list of “Objects of Enquiry During My Residence in Asia,” written down on July 
12, 1783 on his way to India, and the annual discourses he gave at the Asiatick Society of 
Bengal. Jones’s list of “Objects of Enquiry,” argues Edward Said, is an indicator of the 
entanglement of oriental studies with imperialism, but the research interests outlined on 
the list indicate a greater extent of the project of Jones.119 It consists of sixteen topics of 
investigation, not nine as Said suggests, which interestingly enough includes items such 
as “The History of the Ancient World,” “Proofs and Illustrations of Scripture,” and 
“Traditions concerning the Deluge, &c.” While most studies on Jones focus on his 
linguistic endeavors, a number of noteworthy scholars point at the rather ignored 
ethnographic and theological character of his inquiries. Trautmann convincingly argues 
that the ethnology of Jones could be encapsulated within the Mosaic frame, which “is 
supplied by the story of the descent of Noah in the book of Genesis, attributed to Moses, 
in the Bible” (40). In that respect Jones’s initial motivation is no less different than that of 
the Jesuit missionaries who tried to prove the validity of the Biblical account despite the 
existence of non-Abrahamic people arguing otherwise. In a similar vein, Bruce Lincoln 
argues that Jones had “since childhood been convinced of the inspired, inerrant nature of 
                                                
119 For a discussion on Edward Said’s use of this list see App 2009: 1-2; and Lincoln 1999: 84. 
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Scripture” and that “the ultimate goal toward which he organized his lectures was 
‘scientific’ validation of the Genesis account (1999: 91). But Jones’s quest intended to do 
more than prove the validity of the Biblical account; he was “in search of God’s original 
teachings” (App 2009: 71).  
 In his Third Annual Discourse (1786), Jones explicates his own project within the 
Asiatick Society of Bengal as “to prepare a series of short dissertations, unconnected in 
their titles and subjects, but all tending to a common point of no small importance in the 
pursuit of interesting truths” (1807: 24-25). As aptly noted “the hypothesis of a common 
origin of the major peoples of Asia and the question of congruence with the traditional 
biblical account was at the center of Jones’s series of discourses” (App 2009: 41). Jones, 
in fact, hinted at his grand project in the conclusion of his essay “On the Gods of Greece, 
Italy, and India” (1784): “We shall, perhaps, agree at last with Mr. Bryant, that 
Egyptians, Indians, Greeks, and Italians, proceeded originally from one central place, and 
that the same people carried their religion and sciences into China and Japan: may we not 
add, even to Mexico and Peru?” (1807: 387). At that point he was undecided as to where 
that Urheimlat might be: “But which was the original system and which the copy, I will 
not presume to decide; nor are we likely, I believe, to be soon furnished with sufficient 
grounds for a decision” (386). About eight years later, however, after reading the 
Dabistan, he seems to have found it out. Throughout the seven essays that he delivered at 
the annual meetings of the Asiatick Society, he aimed at finding that “one central place”, 
which he would claim in 1792 to be Iran.120  
                                                
120 See Jones’s “Ninth Annual Discourse” (1792) in 1807: 185-205. 
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If we discard the first two discourses of Jones, we might say that the seven talks 
he presented on “Hindus,” “Arabs,” “Tartars,” “Persians,” “Chinese,” “the borderers, 
mountaineers and islanders of Asia,” and “the origin and families of nations” comprised 
the heart of his project devoted to find out the common origin.121 Bruce Lincoln rightly 
notes that Jones followed a consistent pattern in his annual addresses, covering 
geography, history, and cultural accomplishments in sequence.  In the last sphere he 
concentrates on four specific domains, namely, language & letters, philosophy & 
religion, architecture & sculpture, and lastly science & arts.122  
It is in these annual discourses, especially in the language & letters and 
philosophy & religion sections that Jones not only mentions Sufism, but also situates it 
within his grand scheme of religions and history. Although harshly criticized by Max 
Muller for “the utter baselessness of its comparisons and identifications,” Jones’s essay 
“On the Gods of Greece, Italy, and India” (1784) occupies a pivotal position in Jones’s 
conceptualization of primeval religion. The essay, which takes its lead from “features of 
resemblance, too strong to have been accidental” between “different systems of 
polytheism” (1807: 321), relies heavily on the idea of a single origin and divine 
revelation as maintained in the Old Testament (App: 11).123 This general affinity between 
                                                
121 In Jones’s words: “The five principal nations, who have in different ages divided among themselves, as a 
kind of inheritance, the vast continent of Asia, with the many islands depending on it, are the Indians, the 
Chinese, the Tartars, the Arabs, and the Persians: who they severally were, whence, and when they came, 
where they now are settled, and what advantage a more perfect knowledge of them all may bring to our 
European world, will be shown, I trust, in five distinct essays; the last of which will demonstrate the 
connexion or diversity between them, and solve the great problem, whether they had any common origin, 
and whether that origin was the same, which we generally ascribe to them” (1807: 27-28). 
122 In these sections Jones not only describes but also evaluates the cultures in question. His judgments are 
based on what he took to be levels of accomplishment and the extent to which one civilization influenced 
or was influenced by others (Lincoln: 88).  
123 “It is my design in this essay to point out such a resemblance between the popular worship of the old 
Greeks and Italians and that of the Hindus; nor can there be room to doubt of a great familiarity between 
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polytheistic cults, however, does not form the original religion of primeval mankind; it 
was, rather, a “deviation” from an earlier religion, which consisted of “the rational 
adoration of the only true GOD” (Jones 1807: 321). The Ur-religion as imagined by 
Jones was a pure monotheism like that of Lafitau, but it had “too early” metamorphosed 
into, “pre-mosaic united idolatry”, which based the foundation of prevalent forms of 
polytheisms. Jones believed in an initial divine revelation to mankind and was convinced 
that despite the dissemination of polytheistic traditions the core of primeval monotheism 
had been continuously transmitted and survived in ancient texts (App: 71-2). 
Furthermore, Jones insisted that not only all his historical researches “confirmed the 
Mosaic accounts of the primitive world” but also he was able to locate “the true center of 
languages, and of arts” in “Iran or Persia in its largest sense” (Jones 1807: 135). Although 
he was unable to find answers to questions regarding antediluvian history and religion, he 
proclaimed in the “Ninth Anniversary Discourse,” “On the Origin and Families of 
Nations” (1792), his conviction that Hindus (Persians and Chinese among them), Arabs 
and Tartars constituted the three primordial races. They were all descended from Noah, 
circa 1200 BC, and separated at Babel, which he located at the center of Iran between the 
Oxus and Euphrates, and between the Caucasus and the Ganges.124 This division of 
people was permanent, and no amount of research would succeed in restoring the unity 
that was sundered or in recovering the original language (Lincoln: 93). 
                                                
their strange religions and that of Egypt, China, Persia, Phrygia, Phoenicia, Syria; and to which perhaps we 
may safely add some of the southern kingdoms and even islands of America; while the Gothic system, 
which prevailed in the northern regions of Europe, was not merely similar to those of Greece and Italy, but 
almost the same in another dress with an embroidery of images apparently Asiatick” (1807: 321). 
124 Jones repeats this point in 1792 in another essay entitled “On the Mystical Poetry of the Persians and 
Hindus”: “’Plato travelled into Italy and Egypt, says Claude Fleury, ‘to learn the theology of the pagans as 
its fountainhead:’ its true fountain, however, was neither in Italy nor in Egypt (though considerable streams 
of it had been conducted thither by Pythagoras and the family of Misra ), but in Persia or India, which the 
founder of the Italick sect [Academicks] had visited with a similar design” (1824: 131).  
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 The impossibility of recovering the original language notwithstanding, Jones was 
certain that at least certain vestiges of the “ancient theology” are quite present in certain 
non-Judea-Christian philosophies and texts such as the Vedas, Sufi poetry, the 
commentaries of Shankara, and alike. In the religion & philosophy subsection of his 
“Discourse on the Persians” (1789), Jones notes that “the primeval religion of Iran, if we 
rely on the authorities adduced by Mohsani Fani, was that which Newton calls the oldest 
(and it may justly be called the noblest) of all religions” (1824: 99). The basic tenets of 
this religion are listed as “a firm belief, that One Supreme God made the world by his 
power, and continually governed it by his providence; a pious fear, love and adoration of 
Him; a due reverence for parents and aged persons; a fraternal affection for the whole 
human species, and a compassionate tenderness even for the brute creation” (Ibid). Based 
on his reading of Dabistan, Jones adds that because “a system of devotion so pure and 
sublime” could not survive for a long time “among mortals,” the primeval religion of Iran 
degenerated into several sorts of popular worship, one of which was a “purely Sabian 
popular worship” that took the adoration of celestial bodies into its centre. However, 
again based on Dabistan, Jones argues “the first corruption of the purest and oldest 
religion was the system of Indian Theology, invented by the Brahmans and prevalent in 
these territories, where the book of Mahabad or Menu is at this hour the standard of all 
religious and moral duties” (101). 
 The philosophy of old Persians, Jones believed, should be analyzed in connection 
with their religion (102). Citing, once again, Mohsan Fani, Jones maintains that these 
philosophers, who were “assiduous observers of the luminaries,” “are said to have known 
the most wonderful powers of nature, and thence to have acquired the same of magicians 
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and enchanters” (103). The metaphysical theology of the Persian philosophers that “has 
been professed immemorially by a numerous sect of Persians and Hindus” was, 
according to Jones, “carried in part into Greece, and prevails even now among the learned 
Muselmans, who sometimes avow it without reserve” (103). Such “Muselmans” in 
Jones’s scheme, as a matter of fact, were the Sufis: 
The modern philosophers of this persuasion are called Sufi’s, either from the 
Greek word for a sage, or from the woolen mantle, which they used to wear in 
some provinces of Persia: their fundamental tenets are, that nothing exists 
absolutely but GOD: that the human soul is an emanation from his essence, and, 
though divided for a time from its heavenly source, will be finally re-united with 
it; that the highest possible happiness will arise from its reunion, and that the chief 
good of mankind, in this transitory world, consists in as perfect an union with the 
Eternal Spirit as the incumbrances of a mortal frame will allow; that, for this 
purpose, they should break all connexion (or taalluk, as they call it), with 
extrinsick objects, and pass through life without attachments, as a swimmer in the 
ocean strikes freely without the impediment of clothes; that they should be 
straight and free as the cypress, whose fruit is hardly perceptible, and not sink 
under a load, like fruit-trees attached to a trellis; that, if mere earthly charms have 
power to influence the soul, the idea of celestial beauty must overwhelm it in 
extatick delight; that, for want of apt words to express the divine perfections and 
the ardour of devotion, we must borrow such expressions as approach the nearest 
to our ideas, and speak of Beauty and Love in a transcendent and mystical sense; 
that, like a reed torn from its native bank, like wax separated from its delicious 
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honey, the soul of man bewails its disunion with melancholy musick, and sheds 
burning tears, like the lighted taper, waiting passionately for the moment of its 
extinction, as a disengagement from earthly trammels, and the means of returning 
to its Only Beloved. (103-104). 
The description, in itself, is not unacceptable; to the contrary no scholar of Sufism would 
object to the listed tenets of Sufis. Furthermore the idea of a primordial faith revealed by 
God to a select few is not a foreign notion for Muslims.125 The problem with the 
description, however, lies in the framework: Sufism is basically taken out of its Islamic 
context and is incorporated into the grand history of ancient theology. Of course no 
religious tradition can develop and survive without having interacted with other 
traditions, faiths or philosophies. In that regard one cannot propose the existence of pure 
Sufism. What Jones and those following him claimed, however, is not limited to the 
interaction among diverse traditions; they completely ignored Sufism’s organic ties with 
Islam and implanted it within another tradition, the validity of which rests on the Bible. 
Such vestiges of ancient theology were important for Jones as long as they agreed with 
Christian teachings. The appeal of this argument is undeniable; E.B. Cowell (1826-1903), 
a renowned translator of Persian poetry and the first professor of Sanskrit at Cambridge 
University, stated in 1848 “Sufeyism may be pronounced the nearest approach to 
Christianity that poor fallen man can attain by his own unaided efforts” (44). To Jones, 
                                                
125 Muslims themselves have developed a notion similar to that of ancient theology regarding Islam; it is 
basically argued that since the first revelation communicated to Adam there has been only one single 
religion. Until the time of prophet Muhammad that primordial religion was revealed at many times and 
places to several prophets among whom Abraham, Moses and Jesus are considered to be the most 
important ones. In time, however, the pure message of God had somehow been modified due to some 
misconstructions. At last with Muhammad this primordial faith had been revealed once again in its 
complete and perfect form.  
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the philosophy of Rumi and the poems of Hafiz express the same belief system as the 
Vedas purely because they fed on the same spring, that is, the pure monotheist religion of 
the primeval Iranians. The rest of the description underlines this point in a 
straightforward way: 
“Such in part is the wild and enthusiastick religion of the modern Persian poets, 
especially of the sweet HA’FIZ and the great Maulavi: such is the system of the 
Vedanti philosophers and best lyrick poets of India; and, as it was a system of the 
highest antiquity in both nations, it may be added to the many other proofs of an 
immemorial affinity between them. (104) 
In 1791, Jones wrote down another piece, “On the Mystical Poetry of the Persians and 
Hindus,” dealing with the manifestations of the common system of Vedantis and Sufis in 
literature. This time, it seems that, rather ascribing a common origin to the Vedanta 
school and the Sufis, he prefers to assign the Vedanta school to be the source of 
inspiration of modern Sufis: 
A figurative mode of expressing the fervor of devotion, or the ardent love of 
created spirits towards their beneficent Creator, has prevailed from time 
immemorial in Asia; particularly among Persian theists, both ancient Hushangis 
and modern Sufis, who seem to have borrowed it from the Indian philosophers of 
the Vedanta school; and their doctrines are also believed to be the source of that 
sublime, but poetical, theology, which glows and sparkles in the writings of the 
old Academicks. (1824: 131)   
Jones’s endeavor to prove the compatibility of the vestiges of ancient theology with 
Christianity by comparing the contemporary Western ideas about Divine Love or unity 
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with God and the tenets of Sufism constitutes another striking point of this specific 
discourse. After quoting rather long passages on the concept of Divine Love by Isaac 
Barrow (1630-1677), a reputed English Christian theologian, and mathematician, and on 
unity with God by Jacques Necker (1732-1804), finance minister of Louis XVI but drew 
the attention of Jones with his work De l'importance des opinions religieuses, Jones 
repeats his argument: the same points would be done by the Sufis and Yogis.  
Now the passage from Barrow (which borders, I admit, on quietism and 
enthusiastic devotion) differs only from the mystical theology of the Sufis and 
Yogis, as the flowers and fruits of Europe differ in scent and flavor from those of 
Asia, or as European differs from Asiatick eloquence; the same strain, in poetical 
measure, would rise up to the odes of Spenser on Divine Love and Beauty, and, in 
a higher key with richer embellishments, to the songs of Hafiz and Jayadeva, the 
raptures of the Masnavi, and the mysteries of the Bhagavat. [...] 
If these two passages were translated into Sanskrit and Persian, I am confident 
that the Vedantis and Sufis would consider them as an epitome of their common 
system; for they concur in believing, that the souls of men differ infinitely in 
degree, but not at all in kind, from the divine spirit, of which they are particles 
and in which they will ultimately be absorbed; that the spirit of God pervades the 
universe, always immediately present to his work, and consequently always in 
substance, that he alone is perfect benevolence, perfect truth, perfect beauty; that 
the love of him alone is real and genuine love, while that of all other objects is 
absurd and illusory, that the beauties of nature. [...] From these principles flow a 
thousand metaphors and poetical figures, which abound in the sacred poems of 
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the Persians and Hindus, who seem to mean the same thing in substance, and 
differ only in expression as their languages differ in idiom! (135-138)     
 The implications of Jones’s approach to Sufism are significant. He picks and 
chooses from vastly rich and living traditions only the parts that are of interest to his 
hypothesis. The common denominator he finds among different philosophies, religious 
traditions and faiths may not be unobjectionable, but it is contrary to logic to equate these 
traditions based on the existence of such common traits. In his text-based approach Jones 
created a version of Sufism that is fixed in time yet ahistorical and that is confined to the 
beliefs of Sufism, analysis of which, would be incomplete and incorrect without any 
reference to its practices. Unlike travelers to the Orient, Jones was first and foremost 
interested in the philosophy of the Sufis, not their rituals. At no point in his discourses he 
talks about the rituals performed by Sufis – hence no mention of the hypocrisy of 
dervishes! Among several factors, I believe, the changing conceptualization of religion 
stands out as the primary reason for this purely textual approach. In the first section of 
this chapter, I mentioned that since the Renaissance the practical aspect of religions 
occupied a considerable space in ethnographic accounts. In time what happened is that 
“‘religion’ in relation to ritual practice became an item in an inventory of cultural topics 
that could be presented either ethnographically in terms a particular people, ..., or in a 
cross-cultural encyclopedia under the heading of “ritual” or ‘religion’” (Smith: 270). 
With the increasing impact of Reformation was observed another shift in understanding 
of the term “religion” that culminated during the Enlightenment. This time it was from 
ritual to belief.126 By the mid-eighteenth century, the “essentially Catholic understanding 
                                                
126 Talal Asad in Genealogies of Religion (1993) eloquently discusses the repercussions of the post-
Reformation reconceptualization of religion in terms of belief.   
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of religion” in close proximity to ritual has been decisively altered and the shift to belief 
as the defining characteristic of religion could be observed in the German preference for 
the term Glaube over Religion, and in the increasing English usage of “faiths” as a 
synonym for “religions” (Smith: 271). Jonathan Smith reveals that even the dictionary 
and encyclopedia definitions of religion reflect the irrevocable change: 
Samuel Johnson, in his Dictionary of the English Language (1755), defines 
religion as “virtue, as founded upon reverence of God, and expectations of future 
rewards and punishments.” The first edition of the Encyclopedia Brittanica 
(1771) titled its entry “Religion, or Theology,” defining the topic in the opening 
paragraph: “To know God, and to render him a reasonable service, are the two 
principal objects of religion. ... Man appears to be formed to adore, but not to 
comprehend, the Supreme Being.” Terms such as “reverence,” “service,” “adore,” 
and “worship” in these sorts of definitions have been all but evacuated of ritual 
connotations, and seem more to denote a state of mind, a transition begun by 
Reformation figures such as Zwingli and Calvin who understood “religion” 
primarily as “piety.” (271) 
It is no surprise that the new understanding of religion putting emphasis on belief both 
precipitated and facilitated the arguments of Jones and alike. By means of incomplete 
renderings of diverse yet similar traditions such as Hinduism and Sufism, as we shall see, 
Jones did manage to influence a generation of readers regarding ancient theology.  
 
 
 
 91 
(ii) The Legacy of Jones 
The “discoveries” of Jones irretrievably changed the course of Oriental studies and drew 
the attention of the leading intellectuals of his time.127 Furthermore, Jones paved up a new 
path for Sufi studies, on which Orientalists from similar backgrounds, such as Lt. James 
William Graham, Dr. John Leyden, and Sir John Malcolm. Whether or not the 
newcomers to the field agree with Jones’s grand scheme of history of religions and 
people or share his enthusiasm regarding the universal tenets found in Sufism, they 
immediately subscribe to the argument regarding non-Islamic origins of Sufism, even 
through making appeals to Islamic sources.128 These figures, unlike Jones, also appeal to 
the alleged hostility between orthodox Muslims and Sufis. For instance, Sir John 
Malcolm, who considered Sufis to be “philosophical devotees” of “pure Deism,” (219) 
not only took the supposed Indian origins for granted, but also presented the hostile views 
of a certain member of the Shi’ite hierarchy in the city of Kermanshah towards Sufis as 
the common feelings of orthodox Muslims in general (Ernst 1997: 11-12).  
The studies of Jones at the Asiatick Society rendered another significant 
development in Sufi studies.  Up to this point, discussions on Sufism were limited to brief 
                                                
127 Asiatic Researches, the journal of the society, was extremely popular throughout the Western world and 
helped the Asiatick Society to get into contact with other similar societies. Some of the volumes were even 
translated into German and French. All of the leading orientalists of the time from Sylvestre de Sacy to 
Wilhelm Purgstall von Hammer as well as belletrists and philosophers of the time (e.g. Goethe, Herder, 
etc.) were subscribers to the journal.  
128 Sir John Malcolm, for instance, presented a very negative picture of Sufism although he did not disagree 
with Jones regarding the basic tenets of Sufism. In his History of Persia (1815) he presented Sufism as an 
imported philosophy from India to Muslim lands yet his presentation carries on the negative image of the 
previous eras: “It is in India, beyond all other climes, that this delusive and visionary doctrine has most 
flourished. There is, in the habits of that nation, and in the character of the Hindoo religion, what peculiarly 
cherishes the mysterious spirit of holy abstraction in which it is founded; and we may grant our belief to the 
conjecture which assumes that India is the source of from which other nations have derived this mystic 
worship of the Divinity (268). 
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observations in the context of remarks on Persian history and culture. In 1819, however, 
the first separate treatment of Sufism in a European language was composed by an officer 
of the East India Company named James William Graham.129 In his article “A Treatise on 
Sufism, or Mahomedan Mysticism” Graham presents Sufism as a state of mind having 
nothing to do with Islam. According to Carl Ernst, Graham finds Sufism as an attractive 
system “precisely to the degree that it denies the law of Muhammad and approaches 
Christianity” (1997: 13). In this quite descriptive article filled with information based on 
Persian treatises that he had access to in Western India, Graham even explains the stages 
of a Sufi adept on his path to unity with God. However, Graham’s explanation of “the 
doctrine of Sufism” right at the beginning sets the tone of the rest of the article: 
With regard to the religion (if it can be so termed in the general acceptation of that 
word) or rather doctrine and tenets of Sufis, it is requisite to observe, first, that 
any person, or a person of any religion or sect, may be a Sufi: the mystery lies in 
this; -- a total disengagement of the mind from all temporal concerns and worldly 
pursuits; an entire throwing off not only of every superstition, doubt, or the like, 
but of the practical mode of worship, ceremonies, &c. laid down in every religion, 
which the Mahomedans term Sheryat, being the law, or canonical law; and 
entertaining solely mental abstraction, and contemplation of the soul and Deity, 
their affinity, and the correlative situation in which they stand: in fine, it is that 
                                                
129 The article was originally presented in 1811 at one of the meetings of the Asiatic Society. It had become 
one of the primary sources for those interested in Sufism. The above-mentioned Sir John Malcolm, for 
instance, basically paraphrases the information he gleaned through Graham’s article and acknowledges his 
authority: “There cannot be higher authority than this gentleman, who adds to great learning a singular 
knowledge of the opinions and usages of these remarkable oriental devotees” (270, note g). Similarly, the 
renowned French orientalist Sylvestre de Sacy uses Graham as his main source in his comments in Pend 
nameh: Ou le Livre des Conseils de Ferid-Eddin Attar (1819) on the origins of Sufism.  
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spiritual intercourse of the soul with its Maker, that disregards and disclaims all 
ordinances and outward forms, of what sect or religion soever; such as 
observances of feasts, fasts, stated periods of prayer, particular kinds of meat to be 
eaten, ablutions, pilgrimages, and suchlike other rites and ceremonies which come 
under the head of practical worship (Jismani amul), being the deeds of the law, in 
contradistinction to mental or spiritual worship (Roohani amul), that is, I take it to 
be, grace or faith. (90-91) 
Throughout his discussion, Graham insists on explaining Sufi concepts as identical with 
Indian, Christian and ancient Greek ones (92-93). He further claims that the British 
officials in India themselves were regarded as Sufis by the Indians because of their “non-
observance here of any rites of forms, conceiving a worship of the Deity in mind and 
adherence to morally sufficient” (95-96). He concludes, “the present freethinker or 
modern philosopher of Europe would be esteemed as a sort of Sufi in the world, and not 
the one retired therefrom” (96).  
 De-Islamization of Sufism as such was not peculiar to the British Orientalists. 
Their studies kindled a transnational interest in Oriental literatures and religions, 
especially in the classical literature of Persia and the ancient religion of India. Shortly 
after the publication of the above-mentioned discourses and articles, French and German 
orientalists showed learned interest in Persian poetry and Sufism almost 
contemporaneously.130 Sylvestre de Sacy in Paris, Wilhelm Purgstall von Hammer in 
                                                
130 In 1795, Louis-Mathieu Langlès became the founder-director the Ecole des langues orientales vivantes 
in Paris, which is still operating under the name of Institut national des langues et civilisations orientales 
(INALCO). Silvestre de Sacy, who was the first professor of Arabic at the Ecole de langues orientales, was 
appointed about the same time, as the chair of newly created Persian chair at the College de France. In 
1822, a Societe Asiatique was set up in Paris, the first meeting of which was chaired, again, by Sacy. 
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Vienna and F.A.G. Tholuck in Germany provided annotated translations of texts and 
poems written by Sufis.  
 
(iii) The Invention of Pantheistic Sufism 
The relocation of Sufism within the tradition of original monotheism with Indian origins 
have precipitated another major vein of perception that Jones and his friends had not 
probably anticipated: Sufism as a pantheistic philosophy. The overall impact of this 
derivative interpretation is not easy to assess but suffice it to say that numerous 
contemporary scholars of Sufism from Carl Ernst, A. J. Arberry, and Louis Massignon to 
René Guénon have felt the need to discuss the baselessness of this specific interpretation 
in their books. 
The first question that needs to be addressed in this section is “how did the 
original monotheism theory turn into pantheism?” In order to provide a satisfactory 
answer to this question we need to turn our attention to Germany, in specific to the 
Fruhromantiks who grew up within the "pantheistic controversy" (Pantheismusstreit) that 
occupied the greatest minds of the time such as Moses Mendelsohn, Johann G. Herder, 
and F. Jacobi.131 It has been pointed out that pantheism, or Spinozism as the two terms 
                                                
Shortly thereafter the society commenced the publication of its journal, the Journal Asiatique. The rise of 
oriental studies in Germany is dated to the turn of the eighteenth century, when a number of German 
scholars trained in Paris, many by Sacy, returned Germany to conduct their researches. By mid-nineteenth 
century Orientalist institutions such as the Deutsche Morgenlandsiche Gesselschaft began to be set up.  
131 The trigger firing a popular discussion of pantheism in Germany was Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi's 
revelation to Moses Mendelssohn in 1783 regarding the confession G. E. Lessing made shortly before his 
death of being a Spinozist. The controversy, which started as semiprivate exchange of letters between 
Jacobi and Mendelssohn, became public with Mendelssohn's 1786 Morgenstunden and Jacobi's Briefe uber 
die Lehren von Spinoza (1786). In 1787 Herder got involved in the controversy with his Gott, Einige 
Gesprache (1787). At the core of the controversy lies the problem of Spinozism being atheistic. For further 
information on Pantheismusstreit and the pantheistic vision of the see Lee Tveson's The Avatars of Thrice 
Great Hermes (1982), Nicholas Riasanovsky's The Emergence of Romanticism (1992), Julia Lamm's 
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were used synonymously, had been prevalent in German thinking since the end of the 
seventeenth century (Lamm: 167; Beiser: 176).132 With the pantheistic controversy 
initiated by Moses Mendelssohn and Friedrich H. Jacobi, yet further complicated by 
Herder, pantheism as a controversial term became a buzzword in the parlance of early 
eighteenth-century German thinkers. However one should bear in mind that the meaning 
attributed to pantheism had changed quite drastically within romantic circles 
predominantly owing to Herder’s reinterpretation of Spinoza.133 To put it shortly, Herder 
attacked both the notion of a personal, extra-mundane God and the simplistic version of 
pantheism that equates the world/universe with God: “God is not the world, and the 
world is not God, so much is certain. But it seems to me that with the 'extra' and the 
'supra,' not much good is done. When one speaks of God one must forget all idols of 
space and time" (trans. by Lamm: 173). Taking their clue from Herder’s “organic 
monism”, Romantic thinkers such as Schelling, Holderlin, Novalis and F. Schlegel 
                                                
"Romanticism and Pantheism"(2010), Frederick C. Beiser's The Romantic Imperative (2003), and in 
Richard King's Orientalism and Religion (1999).  
132 Although the term "pantheism" was coined by John Toland (1660-1722) in the early eighteenth century 
so as to distinguish it from atheism, for many, Spinoza's pantheism had continued to be indistinguishable 
from atheism. Generally recapitulated with his oft-quoted dictum deus sive natura, Spinoza’s pantheism 
proposes answers to questions preoccupying philosophers and theologians regarding the presumed conflict 
between reason and faith, or in other terms science and religion with an identification of God with the 
infinitude of nature. As noted by Frederick Beiser, by divinizing nature as much as naturalizing the divine, 
Spinoza have "made a religion out of science, a science out of religion" (175). 
133 Julia Lamm and Frederick Beiser consider Herder's Gott, Einige Gesprache (1787) the turning point in 
the reception of Spinoza in Germany. First of all, Herder opposes Jacobi on Spinoza representing an 
alternative to atheism and theism, but, at the same time, believes that Spinoza's philosophy had to be 
revised with the findings of recent developments in biology, chemistry, electricity, and magnetism. Herder 
reinterpreted Spinoza's philosophy as "a vitalistic pantheism or pantheistic vitalism" (Beiser: 182) by 
transposing the latter's philosophy of immanence into a worldview according to which there is no inert 
matter or vacuous space, only a system of living, active, interrelated forces. He developed, in other words, 
an organic monism, what he called a world-nexus", according to which all of nature forms one vast living 
organism (Lamm: 169; Beiser: 182).  
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revised the notion of pantheism in such a way that their religious philosophy came to be 
identified as “panentheism” by scholars of German romanticism.134 
 Whether the idea of God that the Romantics upheld was pantheistic or 
panentheistic did not change the fact that their preoccupation with pantheism, or 
Spinozism, affected their ideas about religions, especially “Hinduism” and mysticism of 
any sort. It was even argued that the “romantically-glorified conception of pantheism” 
was one of pre-Catholic Schlegel’s “original motivations behind his interest in India” 
(Halbfass: 78). Richard King, the author of Orientalism and Religion (1999), believes it 
to be a general inclination definitely not peculiar to Schlegel and draws attention to the 
focus of the Romantic interest in Indian culture on “the question of its apparent 
pantheism” (124). Herder, for instance, saw a pantheistic monism at the core of Hindu 
thought similar to Spinoza’s philosophical system; or Schlegel associated Hinduism and 
Buddhist thought with pantheism. Schelling also, in defense of pantheism against 
Schlegel, praised Indian culture and towards the end of his life “became convinced that a 
noble form of pantheism was best exemplified in the philosophy of Vedanta" (Ibid).  
As regards Sufism, it is safe to say that most of the Romantic thinkers were not 
interested in it or even Islam per se, but the permeation of pantheism (or panentheism) 
into almost every line of thought inevitably manifested itself in the nascent Sufi studies 
undertaken in Germany by a small group of Orientalists. Among the new generation of 
intellectuals showing scholarly interest in Sufi studies, F. A. G. Tholuck (1799-1877), a 
                                                
134 Julia Lamm argues "although the Romantics wanted to defend the idea of pantheism, as well as those 
assumed to be pantheists, against crude accusations, they themselves were not pantheists. Rather than 
maintain the identity of God and world, they maintained a dynamic coincidence of the opposites; they did 
not so much deny a personal God as challenge fixed and limited ideas of God; and they affirmed the divine 
transcendence, albeit in terms of divine immanence” (183). On the panentheism of German romantics see 
Tuveson, Lamm and Beiser. 
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neo-Pietist theologian, stands out due to the scope as well as impact of his studies on Sufi 
studies. However, before discussing Tholuck’s take on Sufism we need to briefly lay out 
the condition of Persian studies in Germany. 
Thirty years before Tholuck, a far more influential German thinker had already 
shown interest in Persian poetry. Having been acquainted with Persian poetry through 
William Jones’s Traité sur la Poésie Orientale (1771), Johann Gottfried von Herder 
wrote a series of essays about the literary productions of non-European cultures, in 
particular those written in Arabic and Hebrew. In addition, Herder published German 
translations of Jones’s translations of poems by Sadi, Hafez and Rumi among others in 
the fourth collection of the Zerstreute Blätter (1792).135 Due to his preference for 
didacticism, he proclaimed Sadi as the model most worthy of imitation (Remy: 19).136 It 
is argued that the moralizing tendency that characterized all of Herder’s work determined 
his taste in Persian poetry as well as the style of his translations (Remy: 17). 
Herder undertook such translations without any prior knowledge of Persian, but 
more comprehensive and learned translations were produced in the following years by the 
Austrian diplomat and orientalist Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall. Although predominantly 
known for his historical works such as Die Staatsverfassung und Staatsverwaltung des 
osmanischen Reichs (1814, 2 vols.); Geschichte des osmanischen Reichs (1827-35, 10 
vols.), and Geschichte der Ilchane (1843, 2 vols.), Hammer’s contribution to the 
                                                
135 The influence of Johann G. Hamann on Herder, especially his perception of the Orient as a place of 
renewal and rebirth as expounded in his Aesthetica in nuce (1762), needs to be acknowledged as well 
(Berman: 135). Arthur Remy notes that Herder had already been interested in the literatures of the Eastern 
world, specifically in Hebrew poetry. With Jones’s translations he had widened the sphere of his Oriental 
studies and had become interested in Sadi (16).  
136 Herder’s taste in poetry was not shared by other leading minds of the time; for Goethe it was neither 
Sadi nor Rumi who sings the most beautiful poems. To him, Hafiz was “the singer of real love, real roses 
and real wine” (Remy: 27). The manifestation of Goethe’s reverence and appreciation for Hafiz was his 
own Divan, Western-östlicher Diwan (1819) written in the style of Hafiz.   
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popularization of Persian literature in Germany is equally impressive. Together with 
Count Reviczky he founded the "Fundgruben des Orients" (Vienna, 1809-19, 6 vols.), a 
periodical devoted to Oriental studies. For this journal, thanks to von Hammer’s 
encouragement, Valentin Freiherr von Hussard translated a short piece by and about 
Rumi. Von Hammer himself was keen on translating; he started his own series of 
translations with the entire Divan of Hafiz (1813). Arthur Remy notes that Hammer’s 
renderings in German prose do scant justice to the original but nonetheless it was the first 
time the poems of Hafiz were made known to Europe in their entirety. In 1818, Hammer 
published a history of Persian poetry entitled Geschichte der schönen Redekünste 
Persiens. It is known that Goethe, Rückert, and many others became acquainted with 
Persian poetry through these translations.137 In this book on literary history, he presented 
to the German-speaking public seventy passages from Rumi’s Masnavi and the Divan-e 
Shams (163-199). His translations deserve to be analyzed on their own but suffice it say 
that the annotations and the introductions written to such compilations of translations 
emphasize, one way or the other, the extra-Islamic sources of Sufism over its Islamic 
character.  
 The translations of Hammer-Purgstall inspired many literary figures; Goethe 
composed Western-östlicher Divan (1819) in the spirit of the Persian poets, in particular 
of Hafiz. Friedrich Rückert was so impressed by Hammer’s work that he went to Vienna 
                                                
137 Von-Hammer continued publishing his translations. From the Arabic he translated the poems of the 
tenth-century poet Mutanabbi (1824), and the Atwak al-dhahab of Zamahshar under the title 
Samachscharis Goldene Halsbander (1835). From Persian Mahmud Shabistari's Gulshan-i-raz under the 
title of Mahmud Schabisteris Rosenflor des Geheimnisses (1838), and a part of the Ta'rikh-i-Wassaf, under 
the title Geschichte Wassafs (1856). From Turkish he translated the sixteenth-century Ottoman poet Baki’s 
Divan (1825), of Fazli's romantic poem "Gul u Bulbul" (1834), and of the Baznamah, a treatise on falconry, 
which he published with two other treatises on the same subject, one Greek and one German, under the title 
Falknerklee (1840). For further info, see Remy. 
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to study Persian with him, a productive venture completed with the publication of 
Ghaselen (1819), “a small but exquisite number” of German poems, which, though not 
exactly translations, were based upon the content and form of poems in the Divan-e 
Shams (Remy: 39).138  
 The significance of the works of von Hammer and Rückert is undeniable, but for 
the purposes of this dissertation F. A. G. Tholuck occupies a far more important position. 
Similar to Jones, Tholuck showed extraordinary talent in the field of philology and is said 
to have mastered nineteen languages by the age of seventeen. Having studied Oriental 
philology at the University of Breslau, Tholuck moved to Berlin where he diverted his 
academic interest to theology, much, like Julius in his philosophical epistolary novel Die 
Lehre von der Sunde und vom Versohner, oder Die wahre Weife des Zweiflers (1823). It 
is claimed that Tholuck "was plagued” in his Breslau years “by skepticism and argued 
that Islam was superior to Christianity" (Baird: 283).139 In Berlin he attended the lectures 
of August Neander (1789-1850) and Schleiermacher, but eventually became one of the 
first protégés of Hans Ernst von Kottwitz (1757-1850), the patron of the German 
Awakening. Becoming an active member of the "Neo-Pietist" circle did not diminish 
Tholuck's interest in Islam but nonetheless framed his approach to it, in the sense that he 
focused his attention to its mystical aspect. In 1821 he published a Latin treatise entitled 
Ssufismus, sive theosophia Persarum pantheistica (Sufism; or the Pantheistic Theosophy 
of the Persians), which secured him a position as ausserordentlicher Professor at Berlin 
                                                
138 Along with those of Hafez, Rumi’s ghazals inspired the creation of a new German verse form. 
Following Rückert, August Graf von Platen published his own collection of Ghaselen in 1821. For further 
information, see Arthur Remy’s The Influence of Persia and India on the Poetry of Germany (1901). 
139 An address he delivered after leaving college on "the Superiority of the Oriental World over the 
Christian" was considered to be a eulogy on Islam. (New Schaff-herzog Encyclopedia of Religious: 420) 
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in addition to the degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the University of Jena. Ssufismus 
together with Tholuck's later studies, namely Die Lehre (1823), Blüthensammlung aus 
der Morgenländischen Mystik (1825) and Die Speculative Trinitätslehre des späteren 
Orients (1826), introduced a new interpretation of Sufism to later generations. Before we 
discuss the significance of Tholuck's take on Sufism, we should note that Tholuck was 
first and foremost a neo-Pietist theologian who was showing interest in mysticism in 
general.  He got preoccupied with Sufism inasmuch as it is pertinent to the current 
academic discussions in theology revolving around speculative philosophy, represented 
in particular by Hegel.  In the preface of both Blüthensammlung and Die speculative 
Trinitatslehre, he calls attention to the importance of studying authentic manuscripts 
written in Middle Eastern languages for historians of philosophy and religion because, 
Tholuck contends, these mystics and some of his contemporaries express similar 
philosophies. In the preface to Die speculative he argues that "the special interest in 
modern times in Near Eastern or Oriental philosophy ... is partly due to the frequent 
attempts carried out in the new theology to derive certain Christian doctrines from 
gnosis" and partly to "the strong religious and philosophical inclination of our time" (v).  
 Refutation of that "strong religious inclination and philosophical inclination" was 
the main thrust of Tholuck's studies, and, to him, pantheism constituted one of the 
foundations of such modern speculative theology. Therefore, it became imperative for 
Tholuck to historicize, analyze and criticize pantheism. While in Die Lehre Tholuck 
explains what pantheism is and how it had branched out through ages, in Ssufismus, as 
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will be discussed in detail below, and partly in Blüthensammlung140 he endeavors to 
reveal how Islamic mysticism got transformed into a pantheistic theosophy in the second 
century Hegira, particularly by the Persian mystics. So in the great scheme of things, 
Sufism, according to Tholuck, was merely one of the most influential interpretations of 
pantheism.  
In addition to being the first European monograph devoted exclusively to Sufism, 
Tholuck's Ssufismus distinguishes itself from the studies of Jones and Malcolm on 
account of his use of original sources, in addition to the Western materials written so far, 
including numerous missionary reports as well as the works of D’Herbelot, D’Ohsson, 
Thévenot , Chardin, Pococke, Jones, and Malcolm. Carl Ernst notes that Tholuck displays 
a relatively wider base of knowledge because of his access to a handful of Arabic, Persian 
and Turkish manuscripts in the royal library of Berlin, but A. J. Arberry, though 
acknowledging his "serious and substantial effort," criticizes Tholuck for choosing 
material "wholly inadequate" to construct his thesis with (Ernst 1997: 16; Arberry 1958: 
16). Arberry believes that although Tholuck “suffered from the handicap under which 
every pioneer labors,” that is, he had no one to guide him, he might nonetheless “have 
made a better choice of bibliography" given the current possessions of the library in 
Berlin (17).141  
                                                
140 Blüthensammlung, in the first five chapters, summarizes the detailed arguments explicated in Ssufismus 
but the rest of the book is devoted to the translations of excerpts from Rumi’s Mesnevi (pp. 52-191), the 
Gulshan-i Raz of Shabistari (pp. 193-224), Gulistan by Sadi (pp. 225-254), Jauhar al-dhat by Attar (pp. 
255-286), Sajib’s Diwan (pp. 287-296), selected poetry by Mawlana Jami (pp. 297-309) as well as Mansur-
u Hallaj’s lifestory taken from Attar’s Tadhkirat al-auliya (pp. 310-327). 
141 Tholuck’s reading list includes in Arabic, two books of al-Gazali, which, according to Arberry, “he 
certainly did not study very profoundly”; ibn Khallikan and al-Qazwini; a history of Cairo by al-Suyuti, a 
book of Muslim sects by al-Isfarani, and an anonymous treatise on Muslim theology. His Turkish sources 
consist of a translation of Aziz Nasafi’s al-Maqsad al-aqsa, and a work entitled Miftah al-abrar wa-misbah 
al-anwar, which he ascribes to Attar. His main material is drawn from Persian, which Arberry finds “more 
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Tholuck evidently tried hard to trace Sufism to its origins, but first we need to 
determine what he meant by Sufism. As the title suggests, for him, Sufism is “Persian 
pantheistic theosophy” which, according to Tholuck, shows, at first glance, more 
similarities with the philosophies of Indian yogis or of Neo-Platonists than with Islamic 
doctrines. According to the German theologian, this has to do with similar but not the 
same conceptualizations of God within these systems. In one of the appendices of Die 
Lehre, entitled “On the necessity by which the mere logical understanding is led to a 
Denial of a self-conscious Deity, Individuality, Freedom, and Morality; of the Antiquity 
and constant recurrence of these Doctrines in the history of the human mind and on the 
distinction between the Belief in a self-conscious Deity and the Pantheistic notion,” 
Tholuck argues that pantheism is as old as mankind and has assumed different identities 
in time.142 It showed certain differences according to the school of thought it was 
incorporated in and now we can identify three sorts of pantheism, namely, “conceptual 
pantheism” (Pantheismus des Begriffs), “pantheism of fantasy” (Pantheismus der 
Phantasie) and “pantheism of feeling” (Pantheismus des Gefühls), which manifested 
themselves in the mystical interpretations of Judaism, Christianity and Islam.143  
                                                
impressive though still very primitive, and one forms the impression that he by no means read through all 
the books he names”- the first half of Jalal al-Din Rumi’s Mathnawi, the Gulshan-i raz of Shabistari, Jami’s 
Subhat al-abrar, Tuhfat al-ahrar, and Baharistan, Attar’s Jauhar al-dhat and Tadhkirat al-auliya, the first 
volume of Mirkhwand’s Raudat al-safa, and a ‘Kitab Hussniye’ by one Asad al-Din. (Arberry 1958: 16-17)  
142 “Da diese Lehre dem anmaßenden Weisheitsdünkel des Menschen am meisten genügt, so ist sie auch so 
alt als der Mensch und ist zu allen Zeiten in den mannigfachsten Hüllen und Gestalten wiedergekehrt” 
(200).  
143 “Der erstere ist ein reines Verstandesergebnis, das sich indeß nicht ohne Phantasie zu einem Ganzen 
constituiren kann. Die anderen beiden werden entweder durch Forderungen des consequenten Verstandes 
vorbereitet, oder verbinden sich mit seinen Formen. Der Begriffspantheismus ist eigenthümlich den 
Eleaten, Spinoza, Fichte, Hegel. Der Pantheismus der Phantasie findet sich im Orient, bei den Kabbalisten, 
Neu-Platonikern, Scotus, Engen, J. Böhme, Schelling. Der Gefühlspantheismus bei den meisten Mystikern 
nicht nur der christlichen, sondern auch der muhammedanischen Religion. Zuweilen hat derselbe sich auch 
mit Reflexion über die Gefühle verbunden, und dadurch ein speculatives Ansehn bekommen” (200). 
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In the proceeding paragraphs Tholuck briefly explains how various systems such 
as the “Inkia,” “Tao-tse,” and the religion of “Fohi” from China, “Shinto” and “Budso” 
from Japan, the “Brahmin, Buddhist, and Jain” from India, Eleatic philosophy 
represented by Xenophanes from ancient Greece, Neo-Platonism, and German idealism 
among many others all represent pantheism of some sort. Among these systems, Sufism 
or “Persian pantheism” has been listed as well, which arguably displays “striking 
correspondence with Indian theosophical pantheism” maybe because of, as shown by 
Silvestre de Sacy, the incorporation of “the germs of ancient Persian teachings” (Keime 
alter persischer Lehre) into Sufism (206).  
Not only with Indian pantheism but also with Christian pantheism, does Sufism 
seem similar. In Ssufismus he explains this similarity with regard to the “identical error” 
made in their endeavor to understand God: 
This discussion in which Christian theologians have striven to determine merely 
how much is to be attributed to Divine agency in the reform of the life, has been 
turned aside by the Mystics into questions of much greater difficulty. For they 
have gone on to inquire, to what “principium” our other actions are to be referred; 
and they ended in the conclusion that God must be regarded as the sole fountain 
of all human actions. Pursuing the same strain of argument, they infer that nature 
in its inner nucleus and source is divine, and that he who withdraws his mind from 
things corporeal to his own essence which exists in perfect purity within the 
recesses of his breast, he having drawn nearer to the Deity, as it were, is able to 
hear His voice. The error of the Soofees, therefore, is identical with that which 
has caused so many Christians to fall into mysticism and pantheism. For this 
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question of “free-will” has vexed the Muhammedan theology not less than our 
own. (100; trans. by Noyes: 244) 
As a neo-pietist, Tholuck is almost sympathetic to mysticism but does not express 
similar partiality towards pantheism. To him, pantheism does not allow room for free will 
and individuality but also, and much more importantly, does not distinguish between 
good and evil. In the novel Die Lehre, the spiritually self-saved character, Julius, tries to 
show, through a lengthy discussion on the nature of evil, the fallacy of speculative 
philosophy, and hence, pantheism, to his friend Guido, who “suffered Parmenides, 
Spinoza, Schelling, Schleiermacher, to pass before him as instructors, all uttering the 
same mighty words to his listening mind” (12). Julius first underlines the importance of 
free will, which is the only force preventing one from believing in a morality-free 
universe: “The greatest thing in man is power; but next to this, the control of that power” 
(25). Next, he explains how Pantheism, which is a negation of free-will, lets loose the 
“cold reckless spirit in man, which treats nothing with reverence, not even his own virtue, 
since it is his own creation” (Ibid). With Pantheism, it “audaciously tramples on worlds 
and laws, on holiness and sin” (Ibid). Eventually, it leads one to “sink into Satan.”144 
                                                
144 Julius explains this totally giving into Satan by referring to his experience of reading Schelling’s 
Representation: “Should it get free from all restraints, and assail me when unarmed, I shall perish by an 
internal foe. This conviction it was which suffered me not to grasp, but only to touch, with inward 
trepidation, the doctrine of the equality of good and evil. A still more fearful horror seized me when I read 
the later 'Representation' of Schelling, in which he has selected terms to express his doctrine, as revolting as 
the thing itself had long been. He distinguishes in the deity a dark primitive origin, and a glorified form of 
the same. The one he calls the inverted God, the enemy of every creature; and as by means of the evolution 
of the dark God in the world, the glorified God develops himself; so out of Satan God is produced. Though 
these are symbolical delineations, yet my heart felt them in all their frightful reality. Am I, as I am, the 
appearance of a partly developed, partly undeveloped God? —then, as far as I know myself, he will 
become in me, not God produced out of Satan, but sunk into Satan. The horror which had previously seized 
me when I was on the brink of merging myself, with my evil as well as my good, into the absolute, 
appeared to me more just than ever. I found in the appellations of that primitive origin the very names 
which my mind had been always obliged to give to that Pantheistic god. (25-27) 
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Tholuck was absolutely confident in his interpretation of Sufism being 
pantheistic, but he was nonetheless reluctant to acknowledge the appropriation of foreign 
elements. In the second chapter of Ssufismus a detailed history of Sufism is presented 
and, probably due to his reliance on original sources, Tholuck did not agree with British 
Orientalists about the supposed Indian origins (1821: 38). He acknowledges that initially 
he was of the opinion, like many of his contemporaries interested in the subject, that 
Sufism was of Magian parentage, but, due to lack of confirmatory evidence, he reverted 
to the view that Sufism sprang from the widespread proneness of Arabs to monastic life 
(Arabum nationem toto animo ad monasticam vitam proclives fuisse) (45).145  Tholuck 
argues that Prophet Muhammad declared that the journey to Mecca was accepted by God 
in place of monasticism for the mere purpose of checking this tendency (45). But the 
warning was to no avail and in less than thirty years following the death of the prophet, 
hermits had become numerous in the deserts, and, in fact, it was Caliph Abu Bakr (d. 634 
A.D.) and Ali (d. 661 A.D.) who established the first Islamic monastic orders,146 which in 
time would branch out into numerous organizations that would be called Sufi orders (48). 
Tholuck further argues that the purest forms of early Islamic mysticism can be found in 
the spiritual utterances of Rabia al-Basri (d. 801 A.D.), which carry the seeds and 
elements of the entire doctrine of Sufism (totius Ssuficae doctrinae semina atque 
                                                
145 “For considering the multitude of Magians that had remained especially in northern Persia, and 
apprehending that many of the most eminent Sufi doctors were born in the northern province of Khorasan; 
having in mind also how the language had formerly passed from India to Persia, as well as how, amid the 
variety of opinions which even in the time of Agathias had divided Persia, some portion of Indian doctrine 
had also migrated thither: I came at one time to view that Sufism had been thought out in about the time of 
al-Ma’mun by Magians in Khorasan surviving, imbued with Indian mysticism. This opinion gained further 
support from the fact that, as we often read, the founders of the sects were either descendents of Magian 
families or at least were well acquainted with Magians.” (Tholuck: 42-43; trans. by Arberry 1958: 17) 
146 This attribution to Ali and Abu Bakr was probably due to Tholuck’s misunderstanding of self-
proclaimed Sufi silsilas, or chains of transmission. All Sufi orders, with the exception of the Naqshbandis, 
trace their spiritual chains to Ali ibn Abi Talib. The Naqshbandi Sufi order traces its chain to Abu Bakr. 
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elements) and it was actually none other than the teachings of Muhammad himself that 
facilitated such mystical tendencies (54). The oft-quoted saying attributed to Muhammad 
provides the basis of Tholuck’s interpretation, which goes as “I have moments (with 
God) when neither prophet nor angel can comprehend me” (Momenta habeo ubi nec 
cherubinus me capit nec prophets) (71).  
 Through examples selected from Farid al-din Attar’s Tadhkirat al-auliya, Tholuck 
constructs his argument about the early mystical tendencies in Islam. He contends that 
both Muhammad’s claim of familiarity with God or “the immediate communion” of 
Rabia with God reveal mysticism inherent in Islam but still cannot completely count for 
the growth of a speculative system that is called Sufism. It was actually the political, 
social, and intellectual developments in the two centuries following the death of Prophet 
Muhammad that transformed such mysticism into Sufism. Building on the seeds and 
elements cultivated by earlier mystics, the ones living in the second century of the Hegira 
engendered “a great diversity and conflict of opinions” (ingens oriretur opinionum 
dissidium) (55). Tholuck lists them as the modification of the old traditional ways of 
teaching and of believing, increased ascetism, the rise of the four “orthodox factions,” the 
beginning and the growth of the scholastic theology, the heresies of the Mutaselitea [read 
Muʿtazilah] and Batenici (i.e. esotericists), the establishment of a great number of 
monastic orders, and eventually the rise of Sufism (55).147 
                                                
147 Tholuck argues that frequent mention made of Sufism from the 200th year of the Hegira onward by 
authors whose writings still remain evidences that the foundations of Sufism were laid at this time (56). 
Tholuck further contends that we can even name the founder of Sufism based on Casinivius (the Arab 
geographer, ‘Plinius Orientalium’) who says that ‘Abu Ssaid Abul Cheir was the founder of the system of 
Sufism or mysticism. After the manner of the Sufis, he built a caravansarai, in token of his love to God, and 
commanded his followers to take food twice in the day. He is the founder of all the Sufic institutions and 
author of the Sufic mysticism.’” (59). 
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 Tholuck explains the dissemination of Sufism, again, with regard to socio-
economic conditions of the era:  
While all things were in dire confusion, and doubt of the truth of their religion 
was filling the minds of men with uneasiness, mysticism, as is wont to be the 
case, insinuating itself, by degrees, into the breasts of those who clung the more 
steadfastly to their faith, secured an immense number of adherents, and spread its 
branches far and wide. From classes of men the most diverse, appeared those 
who, moved by conscientious impulse, gave up their accustomed habits, and 
devoted themselves solely to the task commending to their fellow countrymen a 
fervid zeal in the things of religion, and of showing by example as well as by 
precept, what the divine love can do. In some cases, persons of high rank and 
even robber-chiefs from the mountains, assumed the coarse garments of 
religionists.  (55) 
 Having thus secured the origin of Sufism, Tholuck proceeds to explain how a 
“pure mysticism” (simplicioris pietatis purique mysticismi) as such, initially merely 
promoting the renunciation of worldly possessions, evolved into a system “spreading 
pernicious doctrines among the people” (perniciosaque in populum dogmata 
disseminare) (61). He believes that two figures, Bayazid al-Bestami (d. 874) and al-
Junayd (d. 910), divided the Sufis into two factions by introducing “hidden secrets of the 
science” (abstrusae scientia arcane prac). Especially Bestami’s brazen exclamation of 
“the divinity of man” (divinitas hominis), as opposed to the more cautious Junayd, is the 
proof of Bestami’s “insane pantheism” (vesana haec Bustamii pantheistica), which, 
according to Tholuck, is no different than some Christian mystics such as the Messalians 
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(64).148 For Tholuck, pantheism constitutes the core of the abovementioned “pernicious 
doctrines” and believes that the extraordinary emphasis on Tauhid (Unity [with God]) 
made by Junaid, Abul Huseein Nuri, and Hallaj bin Mansur in their explanations of 
Sufism strongly suggests the pantheistic essence of Sufism (66-68).  
 Now that he has shown the pantheistic nature of Sufism, Tholuck moves on to 
answering the next question, that is, whether these pantheistic notions were of foreign 
origin, and were engrafted upon the simpler mysticism of early Sufis, or whether they 
were derived from Islamic dogmas (70). For Tholuck, the latter seems more plausible. 
Even though he cannot provide convincing proofs that the peculiar dogmas of the Sufis 
were stated in specific form during the first two centuries after the Hegira, he was quite 
confident that the early mystics such as Rabia were definitely familiar with them. In his 
answer, Tholuck’s stance depends prominently on the concept of “Tauhid”, which 
Tholuck argues, was introduced by Muhammad himself as the above-mentioned saying 
manifests, and all the peculiar dogmas of the later Sufis, such as “the emanation of the 
world, the plea of the divinity of man, the elimination of the difference between good and 
evil, and even the contempt for civil laws” is based on this specific concept (70).   
 Though Tholuck acknowledges the Islamic roots of Sufism,149 he nonetheless 
accepts the influence of Neo-Platonism and ancient Persian philosophies on the 
“degeneration” of the nascent form of “sentimental mysticism” (“gemütsvolle Mystik”, 
                                                
148 For his interpretation of Bestami, Tholuck relied on Pocock’s translation of al-Ghazali’s comment on 
Bestami’s claim of union with the Deity and on Attar’s account of Bestami in his Tadhkirat al-auliya. As 
for Junaid, once again Tholuck’s main source was Tadhkirat al-auliya.   
149 “Daher bleibt es doch noch am wahrscheinlichsten, daß der Sufismus das Erzeugniß einer innerlichen 
religiosen Erregung der Muhammedaner ist, welche schon bald nach der Einführung des 
Muhammedanismus die tieferen Gemüther ergriff, und nachher eine bestimmtere Gestaltung gewann” 
(1825a: 36).  
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1825: 33) into pantheism, which shows similarities with its nineteenth-century German 
counterpart (1821: 77-83).150 The transformation is to such a degree that “late Sufism” is 
almost in contradiction with the principles of Muhammad. In order to support his claim 
regarding the detachment of Sufism from Islam, he cites a report, in Ernst words “a 
missionary fantasy,” from the Missionary Register of 1818 maintaining that “there was a 
number of about 80,000 persons in Persia, called Sophis, who about ten or twelve years 
ago, openly renounced Mahommedanism” (vi) and, according to Tholuck, “has a hidden 
pantheistic doctrine.” Furthermore, in the proceeding chapters Tholuck provides 
examples from travelogues mentioned above in order to illustrate the degenerate form of 
such mysticism.  
Rumi occupies a significant place in Tholuck’s analysis insofar he is the perfect 
pantheist, though he managed not to fall for ‘dreadful austerities as a means of attaining 
beatitude like the visionary devotees of India’ (1821: 86). In all of his studies engaging 
with Sufism, Tholuck gives examples from Rumi and even provides a considerable 
number of translations from the first three books of Mesnevi, many of which, according 
to William Hastie, are simply “wrong” (xxiii). When Tholuck was explaining the 
interpretation of the doctrine of “Divine influence” in Sufism, he cites from Rumi (1821: 
101).151 Or in his explanation of prayers, he gives the whirling of Mevlevi dervishes as an 
example of a third type of prayer during which “one finds it difficult to turn away the 
                                                
150 Tholuck defines that kind of mysticism as “religious mysticism” (mehr oder minder eine religiose 
Mystik). See the appendix of Die Lehre. 
151 The quote is thus: “Into the breast of Omar flowth the voice of God, which is the root of all speech and 
of every language. All other tongues whatsoever, that which the Turk, the Persian, the Arab understands, 
are but echoings of this. But why speak of Turk and Arab? Nay, even the wood and stone are but 
repercussions of this voice; for in what moment soever it shall please God to cry aloud, ‘Alist?’ (i.e. Art 
thou not a creature of mine?), matter replies, ‘Beli’ (Even so)” (1821: 101; trans. by Noyes: 245) 
 110 
mind from dwelling on Divine things” (trans. by Noyes: 245). The constant whirling of 
these dervishes is similar to some of the practices of Indian yogis, the ultimate aim of 
which is to arrive at a state of complete non-consciousness (1825b: 205).    
 The works of Tholuck did not remain unnoticed; his analysis elicited a multitude 
of positive and negative reactions.152 His presentation of Sufism together with its 
definition, history, and associated pantheism remained the primary source for a long time 
in the West until Reynold A. Nicholson, his student A. J. Arberry, and others altered the 
framework. Encyclopedia Brittanica’s Sufism entry of the 1911 edition, for instance, 
relies primarily on Tholuck’s Ssufismus. American transcendentalists and Protestant 
theologians – with Ralph Waldo Emerson and Charles Hodge as the most prominent— 
also, drew on the studies of Tholuck. More importantly, the theosophists of the late 
nineteenth-century also utilized Tholuck’s presentation of Sufism in their works. 
   
 
 
 
 
                                                
152 Among the opponents of Tholuck, Hegel stands out probably as the most noteworthy but at the same 
time the most problematic. Because pantheism, hence speculative philosophy, constituted the main focus of 
the discussion between Hegel and Tholuck, Hegel never directly engaged with Sufism. In his answer to the 
pantheistic charges of Tholuck, Hegel in Enzyklopadie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften (3rd ed., 1830) 
makes a distinction between the Hindu and the “Muhammedan”, in particular Rumi’s, conceptualization of 
God. In a footnote to that section, based on his readings of Rückert and Tholuck’s translations of Rumi, 
Hegel commends Rumi because of his presentation of “the consciousness of the One … in its finest purity 
and sublimity.” Hegel claims to find in the verses of Rumi “the unity of the soul with the One set forth, and 
that unity described as love, this spiritual unity is an exaltation above the finite and vulgar, a transfiguration 
of the natural and the spiritual, in which the externalism and transitoriness of immediate nature, and of 
empirical secular spirit, is discarded and absorbed” (308). Here in this short remark he basically dismisses 
Tholuck’s claims regarding the pantheistic nature of Sufism, mostly because of Tholuck’s supposed 
misconstruction of the term pantheism. On the other hand, in Aesthetics, he briefly discusses 
“Mohammedan Poetry,” especially that produced by Persian poets, within a section entitled “Pantheism of 
Art”, which according to Hegel’s categorization falls within the evolutionary history of art into the 
“symbolic” form, which was followed by the “classical” form of art of the ancient Greeks and then the 
“romantic” form of the modern Western (368-370). Probably because of the incidentiality of such remarks 
and of the problematic approach, Hegel’s objections against Tholuck’s ascription of pantheism to Sufism 
have never become influential.  For further discussion on this topic see Klas Grinell’s “Hegel reading 
Rumi: The limitations of a System.”  
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(iv) Aryan Sufism 
 
In close association with the “ur-religion” and the “pantheism” theories, another 
interpretation of Sufism put into circulation in the nineteenth century: Aryan Sufism. 
Closely intertwined with the contemporary discussions in religious and philological 
studies, the Aryan theory affirmed almost a clear-cut distinction between Islam and 
Sufism. By relocating Islam into the category of national/ethnic religions yet 
differentiating Sufism from it by ascribing to it an Aryan origin and character it was 
argued that Sufism was the survival method of the Aryan mind in greater Persia against 
the conquering Semitic religion.  
 The Aryan ascription theory is utilized in the works of numerous Orientalists, but 
the real premise of the theory is couched in the prevalent theories about religion, race and 
philology. At least since the Middle Ages until the early decades of the nineteenth 
century, the world population had been traditionally divided into four groups: Christians, 
Jews, Muhammedans (i.e. Muslims), and the heathens, also invariably known as pagans, 
idolaters, or polytheists.153 With the systematic analysis of the religions in the fourth 
category, another type categorization became prevalent. In 1827 Johann Sebastian von 
Drey introduced the term Weltreligion as opposed to Landesreligion (Masuzawa 2004: 
9800). Even though von Drey did not differ from his predecessors in his supposition of 
Christianity as the one and only, hence the true, “world religion,” the distinction he 
                                                
153 This four-part classification did not, as a matter of fact, recognize four distinct religions as we think of 
them today; it rather implied “a division of the world’s nations into, first, the correctly faithful believers in 
the true and only God (i.e. Christians of various sorts), then two major groups with errant or heretical 
opinions and attitudes toward God (Jews and Muhammedans), and then the rest, who were altogether 
ignorant of God and therefore paid inappropriate reverence to various substitute objects, or idols.” 
Therefore, from that perspective, there was one and only religion and others were various ways of straying 
from it. (Masuzawa 2004: 9800).  
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brought forth became extremely standard in any study on religions in the ensuing decades 
of the same century. Hence instead of a four-part taxonomy, European scholars of 
religion suggested a two-part categorization that juxtaposes “universalistic” religions 
with “national” or “ethnic” ones.  
 James Freeman Clarke in his book Ten Great Religions (1872) explains the 
distinction between the two sorts of religions as such: 
By ethnic religions we mean those religions, each of which has always been 
confined within the boundaries of a particular race or family of mankind, and has 
never made proselytes or converts, except accidentally, outside of it. By catholic 
religions we mean those which have shown the desire and power of passing over 
these limits, and becoming the religion of a considerable number of persons 
belonging to different races. (15)  
During the same period philology-based race theories upholding the superiority of Indo-
European language family helped the practitioners of the newly emerging science of 
religion, or Religionswissenschaft, to outline their views on the above-mentioned 
distinction between universal and ethnic/national religions. It was argued that the Indo-
European (or Aryan) languages are characterized and distinguished from other language 
groups by “the purity of their grammatical form,” that is, inflection.154 The new European 
identity was separated from the Semitic, whose languages are marred by “imperfect 
inflection,” as well as from the rest who are the speakers of non-inflectional languages of 
Asia and Africa. 
                                                
154 The nineteenth-century linguists who prioritized the Indo-European language group argued that inflected 
languages were capable of intellectual subtleties not available to non-inflected languages. 
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One of the most noteworthy ramifications of such hierarchical groupings came to 
be observed when the groupings of languages became increasingly understood in a racial 
sense. It did not take long, says Masuzawa, for philologists to draw, “an immediate 
equation between the nature of syntax and the cultural character of a people or their 
religious dispositions” (2005: 170).  It was basically argued that not only the language 
groups, but also cultures and eventually “races” could be explained with reference to the 
superiority of inflection over agglutination. The relevance of this development to the 
current topic lies in its assessment of Islam. As aptly put by Masuzawa, concurrent to the 
re-appraisal/ennoblement of Buddhism occurred the re-evaluation/denigration of Islam on 
novel grounds.  Islam has never been deemed a “true” religion by the orientalists but in 
light of such developments it came to be regarded a Semitic religion, hence a 
national/ethnic religion. Because Arabic, like Hebrew, was a non-inflected language it 
was not considered to be capable of the same kind of intellectual power as the Indo-
European languages. By the end of the century, Islam, just like Judaism, had come to be 
seen a national religion rather than a world religion.  
The mid- to late-nineteenth-century studies on religions, especially those on 
Islam, are couched in the safety net of such philological theories of language groups, 
races, and religions (e.g. the works of Ernest Renan on Islam).  However, interestingly 
enough, the same period also witnessed another significant racialization with regard to 
Islam: the Aryanization of Sufism. The reconstitution of Islam as essentially Semitic 
further divided the assumed gap between Islam proper and Sufism. As it was explained in 
the previous section, due to the constellation of various socio-historical and political 
discourses Sufism had already been relocated to an extra-Islamic category. There was no 
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consensus on whether it had originated from the religious traditions of ancient Persian 
(i.e. Zoroastrian), India or from Neo-Platonism, but it was decided that it could not be 
Islamic due to the rich and profound metaphysical and mystical tradition it carried. 
Furthermore, by virtue of being a pantheistic philosophy it could not be Islamic which is 
defined to be adamantly monotheistic. With philology-based racial theories the non-
Islamic character of Sufism was underlined in more and more studies. Masuzawa uses the 
writings of the German theologian Otto Pfleiderer (1839-1908) to demonstrate the 
success of this discourse. In his description of Sufism in Religion und Religionen 
(translated as Religion and Historic Faiths; 1906) Pfleiderer dissociates Sufism from 
Islam which he supposes to be the national religion of the Arabs: 
A peculiarity of Persian Islamism, not less interesting is Sufism, a mystical-
speculative tendency, some of which was deeply pious and given to flights of high 
thinking. Certain it is that this was not a genuine product of Arabian Islamism, 
even though it must remain undecided whether it owes its origin to ancient 
Persian, Indian or Neo-Platonic gnosticism. (1907: 287)   
Pfleiderer was definitely not an exception. In 1867 E. H. Palmer (1840-1882), a young 
British orientalist by then, penned a very short treatise on Sufism titled Oriental 
Mysticism: A Treatise on the Sufiistic and Unitarian Theosophy of the Persians. He 
describes “the system of the Sufis” to be consisting in “endeavoring to reconcile 
Philosophy with Revealed Religion, and in assigning a mystical and allegorical 
interpretation to all religious doctrines and precepts” (x). Even though he aimed to 
“present an epitome of the oriental Mystic Philosophy from the point of view taken by 
the Mohammedan writers, from whom [his] information is chiefly derived” (2), he was 
 115 
convinced and determined to prove in subsequent studies that “Sufiism is really the 
development of the Primeval Religion of the Aryan race” (xi). One of the reasons of this 
belief is hinted in his definition of Sufism: “steering a mid course between the pantheism 
of India on the one hand, and the deism of the Coran on the other, the Sufis’ cult is the 
religion of beauty, where heavenly perfection is considered under the imperfect type of 
earthly loveliness” (x).  
In the United States, where European scholarship was the main source in any 
Orientalist literature, Sufism came to be understood as a Persian religious tradition 
separate from Islam. In Ten Great Religions James Freeman Clarke identifies Sufism as a 
“heresy” against Islam, a moral religion the root of which consists in obedience to Allah 
and his prophet (183).155 “Sufism of Persia,” on the other hand, is a spiritualistic religion 
which, just like Brahmanism, Neo-Platonism and Gnosticism, as a tendency to the 
abstract, to the infinite” they “ignore personality. Furthermore, Clarke goes on to present 
the “Aryan reaction theory” as the cause of the difference: 
Judaism and Mohammedanism, with their more concrete monotheism, have not 
been able to convert the Aryan races. Mohammedanism has never affected the 
mind of India, nor disturbed the ascendency of Brahmanism there. And though it 
nominally possesses Persia, yet it holds it as a subject, not as a convert. Persian 
Sufism is a proof of the utter discontent of the Aryan intellect with any 
                                                
155 Clarke explains the difference between Islam proper and Sufism with reference to the distinction 
between “spiritualistic religions” and “moral religions.” It is his claim that “the essentially spiritualistic 
religions,” such as Brahmanism, Gnosticism, the Sufism of Persia, the Mysteries of Egypt and Greece, 
Neo-Platonism, the Christian Mysticism of the Middle Ages, “are ignorant of their founders,” Like “every 
tendency to the abstract, to the infinite” they “ignore personality.” On the other hand, there are “moral 
religions” which are “the religions of persons,” such as “the systems of Confucius, Buddha, Zoroaster, 
Moses and Mohammed” (183). all the moral creeds of the world proceed from a moral source, i.e. human 
will.” 
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monotheism of pure will. Sufism is the mystic form of Mohammedanism, 
recognizing communion with God, and not merely submission, as being the 
essence of true religion. (500)  
The whole idea of Sufism being an Aryan product was challenged only in the 
beginning of the twentieth century by Orientalist scholars such as E. G. Browne (1862 – 
1926) and Reynold Nicholson who summed up the whole frenzy as the “Aryan reaction 
theory” which basically asserts that Sufism should be understood as “the reaction of the 
Aryan mind against a conquering Semitic religion” (Nicholson 2009: 8).  
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CHAPTER 3 
RUMI IN THE AMERICAN RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE 
       What I am saying is according to the measure of your understanding:  
                   I die in grief for a sound understanding. (Masnavi III, l.2098) 
     The meaning in poetry has no sureness of direction;  
     it is like the sling, it is not under control. (Masnavi I, l.1528) 
  
 The past several decades have witnessed an intriguing increase of interest in Rumi 
in the United States. Works about Rumi, both scholarly and non-scholarly alike, and a 
variety of translations of his poetry by people from different walks of life have noticeably 
proliferated. The “Rumi-mania,” as Coleman Barks calls it, has become impossible to 
ignore so much so that in 1997, the Christian Science Monitor proclaimed Rumi to be the 
best-selling poet in the United States (November 25, 1997).156 The surge of interest in 
Rumi has been precipitated by factors such as the receptive spirit of the American 
religious landscape and the promotion of Rumi by people, specifically from Turkey and 
Iran, as the antithesis of radical fundamentalists. But, as the eminent Rumi scholar 
Franklin Lewis puts it, it is Coleman Barks “who, more than any other single individual 
is responsible for Rumi’s current fame” (2011:1).  
 The aim of this chapter is to analyze the contentious translations by Barks with 
regard to the general theme of the de-Islamization of Rumi. Rather than dealing with 
questions concerning linguistics, I examine acts of mediation, representation and the 
                                                
156 However, Franklin Lewis asks with reason whether Rumi's recent fame in the West represents just 
another passing fad, particularly when one considers the example of Omar Khayyam (d. 1121), who once 
had societies dedicated to him in every corner of the Anglophone world, but is relatively little read today 
(2009: para 3).  
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discourses with which Barks’s renderings engage as well as Barks’s positionality in 
relation to his translation strategies. I specifically focus on the qualitative contraction that 
characterizes Barks’s translations of Rumi. Examining what is excluded and hidden in the 
translational process and, more importantly, to what effect, sheds light on the nature of 
contemporary reception of Rumi in the United States. 
 My analysis predominantly covers Barks’s translations of Masnavi-i Manevi 
(Couplets of True Meaning) that appeared in The Essential Rumi (1995; expanded edition 
2004), which also includes translations from the Divan-ı Shams. I choose to focus on The 
Essential Rumi because it is Barks’s foundational work; in his later compilations such as 
The Book of Love (2003) and The Big Red Book (2010; paperback 2011), Barks uses the 
same translations though in a different layout. In some cases, such as some of the poems 
in A Year With Rumi (2006), he edits, abbreviates or “relineates” but usually keeps them 
loyal to the versions in The Essential Rumi.157 Among his oeuvre only The Essential Rumi 
and Soul of Rumi are original in the sense that they include new translations. Between 
these two, however, the latter has not gained the recognition that The Essential Rumi 
enjoyed. In 2004, an expanded edition of The Essential Rumi was published probably 
because it had continued to be the far better-known work.  
I prefer to concentrate on the translations from the Masnavi for a couple of 
reasons. As a collection of “strange tales and rare sayings and excellent discourses and 
precious indications, and the (religious) path of the ascetics and the (spiritual) garden of 
the devotees” (Masnavi vol. I: 1), Masnavi abounds with references and allusions that 
                                                
157 Also only in The Essential Rumi, The Soul of Rumi and A Year With Rumi does Barks provide 
information regarding the origin of the poem. By the end of the books he lists which poem is translated 
from which source. In his other works there is no such information. 
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inextricably weaves it to Islamic culture. Furthermore, these stories are told with the aim 
to serve the righteous by virtue of being “the cure for (sick) breasts, and the purge of 
sorrows, and the expounder of the Qur’an, and the (source of) abundance of (Divine) 
gifts, and the (means of) cleansing (sordid) dispositions” (Masnavi vol. I, 3). In this 
respect they are quite distinct from the ghazals (odes) and rubais (quatrains), which are 
more obscure, less referential utterances of Divine Love and Longing and comprise 
another monumental work of Rumi, that is, Divan-e Shams.  
 The acquaintance with Rumi in the United States is quite a recent phenomenon. 
By mid-nineteenth century, Sufism, let alone Rumi, was hardly known, even among the 
United States intelligentsia. The whole Sufi literature, including the poetry of Rumi, was 
read under the intellectual guidance of European Orientalists who interpreted Sufism as 
an extra-Islamic tradition molded with pantheistic and Aryan characteristics.158 Rumi’s 
name, known as Dschelaleddin at that point in time, began to be mentioned only with the 
cursory references of the Transcendentalists, who got to know about Rumi and Sufism 
via the translations by Baron von Hammer-Purgstall and F.A.G. Tholuck. 
By the early 1900s, the increasing interest in “Oriental wisdom,” which until then 
had been mostly of a textual nature, prompted the practitioners of non-Judeo-Christian 
religious traditions to engage with religious liberals on a personal level.159 On this 
                                                
158 The absence of academic orientalism in the US was addressed by Ralph Waldo Emerson in a 1865 essay 
which complains about the slow and insufficient progress in the American academia: “Whilst the Journal of 
the Oriental Society attests the presence of good Semitic and Sanskrit scholars in our colleges, no 
translation of an Eastern poet has yet appeared in America. Of the two hundred Persian bards of whose 
genius Von Hammer Purgstall has given specimens to Germany, we have had only some fragments 
collected in journals and anthologies. There are signs that this neglect is about to be retrieved.”  
159 The Early 1900s was, in general, a period of “flowering of diversity within a free market for religious 
entrepreneurs” (Hulsether: 49). Sufism partook in this religious diversification. In her article on Sufism in 
America, Gisela Webb identified three major phases in the development of Sufi groups in America. The 
above mentioned interest in Oriental wisdom corresponds to the first phase (251). For information on 
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account many “Oriental” spiritual teachers, be it Zen masters, Hindu yogis, or Sufis, 
frequented the United States. Thanks to the actual acquaintance with such personalities, 
Rumi’s name became relatively recognizable. Specifically the “universalist” teachings of 
Hazrat Inayat Khan, who was appointed by his master to harmonize East and Western, 
incorporate selective readings from Rumi.160  
The spiritual explorations of the baby-boom generation during the rise of the 
counterculture(s) further popularized Rumi to the extent of absorbing him into a unique 
form of American religiosity that has been marked by radical syncretism.161 Disenchanted 
with institutionalized religion, spiritual seekers, who employed “psychothereapeutic, 
pharmacological, mystical and literary modes of introspection” (Tipton: 14), fostered an 
eclectic approach to religion that differentiates spirituality from religion, usually in favor 
of the former. Within this structure Rumi, though not necessarily Sufism, fell into the part 
of spirituality, along with Buddhism, Kabbala, Krishnaism, and “Jesus Freaks.” Along 
the road, Rumi’s deep-rooted organic connections with Islam have been further ignored.  
Developments in the religious landscape inevitably made Rumi a familiar name, 
but only towards the end of the millennia did Rumi gain a deserved fame. In the late 
                                                
contemporary practice of Sufism in America, see Sufism in the West (2006) and Sufis in Western Society 
(2009).  
160 In his original country Hazrat Inayat Khan (d. 1927) was first and foremost a musician, who in his early 
life received the highest recognition and honors for his artistic accomplishments. In addition to his musical 
studies, Inayat Khan was engaged in Sufism. By the very beginning of his journey, which he set on in 1910 
at the behest of his Sufi master, Sayyed Muhammad Abu Hashim Madani, Khan founded the first 
American Sufi Order, called ‘The Sufi Order in the West.’ Throughout his continuous travels in Europe and 
the United States, Khan brought music to the fore in his spiritual teachings, which do not carry overt 
Islamic tones. Khan describes Sufism along the lines of the concept of “universal religion” which leaves its 
stamp on late nineteenth-century religious landscape, specifically in the US. Khan says “There is one God 
and one truth, one religion and one mysticism. Call it Sufism or Christianity or Hinduism or Buddhism, 
whatever you wish” (27). His followers describe Khan’s philosophy as “a revolutionary vision of the unity 
of religious ideals and the coming awakening of the human spirit to its inherent divinity” 
(http://www.sufiorder.org/biographies.html).  
161 In Gisela Webb’s scheme Rumi’s reception by the seekers of the counterculture is included in the second 
phase of Sufism in the US.  
 121 
1990s, the translations by Coleman Barks accomplished what the more scholarly 
translations by Reynold Nicholson (1945) and A.J. Arberry (d. 1969) from earlier 
decades failed to pull off: reaching out to spiritual seekers. 
The popularity of Barks’s versions over more literal translations unmistakably 
defined how Rumi is read and understood by modern audiences. Barks’s translations are 
recited at wedding ceremonies (even sometimes replacing the all-time favorite 
Corinthians) or read by celebrities of the entertainment world such as Madonna, Tilda 
Swinton, and Demi Moore. But it is again Barks’s versions that appear in the Norton 
Anthology of World Masterpieces. A simple search on the Internet manifests the extent 
of Barks’s success in conveying his own version of Rumi.162  
The success of Barks is partly explained by his poetic skills. As a published poet 
and a professor of poetry, Barks knows how to swim through words.163 But more than his 
verbal dexterity the way Rumi and his “philosophy” are presented defines Barks’s 
success as a Rumi translator. By means of translation strategies that are usually analyzed 
under the category of “domestication” or “naturalization,” Barks contributes to the de-
Islamization of Rumi – though, unlike Orientalists, without appealing to history. As 
maintained by Barks himself in numerous instances, he does not consider Rumi an 
                                                
162 Barks addresses the issue of popularity of his works, specifically of The Essential Rumi, in Rumi: The 
Book of Love: “I have sold too many books. Rumi translations have no business cresting in a wave of over 
half a million. It’s like selling picnic tickets to an unmarked minefield. You wouldn’t expect there to be a 
rush, but somehow there is. […] That book has achieved the cultural status of an empty Diet Coke can! It’s 
everywhere. It’s recommended summer reading in a two-page newsletter put out by a women’s clothing 
store, Kathleen Sommers of San Antonio. Philip Glass goes on world tour with Monsters of Grace, a choral 
piece using Rumi’s words. Donna Karan reads Rumi on the fashion runway showing her new line. 
Madonna and Demi Moore read his poems on a Deepak CD. What to make of Rumi-mania? This too shall 
pass? Of course it will.” (xvi) 
163 Upon receiving his PhD at the University of California, Berkeley in 1968 —with his dissertation on the 
short novels of Joseph Conrad— Barks began teaching literature at the University of Georgia-Athens. Long 
before securing a name as a Rumi translator he published three collections of his own poetry (The Juice, 
1971; New Words, 1976 and We’re Laughing at the Damage, 1977).  
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Islamic philosopher-poet; instead he interprets him to be a “dissolver of boundaries” who 
does not belong to any institutionalized, organized religion (2004: xvii). Not surprisingly, 
Barks’s translation strategy reflects this interpretation. For instance, in his commentary 
on the concept of fana, Barks notes being scolded by one of his friends for not saying 
outright that fana means “annihilation in Allah.” In his defense, Barks says: 
I avoid God-words, not altogether, but wherever I can, because they seem to take 
away the freshness of experience and put it inside a specific system. Rumi’s 
poetry belongs to everyone, and his impulse was toward experience rather than 
any language or doctrine about it: our lives as text, rather than any book, be it 
Qur’an, Gospel, upanishad, or sutra” (2001: 9) 
Getting rid of Islamic references is not the only means for Barks in his endeavor 
to render Rumi’s poetry sound universal-yet-American. Stylistically as well Rumi was 
“Americanized” as Barks’s explanation of his translating act demonstrates: “making 
literal, scholarly transcriptions of poems into valid poems in American English [in 
connection] with a strong American line of free-verse spiritual poetry such as that of 
Theodore Roethke, Gary Snyder, Walt Whitman, and James Wright” (Moyers: 46). Here 
Barks is referring to the politics as much as the poetics of his translations, which, as 
mentioned above, both stylistically and thematically domesticate Rumi. Without denying 
the importance of poetics, I aim to probe into the politics of Barks’s translations so as to 
better understand the context as well as the conditions of domestication of Rumi. In order 
to better “situate the translated text in its social and historical circumstances and consider 
its political role” (Venuti 1992: 11), I will briefly discuss the strategy of domestication in 
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translation, then the historical tradition Barks is embedded in before moving onto 
analyzing the translations of Barks. 
 
(i) Domestication in Translation 
Translation is never an innocent act: it is inherently political and ideological on 
account of being a partial and metonymic transfer of meaning defined by the choices of 
the translator within the parameters of the socio-cultural context.164 Translation is, after 
all, “an active reconstitution of the foreign text mediated by the irreducible linguistic, 
discursive, and ideological differences of the target-language culture” (Venuti 1992: 10). 
Of course the political standing of any translation is closely related to the semiotics in the 
sense that (1) languages are reciprocally incommensurable and (2) meaning of a text is 
always contested and is bound to be more extensive than a translation (or any reader for 
that matter) can impart. As such translators make choices that result in silencing, 
underlining, editing, transcreating or recreating certain aspects or parts of a text. For 
decades in translation debates, which have been dominated by the question of fidelity, 
many consider the inevitable recreation process inherent in translation to be a defect. 
Recent studies in translation theory suggest leaving such unproductive discussions behind 
so as to be able to focus on more significant issues such as the political nature of 
                                                
164 Maria Tymoczko argues that translation, in addition to standing in a metaphoric relation to a source text, 
is also involved in a metonymic relation. The metonymic aspect is particularly significant as it precipitates 
the assimilation of the source text into “the existing structures in the receptor literary and cultural system” 
(51).Translation, she asserts, “metonymically constructs a source text, a literary tradition, a culture, and a 
people,” for the receiving audience, “by picking parts, aspects, and attributes that will stand for wholes” 
(57). It becomes all the more significant in the translation of non-canonical or marginalized literatures, 
because in such cases the translator finds herself “in the paradoxical position of ‘telling a new story’ to the 
receptor audience” and “the more remote the source culture and literature, the more radically new the story 
will be for the receiving audience” (47). For a discussion on the metonymic aspect of translation, see 
Tymoczko’s Translation in a Postcolonial Context (1999), pp. 41-61.  
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translation. Edwin Gentzler and Maria Tymoczko, for instance, argue that partiality is “a 
necessary condition of the fact” rather than “a defect, a lack, or an absence in a 
translation” so much so that it “enables translations to participate in the dialectic of 
power, the ongoing process of political discourse, and strategies for social change” 
(xviii). 
The recreation process is not a mere linguistic transfer from one system to 
another. There are additional levels such as “the literary system” and “the socio-cultural 
system” on which the translator operates during the process of translation (Holmes 1988). 
While the literary system comprises the set of texts that the text is connected with, both 
stylistically and thematically, the socio-cultural system comprises its cluster of values, 
meanings, norms, associations, power-relationships, in short a system “in which objects, 
symbols, and abstract concepts function in a way that is never exactly the same in any 
other society or culture” (47). On each of these three levels the translator is inevitably is 
confronted with inter-systemic incompatibilities that demand, at least the illusion of, 
resolution (36). In order to achieve that illusion, the translator, on each level, must make 
a choice. And it is these choices that result in the above-mentioned silencing, underlining, 
and the like that ultimately make translation a political act.   
Among such choices, whether to “foreignize” or “domesticate” the text, hence 
indirectly/metonymically the culture that the text belongs stand out.165 Lawrence Venuti 
aptly notes that the choice made by the translator between the two is itself an ideological 
one. Making translation visible (foreignization), by accentuating its strangeness and 
                                                
165 Though akin to the debate on the “word-for-word” (literal translation or metaphrase) vs. sense-for-sense 
(free translation or paraphrase) translation, domestication vs. foreignization debate has a more political tone 
than the former one. Lawrence Venuti, who coined the terms, stresses the question of 
preserving/suppressing the cultural values of the source text (1995: 20). 
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resisting fluency and transparency, is as much a political gesture as appropriating the text 
to the norms and values of the target-text culture (domestication). Admittedly, no matter 
what kind of strategy is used during the process, translation, on account of being a form 
of rewriting, is already endowed with the potency to manipulate literature.166 But the 
significance between the strategies of foreignization and domestication further increases 
when there is an unequal relationship between the two cultures, that is, when the 
preferred strategy has the potential to play a part in the construction of the “other,” either 
by challenging, resisting or reinforcing the hegemonic discourse regarding the other.  
Between the two strategies, foreignization has enjoyed the support of scholars. 
Antoine Berman argues that foreignizing is the more ethical choice of the two, if not the 
most convenient. According to Berman, “receiving the Foreign as Foreign” is the “ethical 
aim of the translating act” because accentuating the strangeness is “the only way of 
giving us access to” the text (285). In this way “the language of the original shakes with 
all its liberated might the translated language.” Berman is not alone in his appreciation of 
the foreignizing strategy. His article “Translation and the Trials of the Foreign” (2000), 
where he describes the ideal form of translation as the “trial of the foreign,” heavily 
draws on Heidegger’s analysis of Hölderlin’s translation of Sophocles. Hölderlin’s 
contemporary Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), also, argues that instead of 
“moving the author towards” the reader so as to leave “the reader in peace as much as 
                                                
166 Translation, a double-edged sword, can either help a literary system/culture expand and evolve by means 
of introducing new genres, concepts, literary devices and techniques or aide “repress innovation, distort and 
contain.” (Bassnett & Lefevere 1995: vii). Not all translations possess such power but some translations 
“have obliged a given language to express thoughts and facts that it was not accustomed to express before” 
(Eco 2001: 21). The impact of Luther’s translation of the Bible on German culture, Heidegger translations 
on the French philosophical style, or Elio Vittorini translations of American writers on Italian literature 
constitute cases in point (Ibid). 
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possible,” translator should “move the reader towards” the author in order to “leave the 
author in peace, as much as possible.” In this way the reader would be able to “discern 
the workings of the original language that expresses the language game, the culture of 
which the original was a part, shining through the words on the translated page. (Lefevere 
2002: 5). 167 
Yet the history of translation shows that “domestication” has been the preferred 
strategy. For many people, including publishers and critics, a successful translation is the 
one that does not feel like a translation at all, which requires above anything else the 
invisibility of the translator and “rewriting” of the text “in terms of a system their 
potential audience [is] able to understand” (Lefevere 1992: 77). The system in general 
imposes domestication, but there are “deforming tendencies or forces” inherent in the act 
of translation as well that not only “every translator is inescapably exposed to” but also 
unconsciously “form part of the translator’s being, determining the desire to translate” 
(Berman: 286).168 In effect, “the valorization of transparency,” both by the system and the 
translator, leads to the inevitable manipulation of the text and the reader to a significant 
extent. Aiming for fluency, which is an essential component of the domestication 
strategy, leads to translator’s self-annihilation and marginality, in addition to obliterating 
                                                
167 Of course one of the most passionate advocates of the foreignizing strategy is Lawrence Venuti, whose 
influential study The Translator’s Invisibility (1995) provides an in-depth analysis of this issue.  
168 Berman’s list comprises 12 tendencies: rationalization, clarification, expansion, ennoblement, qualitative 
impoverishment, quantitative impoverishment, the destruction of rhythms, the destruction of underlying 
networks of signification, the destruction of linguistic patternings, the destruction of vernacular network or 
their exoticisation, the destruction of expressions and idioms, and the effacement of the superimposition of 
languages. Because “the system  of deformation] is the internalized expression of a two-millennium-old 
tradition, as well as the ethnocentric structure of every culture, every language,” adds Berman, it would be 
“illusory to think that the translator can be freed merely by becoming aware of them”. (286). The only way 
for a translator to free herself from the yoke of deforming tendencies is to “yield to the ‘controls’ (in the 
psychoanalytic sense)” which requires analysis of the “tendencies” that are operative in the translation.  
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the linguistic and cultural differences of the foreign text, ultimately performing “a labor 
of acculturation.” By rendering the text more intelligible and even familiar to the target-
language reader, domestication, also, precipitates a “narcissistic experience.” Venuti 
argues recognizing his or her own culture in a cultural other, enacts “imperialism that 
extends the dominion of transparency with other ideological discourses over a different 
culture” (1992: 5).169  
While the expectations of the reader as well as the translator’s desire to translate 
prompt a preference for domesticated translation, the way the translator acts on these 
factors is largely determined by the socio-cultural milieu. The relationship between the 
two cultures, as well as the context that the translator is organically rooted in, loom over 
the translator’s interpretation of the source text. Therefore, it becomes imperative to 
analyze the context of the translation in question in an attempt at revealing the ideological 
undercurrents.   
    
(ii) Barks and American Spirituality 
In order to better grasp the context of Barks’s translations of Rumi, one has to, 
first and foremost, examine a specific tradition of spirituality that has assuredly 
influenced Barks. In agreement with the gist of this tradition, Barks declares himself not 
belonging to any kind of pre-defined religion, though he acknowledges benefiting, at 
least potentially, from all: 
                                                
169 The foreignization strategy, on the other hand, by making the translator’s work visible, can prompt a 
critical appreciation of its cultural political function. What is more, the linguistic and cultural difference of 
the foreign text can be preserved “by producing translations which are strange and estranging, which mark 
the limits of dominant values in the target-language culture and hinder those values from enacting an 
imperialistic domestication of a cultural other” (Venuti 1992: 13).  
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The religions of the world are luminous in their individuality ... I say that the 
exclusivity of most of the organized religion does insult the soul. We must be 
open enough to assimilate the insights of indigenous cultures as well as those of 
the Abrahamic religions, to glory in the clarity of Rinzai and Bodhidharma as well 
as that of the dreamtime drawings. Joseph Campbell teaches us this. (2004: xvii) 
At first glance it seems like a mish-mash of any spiritual teaching with a relevant edge, 
but it is of crucial importance to note that Barks is not alone in his promotion of a 
personally crafted, eclectic form of religiosity. Though his tailor-made spirituality might 
be unique on its own, the discourse that this individualized form of spirituality springs 
from has become the source of a perspective that more and more people associate with. 
Today many Americans, like Barks, craft their own definitions of religiosity, which, in 
general, necessitate a syncretic outlook that would embrace the teachings of Rumi as 
much as it would embrace Buddhism, Hinduism, and Christianity. As long as the 
practitioner is able to harmonize diverse traditions according to her/his perspective, the 
individualized fusions are deemed to be as valid as any other religious system.170  
The creation of individualized forms of “spiritual bricolage” is facilitated by two 
developments: an unprecedented access to diverse forms of religions, and the adoption of 
a new understanding of religion. This highly subjective approach to religion underlines 
spiritual growth, holiness and authority of the self, self-awareness, self-actualization, 
receptive and monistic holism, eclecticism, syncretism, intuitive knowledge and 
                                                
170 For further information and analysis on the privatization of religion in the US see A Generation of 
Seekers by Wade Clark Roof, Spiritual but not Religious by Robert C. Fuller, The Fifties Spiritual 
Marketplace by Robert Ellwood, After Heaven by Robert Wuthnow, Religion in the United States by 
Jeanne Cortiel et. al., Getting Saved from the Sixties by Steve Tipton, Beyond New Age by Steven Sutcliffe 
& Marion Bowman, eds., American Spiritualities by Catherine Albanese, ed., The New Religions by Jacob 
Needleman, The New Religious Movements Experience in America by Eugene V. Gallagher, etc.     
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immediate unmediated experience. It is, in Wade Clark Roof’s words, “more internal 
than external, more individual than institutional, more experiential than cerebral, more 
private than public” (153) 
The sociology of this hard-to-categorize tradition has become the subject of 
numerous studies, most of which point at the 1960s counterculture mentality as the 
turning point in its proliferation among spiritual seekers who happen to differentiate 
spirituality from religion. The distinction is crucial for the point of this chapter, because 
Rumi is believed by many who identify themselves as “spiritual but not religious” to 
belong within the realm of spirituality. The distinction, however, has not always been this 
clear. Spirituality, once belonging to the realm of religion,171 has acquired a new sense 
since the late 1950s, so different from the traditional one that it is now considered to be 
“an emic repacking of popular and vernacular religion to suit the peculiar conditions of 
industrial and post-industrial societies” (Sutcliffe: 8).172 With “emphasis on the subject, 
discovery of the self and a more differentiated understanding of psychology” more and 
more people have approached with caution and doubt to “the empirical features 
associated with official religion such as distinctive buildings, a dominant founder-figure, 
a foundational book or a uniquely authoritative “canon,” an acknowledged creed and 
determined body of ritual, and a more or less clear and unambiguous self-presentation” 
(Ibid). For most of these seekers, spirituality, due to its flexibility and malleability, has 
                                                
171 Eric Leigh Schmidt states that spirituality was usually employed a s a theological term in opposition to 
materiality  let alone being a keyword in the early Protestant vernacular of personal devotionalism (4). 
172 Catherine Albanese argues that in the 1960s the combined effect of the religious vernaculars of three 
distinct movements, namely a newly arrived Asian presence and missionary consciousness, the 
theosophical legacy, and the New Though tradition, on the baby boomer generation who, thanks to the 
socio-political ethos of the time, was dissociation with official religions by turning to experiential modes of 
self-presentation (2001: 3-9). 
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become a “universal codeword,” covering diverse attitudes to experiential and mystical 
self-quest. 
The American experience with spirituality in the twentieth century is usually 
roughly labeled as “New Age spirituality.” More nuanced studies such as Catherine 
Albanese’s A Republic of Mind and Spirit (2006)173 or Eric Leigh Schmidt’s Restless 
Souls: The Making of American Religiosity argue for calling it  “metaphysical religiosity” 
or the “spiritual left.” Admitting the cruciality of the 1960s both Schmidt and Albanese 
underline the historical roots of “pastiche spirituality” in America. Schmidt specifically 
calls attention to the tradition of religious liberalism which together with its romantic and 
reformer supporters, “led the way in redefining spirituality and setting out its essentials” 
(11).174 Its legacy is so ingrained in American religious life that seeker spirituality with its 
“excitedly eclectic, mystically yearning, perennially cosmopolitan” nature is an artifact of 
religious liberalism (6). 
Catherine Albanese agrees with Schmidt with regard to the legacy of religious 
liberalism but goes further back, to colonial times so as to trace the individual elements 
that are fused into “metaphysical religiosity. According to Albanese, the most prominent 
                                                
173 According to Catherine Albanese three major traditions have shaped American religiosity. The first two 
being evangelicalism and the liturgical form of religious piety have been studied in numerous accounts. 
The third one, the metaphysical religion, on the other hand, had received less attention, probably due to its 
extremely ambiguous nature as well as its less respected value. Nonetheless as Albanese’s extensive study 
demonstrates it has a major impact on both American culture and religion.  
174 Schmidt argues to examine varieties of spiritually-oriented traditions under the term religious liberalism. 
As products of nineteenth-century liberalism religious liberals were “committed to progress in the domains 
of spiritual consciousness, social organization, and scientific knowledge.” Unlike their secular cousins, they 
consider “a deepened and diversified spirituality” to be “part of modernity's promise.” They were, in 
general, wary of creeds and object to uncritical devotion to scriptural texts. Schmidt lists the rudiments of 
religious liberalism as “individual aspiration after mystical experience or religious feeling; the valuing of 
silence, solitude, and serene meditations; the immanence of the transcendent-in each person and in nature; 
the cosmopolitan appreciation of religious variety as well as unity in diversity; ethical earnestness in pursuit 
of justice-producing reforms or "social salvation"; an emphasis on creative self-expression and 
adventuresome seeking” (6-12). The rise and flourishing of religious liberalism is also analyzed from 
different perspectives in American Religious Liberalism (2012). 
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feature of this extremely heterogeneous and syncretic tradition is “combinativeness,” 
which reveals itself in its extraordinary absorptive power of different sorts of 
metaphysical traditions as diverse as Hermeticism, freemasonry, Native American 
spirituality, Mormonism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Christian Science and many more.  
As it happens, American history is replete with miscellaneous attempts at 
syncretic synthesis of religious traditions. Several Americans, at least since the eighteenth 
century, have delineated the outlines of a universally acceptable fusion-religion that is 
deemed to replace all religions. And it does not even have to be metaphysical as Albanese 
argues; the “rational religion” anticipated by the Founding Fathers, for instance, is devoid 
of particular creeds, rituals or metaphysical elements. In a similar vein Samuel Johnson, 
who F. Max Muller described as the finder of “a religion behind all religions,”175 
dedicated his life to the exploration of the “universal religion” which he describes as 
“what is best in each and every one of the great positive religions in the world”  (1873: 
6).176 A comparable concept, termed “pure religion,” was put forth by the Free Religious 
Association (FRA), which was founded in 1867 by David Atwood Wasson and Reverend 
William J. Potter to create a “nonsectarian religion to which any intelligent person could 
                                                
175 Max Muller says: “What I admire most in Samuel Johnson was his not being discouraged by the rubbish 
with which the religions of the East are overwhelmed, but his quietly looking for the nuggets. And has he 
not found them? And has he not found what is better than ever so many nuggets, -- that great, golden dawn 
of truth, that there is a religion behind all religions, and that happy is the man who knows it in these days 
of materialism and atheism?" (Oriental Religions and Their Relation to Universal Religion, vol. 3, p. x)  
176 In the first volume of his multi-volume study Oriental Religions and Their Relation to Universal 
Religion Johnson says: “Universal religion, then cannot be any one, exclusively, of the great positive 
religions of the world. Yet it is really what is best in each and every one of them; purified from baser inter-
mixture and developed in freedom and power. Being the purport of nature, it has been germinating in every 
vital energy of man; so that its elements exist, at some stage of evolution, in every great religion of 
mankind” (1873: 6). 
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subscribe despite conditions of race and birth” (Gohdes: 231).177 The manifesto of “Fifty 
Affirmations” written in 1870 by the editor F. A. Abbot to the first volume of the FRA-
inspired periodical The Index explains “Free Religion” as “the natural outcome of every 
historical religion – the final unity, therefore, towards which all historical religions 
slowly tend” (1).178 Into the twentieth century there were those such as Hazrat Inayat 
Khan and Aldous Huxley in the United States or Frithjof Schuon and René Guénon in 
Europe who promoted the idea of philosophia perennis though under different 
designations. Described by Huxley as “a version of the Highest Common Factor in all 
theologies” (2009 [1944]: vii), the Perennial Philosophy could easily be analyzed as a 
form of universal religion which, according to Schuon, is “the underlying religion” of all 
religions, or simply “the religion of the heart” (religio cordis) (Lings: xii).179 
Probably more influential and important than any of the above, there were the 
Transcendentalists who under the guidance of Ralph Waldo Emerson explored world 
religions by means of studying their sacred texts.180 Even though he never termed or 
                                                
177 FRA is considered one of the most important sites of activity for the post-Civil War Transcendentalist 
movement. Its members included prominent figures such as Cyrus Bartol, Lydia Maria Child, Octavius 
Brooks Frothingham (who served as the first president of the FRA in 1867-78), Thomas Wentworth 
Higginson (who also served a term as president of the association), David Wasson, and John Weiss. 
Emerson also supported and attended meetings of the group as well as serving as vice president under 
Frothingham” (Wayne: 113). 
178 In addition to such US based attempts or anticipations, there were international societies that were 
actively present in the US such as the Theosophical Society founded by Madame Blavatsky. Dedicated to 
revealing a dormant “Ancient Wisdom” common to religions worldwide, theosophists were specifically 
influential in conjuring up the image of mystical East. However, because theosophists preferred to narrow 
their focus to esoteric features, they consequently gave “the mistaken impression that their spiritual 
practices were primarily concerned with arousing the body’s subtle energies or eliciting paranormal 
abilities such as clairvoyance, telepathy, and astral projection” (Fuller: 81). Later in the twentieth century  
179 For a detailed analysis of the Perennial Philosophy as promoted by Guénon et. al. see Mark Sedgwick’s 
Against the Modern World: Traditionalism and the Secret Intellectual History of the Twentieth Century 
(2004). 
180 Transcendentalists’ prioritization of text over performance clearly demonstrates a “textualist bias,” 
which is one of the natural outcomes, among other things, of print culture. Due to print’s encouragement of 
the ‘sense of closure’ – that is, “the sense that the content of the text was final and complete,” “the 
enlightened mind” eventually became sure that “one can give an objective and definitive account of that 
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claimed to found a new religion, Emerson believed in the coming of a new understanding 
of a religion of fusion, which he explicates in his preface to the extracts from “Veeshno 
Sarma”, the first “Ethnical Scriptures” article in the transcendentalist periodical The 
Dial:181 
Each nation has its bible more or less pure; none has yet been willing or able in a   
wise and devout spirit to collate its own with those of other natures and sinking 
the civil-historical and ritual portions to bring together the grand expressions of 
moral sentiment in different ages and races, the rules for the guidance of life, the 
bursts of piety and abandonment to the Invisible and Eternal; - a work inevitable 
sooner or later, and which we hope is to be done by religion and not by literature. 
(82)182 
As the quote demonstrates, Transcendentalists never advocated fully adopting a religious 
tradition; they picked from the “ethnical scriptures” whatever they needed to support their 
                                                
which one is studying” (King: 65). It is also significant to note that the text-centered conceptualization of 
religion facilitated the rise of religious liberalism in the twentieth century. In a recent study Matthew 
Hedstrom exposes the dependence of the “the liberal project of renovating religion in light of modern 
knowledge” on “the marketplace of print” (4). The impact of the print on popular culture had been a case 
since the Protestant Reformation and the invention of the moveable type but as Hedstrom notes “only in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries did the economic, cultural, social, and religious forces align to make the 
consumption of mass-market books a part of everyday American spiritual practice” (Ibid). I believe it could 
be said that the early transcendentalists were heralds of such collaboration, which facilitated “the spread of 
liberal religious sensibilities through middle-brow culture” (Ibid).   
181 Emerson succeeded Margaret Fuller as editor of the Dial in 1842. Together with Thoreau he prepared a 
new section titled “Ethnical Scriptures”, a selection and edition of sacred texts. According to Alan Hodder, 
the "Ethnical Scriptures" column represented the first tentative steps in the direction of composing a 
universal scripture or "world bible" that would encompass and transcend the individual scriptures of the 
world's religious heritage (32).   
182 Anthony Versluis coined the term “literary religion” for the American religion envisioned by Emerson 
and his close circle. This literary religion was removed from any ritual and institutional context and drew 
on various religious traditions from all around world. Though it must be noted that Emerson was rather 
individualistic in his attempts, which he has described in one of his essays as enjoying “an original relation 
to the universe” (2012: 1). By means of a syncretic approach, Emerson was looking for personal inspiration 
and spiritual edification in any text available to him and the emphasis was on personal and symbolic forms 
of expression that focus on the “individual fulfillment of one’s potentialities” (Ahlstrom: 32).  
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own ideas or sometimes to construct a concept, such as the Over-Soul concept of 
Emerson.183 Identified as “intellectual colonization” by Arthur Versluis, this approach has 
become a characteristic feature of not only transcendentalism but “religious liberalism” in 
general. Taken out of their socio-historical context, any given religious tradition is 
bisected into moral, ethical and self-transcending features as opposed to the “civil-
historical and ritual portions.” What is to follow is to synthesize the ethical strictures as 
well as moral and self-transcending aspects of those distinct traditions.  
The most significant aspect of this approach to religious traditions, I believe, is its 
“transformative power,” which can be defined as the effect of such combinative 
eclecticism on the appropriated subject. Once a tradition enters the range of this type of 
American religiosity, it no longer is the same as it is received and performed in its 
original landscape.184 One could definitely dispute the uniqueness of this type of 
appropriation, but a brief glance at the history of culture and, in particular, of religiosity 
evolved in the United States, reveals the success and extent of this process of 
“Americanization,” which was promoted, as early as 1847, by Ralph Waldo Emerson in a 
note in his journal: “It makes no difference what I read. If it is irrelevant, I read it deeper. 
I read it until it is pertinent to me and mine, to Nature, and to the hour that now passes. A 
                                                
183 The transcendentalists were quite conscious of the consequences of their approach as a parable provided 
by Thoreau in his conclusion to a selection from the Saddharmapundarika bespeaks. In the parable chosen 
by Thoreau, the Dharma is explained through the analogy of a rain cloud, from which each plant depending 
on its size, nature and needs absorb water. This parable sums up the Transcendentalist attitude of the time 
toward Oriental scriptures and probably served as Thoreau’s answer to those who object to taking part of 
Buddhism without taking all of it (Versluis: 191).  Thoreau was of the opinion that comparable to the 
plants’ absorption of water, human beings can utilize the teachings of Buddha according to their own 
needs; it could be as little as few drops or as much as many barrels.  
184 Richard King, for instance, demonstrates the extent of such transformative power on Buddhism and 
Hinduism in his book Orientalism and Religion (1999). 
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good scholar will find Aristophanes and Hafiz and Rabelais full of American history” 
(1926: 222).  
 Going back to Coleman Barks, his embeddedness into the above-mentioned 
tradition with regard to his approach to religion remains fundamental. Like the 
transcendentalists and religious liberals in general, Barks is skeptical about the idea of 
organized religion, and opposes to be defined or confined by any religion or the sacred 
text thereof. For Barks in the “all-inclusive, no-dogma, no-structure way” the most 
meaningful act is to nourish the soul which needs moving along, expanding and 
deepening in love, without exclusively subscribing to any doctrine (2009: 9).185 Rather 
than clinging to prescribed forms of religious experience, Barks espouses creating 
personalized forms in an “open-air sanctuary without buildings, doctrine, or clergy,” 
where “the Lord is what is, nothing less than that” (2002: 164). In explanation of his 
stance on the issue of exclusivity of religions, Barks refers to the words of his own master 
Bawa Muhaiyaddeen, who says that “once you believe in God, there is no religion. Once 
you divide yourself off with religions, you are separated from your fellow man” (2011: 
479).186 In this universe shared by many like-minded religious liberals and spiritual  
seekers, again in Bawa Muhaiyaddeen’s words, ‘God has no form, no shape, no color, no 
                                                
185 In A Year With Rumi, Barks argues that “the exclusivity of Abrahamic religious doctrines” “insult the 
soul” (7). He argues that there cannot be one messenger, one book, one revelation as the Islamic creed 
dictates.  
186 Bawa Muhaiyaddeen (d. 1986) was a Sufi mystic who had both Hindu and Muslim disciples in Sri 
Lanka. There he was known as “a former wandering ascetic, a holy man, and inspired teacher,” who 
founded an ashram to care for the poor and to heal spiritual illnesses. Though he was associated with Islam 
because of him laying the foundation for a mosque near Mankumban, he insisted at his talks that 
distinctions between people due to race, color, class, or religion do not exist. He further argues that men 
and women of all religions could pray in the mosque as long as non-Muslims respected the salat times of 
Muslim prayer. Bawa came to America upon the invitation of a young woman,who in her own spiritual 
quest, had heard about Bawa. After his arrival in Philadelphia in 1971 a fellowship by similar-minded 
spiritual seekers was established (Webb: 254-55). For more information, see Gisela Webb “Sufism in 
America” and http://www.bmf.org/m/fellowship/founder.html  
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differences, no race, no religion, no country, no place, no name, neither beginning nor 
end. God is the grace that lives within all lives” (2011: 343). 
 Furthermore, in the customized religiosity, religion, as understood in the 
conventional sense, disappears to merge with literature, reminding us what Emerson had 
advocated. Barks argues that this type of approach to religion, that is, “the experiment to 
live without religion, or rather to live in friendship with all religion and literature 
simultaneously,” is “the brave American try for freedom and flow” (2002: 164). Though, 
he makes sure that it does not have to be literature for everyone because there had been, 
and will be, many valid ways of acknowledging the mystery as well as the sacredness of 
creation (2009: 7). For Barks, it has always been literature; “works of literature,” he 
argues, “are agents in the continuous revisioning of the language of who we are and are 
becoming” (2002: 265).  
 In parallel to his ideas about personalized forms of religious experience Barks 
argues that instead of blindly following the sacred texts that are promoted by 
institutionalized religions one needs to find out his/her “own anthology of sacred 
texts.”187 For him Cormac McCarthy and James Agee work better than the epistles of 
Paul or the Qur’an; Joseph Campbell is as illuminative as Abrahamic religions, Rinzai 
and Bodhidharma for that matter.188 In this regard, Rumi, specifically his Masnavi, which, 
according to Barks, possesses “a wildness beyond Thoreau or D. H. Lawrence or 
                                                
187 Though it must be noted that Barks believes that such “texts” do not necessarily have to be texts at all. In 
“disagreement with the idea of sacred texts as a category” Barks argues “everything,” including people, 
memories, pets, “is a kind of sacred text” as long as they “deepen [one’s] own sense of being” (interview) 
188 The compilation Barks plans to make for his granddaughter gives a hint about Barks’s own anthology of 
sacred texts: “lines from Shakespeare, Keats, Wordsworth, maybe some Bible, C. K. Williams, Agee, 
Yeats, Hopkins, Dickinson, Mary Oliver” (interview)  
 137 
Nietzsche,” works far more successfully than many other texts in leading the listener 
“into an experience, into a presence or presences” (2002: 258; 2010: 9). 
 Again like transcendentalists, or religious liberals for that matter, Barks adopts an 
extremely selective approach to any spiritually enhancing material he encounters. The 
bricolage method liberally employed by Barks and alike enable them to tailor anything 
they read to the fusion they personally oversee. According to Barks, such fusions are 
what Rumi’s life, poetry and friendship with Shams suggest. By means of fusions that 
simulate the revolutionary friendship of Rumi and Shams, we will be able to “break 
cultural molds and cross religious and national boundaries” says Barks (2011: 480). The 
overall effect, which is “a new way of being,” has no name or form yet but is “something 
at once planetary and tribal, indigenous and universal” (Ibid). Of course, as it is the case 
with any claim to fusion, one has to ask which parts to use and which parts to get rid of. 
The question is crucial because it determines the character of the fusion one is seeking.  
      
(iii) Barks on Rumi 
Barks’s reading of Rumi needs to be discussed with reference to the question above. His  
interpretation is marked by an emphasis on the universalist aspect, which allegedly 
nullifies the Islamic character of Rumi’s poetry. But in order to comprehend and 
overemphasize the universalist aspect that he hears in Rumi’s poetry and personality, 
Barks interprets Rumi’s poetry as if it exists in a vacuum, safe from any external element: 
“the poems lived free of purpose, free of time and space in a kind of pure sailing” says 
Barks (2004: xvi). In short the more Rumi is universalized the more his poetry is 
decontextualized. Barks argues that “in its essential nature” mystical poetry in general “is 
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not something to locate or describe within a cultural context” (2004: xvii). It is always 
already above and beyond time and place. That’s why, Barks claims, despite the different 
categories where individual “mystics” were put, “they recognize one another across 
centuries and cultures” (2009: 7).189 And on account of being a universal mystic neither 
Rumi nor his poetry belongs to thirteenth-century Islamic culture. 
 Barks further argues that, similar to his independence from time and space, Rumi 
is also not confined by religions. As “a dissolver of boundaries” among world religions 
Rumi is capable of moving beyond the confines of organized religion that Barks 
insistently refuses to be a part of. “Other people see him as an Islamic poet,” says Barks, 
“but I like to hear in him that which calls us beyond the boundaries that separate us” 
(interview). Preferring to “hear Rumi’s poems outside of any system, in the shared heart, 
part of no religion and all” (TSOR: 46), Barks maintains that Rumi “claimed to belong to 
that companion who transpires through and animates the whole universe” “rather than be 
exclusively part of an organized religion or cultural system” (TSOR: 8).  In short, in 
Rumi Barks sees a fellow free soul with no attachments whatsoever.  
 As can be predicted, Barks’s interpretation of Rumi as a “gnostic, without-
religious-form,” constitutes one of the most controversial aspects of his reading. Many 
Rumi scholars, as well Sufis including Franklin Lewis and Ibrahim Gamard, oppose a 
reading of Rumi divorced from Islam. Sayer H. Nasr, for instance, aptly argues that 
representing Rumi as an extra-Islamic figure is as problematic as reading Dante as an 
extra-Christian poet: 
                                                
189 In his “anthology of sacred texts” or the customized list of “soul books” Rumi is situated among a 
“scruffy, thoughtful, ecstatic crowd” that Barks identifies as “the DUMs, the Disreputable Unaffiliated 
Mystics” most of whom are, in Barks’s words, “devoutly affiliated” and “not at all disreputable”  (2009: 7).  
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It is as if Dante were to be translated very approximately into Arabic and presented 
as a 'universal poet,' which he of course is, but without any reference to Christianity, 
without which Dante would not be Dante. The same truth holds for Rumi, who 
represents one of the greatest flowerings of Islamic spirituality, a tradition whose 
roots are sunk deeply in the Koran and whose prototype is to be found in the Prophet 
of Islam. (2003: xi)190 
 Barks is well aware of such criticism and welcomes them but argues to maintain 
his position regarding Rumi’s supposed indifference towards any organized religion. In 
The Soul of Rumi he acknowledges the presence of “a Rumi loved by Muslims whose 
almost every poem is read as a commentary on the Qur’an” (46) but adds that his own 
version of Rumi, which he shares with notable figures such as “Dag Hammarskjold, 
Gurdjieff, Joseph Campbell, Erich Fromm, Meher Baba, Hasan Shushed, Sam Lewis, Pir 
Vilayat Khan, Reshad Feild, Idris Shah, Hamid Karzai, and Barack Obama” (2011: 487), 
should be as valid as the Muslim Rumi. Rumi’s baraka (blessing), he argues, is vast 
enough to accommodate all kinds of interpretations and there is no need to be “dogmatic” 
or “argumentative” about it. “We can meet and talk and proclaim our takes on his 
poetry,” says Barks, “but all within the embrace of his presence” (2002: 46).  
 In this scheme of interpretation Rumi owes his supra-religious standing to his life-
changing friendship with Shams-i Tabriz. Scholars actually agrees on the transformative 
effect of Shams on Rumi. According to S. H. Nasr, Rumi’s “latent” Sufi inclinations 
came to the fore after his encounter with Shams, who probably guided him to the 
                                                
190 James Winston Morris also notes that Rumi and Dante share a similar destiny in the sense that 
explicating the meanings of the Masnavi and Divine Comedy to modern audience is complicated because of 
the “constant interplay between initially unfamiliar metaphysical assumptions” that are inherent in both 
works but unfamiliar to modern audiences. 
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realization of certain stations of perfection to which he had not already gained access. 
Both Annemarie Schimmel and William Chittick underline the decisive influence of 
Shams upon Rumi; outwardly he was transformed from a sober jurisprudent to an 
intoxicated celebrant of the mysteries of Divine Love. It is the disappearance of Shams 
that initiated Rumi’s transformation into a mystical poet. Barks probably agrees with 
these comments but further claims “that ineffable and yet particular connection, 
consumed the structure of religion for Rumi” meaning that “the friendship became his 
worship, absorbing Islam, Muhammad, Jesus, and all doctrines in the ocean of its reality, 
the heart” (TSOR: 46). At that point, says Barks, “theological discussions” including 
those on prayer, were “no longer relevant” (Ibid).191  
Barks’s translation strategy is inevitably an expression/continuum of this reading. 
In fact, he defends de-contextualization, or “not trying to place Rumi in his thirteenth-
century locus,” with reference to his “grandiose project” which is “to free [Rumi’s] text 
into its essence” (2004: xviii) by “putting Rumi into the Whitman free-verse lineage, 
which is the strongest strand of American poetry, and the most soul- and self-searching” 
(2011: 10).192 The “essence” that Barks claims to reveal is akin to the universalism of the 
transcendentalists and the like. Barks himself notes that in all his “renderings of Rumi”, 
he aims to “emphasize this universalist aspect” (2011: 7).  
This universalism, however, is not necessarily about finding “the Highest 
Common Factor in all theologies.” A very personal universal underlines specific 
                                                
191 According to Barks, Rumi “does not stress prayer so much as continuous conversation”. Barks supports 
this highly contentious claim by his own take on the concept of worship: “If our real consciousness is 
beyond time and space, the core of worship must be beyond any cultural or religious system” (TSOR: 46). 
192 Barks notes that “I am told by those who know that Rumi’s language has the taste of his refinement, his 
learned lineage, as well as an easy colloquial, conversational tone. That blend of delicacy and sudden 
directness is part of what I hope to reproduce in American English” (2011: 480).  
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characteristics that Barks finds ideally appropriate for the universal religion of love. What 
is more, despite its neutrality claim, Barks’s method of decontextualization does not 
automatically make his Rumi or his poetry “universal” in the conventional sense, because 
the term “universal” never remains out-of-context. Decontextualization, in this case, 
means re-contextualization. Here the new context that Rumi is situated in corresponds to 
a specific form of American religiosity that is briefly described above. The Rumi that 
Barks favors and claims to capture the essence and soul of is, indeed, a mirror image of 
Barks. Barks sees a fellow soul in Rumi and translates only the parts that would 
substantiate the presence of that fellowship. By the same token the parts that he considers 
“nonessential” are either mistranslated or not translated at all. 
   
(iv) The translations by Barks 
Barks never claims to produce “scholarly translations” and is well aware of the 
criticism directed at his work for not being “proper” translations (2002: 390).193 Such 
criticisms are not baseless. Due to the extreme license he takes, Barks’s renderings of 
Rumi’s poetry present certain complications. The first problematic element pertains to 
Barks’s lack of knowledge of Persian. Rather than the original Persian versions of the 
poems, he works from different translations to English194 to render them in American 
                                                
193 In The Soul of Rumi Barks says: “These are not scholarly translations, though to produce them I 
collaborate with scholars who know the original language, Farsi. I do not work from the Persian. Some 
people would not call these translations, but rather “translations,” or versions, or imitations” (390). In A 
Year With Rumi he reiterates the non-scholar characteristic of his translations: “Whatever you call the 
collaborative effort at translation that I do, it is not scholarship” (415). 
194 For the Masnavi translations he mainly uses Reynold Nicholson’s 8-volumed The Mathnawi of 
Jalaluddin Rumi (1925-1940), and also M.G. Gupta’s Maulana Rumi’s Masnawi (6 vols; 1995). For the 
quatrains (rubaiyat), and odes (ghazals) his main sources are A. J. Arberry’s Mystical Poems of Rumi (1968 
and 1979), The Rubaiyat of Jalal al-din Rumi (1949) as well as the unpublished translations of John 
Moyne, an emeritus professor of linguistics at the CUNY. In addition, again particularly for the quatrains 
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English.195 He calls this method “collaborative translation,” by means of which he hopes 
to “release” Rumi’s poems “from their cages” (2004: 363).196  Here the cage that Rumi’s 
poetry is entrapped in refers to the more literal and scholarly yet dry translations of R. A. 
Nicholson and A. J. Arberry. According to his own account, Barks has set a routine of 
translation practice since 1976 which, upon reading such literal translations, starts with  
him “enter[ing] the ecstatic consciousness, the love that is the subject that generates the 
poetry” (2003: 184). He describes this state as “mov[ing] with the images and try[ing] to 
absorb the soul-growth truth being transmitted” (Ibid). And the words come to him 
“when it feels like a connection has occurred,” which is finalized by the feeling that his 
“head bowing in gratitude” (Ibid). The product of such an intuitive experience, of course, 
defies systematic analysis. 
The second problematic aspect of Barks’s translations concerns his editing 
process. Usually accompanied by some sort of paratextual matter Barks creates his own 
editions of Rumi poetry by redesigning the structure of Rumi’s oeuvre. The Masnavi, for 
instance, is a collection of embedded stories, jokes, folktales, anecdotes, lyrical poetry all 
of which, though seemingly disconnected, are, in fact, linked to each other by the thread 
                                                
and odes he uses Nevit Ergin’s Divan-i Kebir (16 vols; 1992-2001). For a few poems he uses other sources 
such as Hazrat Inayat Khan but these constitute a negligible percentage.  
195 What Barks does can, as well, be defined as a form of “intralingual translation” which is described 
Roman Jacobson as “rewording,” or “an interpretation of verbal signs by means of other signs of the same 
language” (2). 
196 In almost all of his works of Rumi translations Barks recounts his meeting with the poetry of Rumi. In 
1976 when he was teaching poetry at the University of Georgia-Athens Robert Bly, a fellow poet, gave him 
a copy of A. J. Arberry’s translations of Rumi, saying, “these poems need to be released from their cages." 
According his own account, he “felt drawn immediately to the spaciousness and longing in Rumi’s poetry” 
(ER: 363). After a while he sent some of his early attempts of “rephrasing Arberry’s English” to a friend 
who was teaching law at Rutgers-Camden. Though Barks does not know the reason this friend read those 
translations to his students among whom someone asked him for Barks’s address, and started writing, 
urging him to come meet his teacher in Philadelphia. Somehow Barks accepted this invitation and the said 
teacher, Bawa Muhyiyaddeen, turned out to be someone that Barks had met in a dream a year before their 
actual meeting. That Bawa also told him to continue with the Rumi work: “It has to be done” he said.  
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of Divine Love.197 In his editions Barks usually uses thematic chapters to re-contextualize 
the poetry he is using. An abridged version of a certain passage from the Masnavi is 
taken as a free-standing poem and usually sorted with another poem from the Divan 
and/or another abridged poem from another volume of the Masnavi. In short, usually the 
whole oeuvre of Rumi is re-categorized by Barks according to the themes he chooses.198 
Barks describes his method as ‘taking what he hears as the tastiest lines from a poem 
without giving the context” (2003: 184). Though it should be noted that Barks 
acknowledges the disparity between his personal recreations’ and Rumi’s originals:  
Rumi’s poetry was a continuous spontaneous outpouring. The poems have no 
titles in Persian. They are seamless, whereas I have given most of these titles. In 
English we feel the title is an organic part of the poem, but it may contribute here 
to a false feeling of stop-start process. There are no full stops. Rumi’s poetry 
should be felt as a whole like Walt Whitman’s Leaves of Grass or Wallace 
Stevens’s Harmonium. Also, in this collection I often take what I hear as the 
tastiest lines from a poem without giving the context. That can be found in the 
earlier volumes, The Essential Rumi and The Soul of Rumi. The wider truth is that 
                                                
197 Annemarie Schimmel argues that even though the Masnavi seems like an “illogical work” there is in fact 
“a secret order behind” it. As a work containing “the entire wisdom of an unusual and yet exemplary life, 
the fruit of scholarly and poetic activity, of burning in Divine Love and of being revived,” the Masnavi’s 
inner working can be perceived with reference to a tree metaphor: Masnavi is a “wondrous tree that has 
produced strange blossoms and fruits, a tree in which birds of different hues are nesting – until they leave 
the nest “Word” and fly back to their eternal home.” (2001: 29).  
198 The themes are organically related to the spiritual verses of Rumi. The Essential Rumi is divided into 
twenty-eight chapters that Barks present as “faint and playful palimpsests spread over Rumi’s imagination” 
(xxiii). Chapters are titled “The Tavern: Whoever Brought Me Here Will Have to Take Me Home,” 
“Bewilderment: I Have Five Things to Say,” and “Emptiness and Silence: The Night Air,” Union: Gnats 
Inside the Wind.”  And in each chapter Barks brings together poems from different works of Rumi. In his 
other works Barks uses more or less the same poems but under different organizations. In The Big Red 
Book, for instance, which is divided into twenty-seven categorical chapters, he uses the eighteen of the 
“ninety-nine beautiful names of Allah” in Arabic along with the categories of his own devising such as 
“Tenderness Toward Existence,” and “Everything and Everyone Else.” In short, at different levels Barks 
uses licenses to create “new” works by means of simple restructuring out of the oeuvre of Rumi. 
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Rumi’s poems all grow together in a field called the qalb, or the innermost heart. 
(2003: 184) 
In another instance, however, Barks argues that his re-arrangement of the poems 
does not contradict the original restructure of the Masnavi, which, despite being “whole,” 
“seems composed of strands and fragments” and does not have “a satisfying beginning, 
middle, or end” (2002: 264). Because “there’s no beginning or end to the flowing of heart 
energy,” one can “enter the poem anywhere and swim around, listen for resonance, 
experience the motions” (Ibid) is his justification. The Masnavi, just like any great 
artwork, is a field “spreading out a spontaneously exploratory, tending region of 
consciousness” (Ibid).  
As mentioned above, Barks’s translation strategy tends toward “domestication,” 
which roughly means adapting a text via translation to the norms and values of the 
receiving culture.199 Such imposing of the norms and values of the target-text culture on 
the source-text culture can be undertaken by means of various tactics, each and every one 
of which potentially contributes to the ideological manipulation of the text. Christina 
Schaffner, for instance, notes that “the deliberate choice or avoidance of a particular 
word” at the lexical level and “the use of passive structures to avoid an expression of 
agency” at the grammatical level are common manipulative tactics operative in 
translation (23).  
Upon careful examination of the translations by Barks, specifically those that 
appear in The Essential Rumi, specific maneuvers draw attention. I argue that Barks 
employs them so as to accommodate the poems to his own worldview partly because 
                                                
199 It should be noted that because the receiving culture can never be monolithic there is no single set norms 
and values. 
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most of them inevitably serve the overarching theme of de-Islamization. Among such 
tactics the most prominent one is qualitative contraction which needs to be examined in 
conjunction with quantitative contraction. The six-volume Masnavi, which comprises 
more than 25000 rhyming couplets, is claimed to be an exegesis of the Qur’an with 
emphasis on its mystical dimensions, though, as William Chittick notes, “more generally, 
it is aimed at anyone who has time to sit down and ponder the meaning of life and 
existence” (1983: 6).200 Following the example of the Qur’an, which according to Rumi, 
contains seven layers of meaning for both common and elite readers,201 Rumi aims to 
appeal to the taste and constitution of every potential reader (Lewis 2009).202   
As a collection of “stories, parables, exhortations to virtuous action, wisdom 
sayings, didactic monologues, vivid eschatological reminders and ecstatic utterances,” 
Masnavi nourishes from a vast array of sources such as the Qur’an, the Bible, various 
Hadith sources, Kalila and Dimna, Garden of Mystical Truth by Sana’i, and Book of 
Secrets by Farid al-Din 'Attar. It deals with, among other things, the principal themes of 
Sufi mystical life and doctrine as well as the major questions of Islamic theology by 
means of parables and exemplary tales.203 According to Franklin Lewis, the aim is to 
                                                
200 For a detailed discussion on this issue, see Chapter 3 of Jawid Mojaddedi’s Beyond Dogma (2012).  
201 It is believed that Prophet Muhammad declared every verse of the Qur’an to have seven layers of 
meaning. This hadith is a precipitating factor in the development of esoteric interpretation of the Qur’an 
which is a major occupation for numerous Sufis who are in the quest of the hidden, inner meaning of the 
Qur’an.  
202 Throughout its history the discourse that the mystical aspect is wrapped in has been a contentious topic 
due to its seemingly unorthodox statements. Franklin Lewis notes that mystics in the Islamic tradition, 
following the example of Hallaj (d. 922), usually addressed to two distinct audiences, roughly described as 
the common folk who are not privy to the mysteries of esoteric discourse and for whom it might seem 
blasphemous; and an initiated elite who are familiar enough with the discourse to know that it is not 
blasphemy (2009).  
203 As noted by Arberry the use of the parable in religious teaching has a very long history, and “Rumi 
broke no new ground when he decided to lighten the weight of his doctrinal exposition by introducing tales 
and fables to which he gave an allegorical twist” (2013: 12). He was especially indebted, as he freely 
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“explain the very roots of spirituality and the meaning of religion as understood by those 
who tread the mystical path, and thus to provide a guide for the thinking person to resolve 
everyday moral and metaphysical quandaries as a true Sufi might” (2009).   
This extremely digressive poetic exploration of the relationship between the 
Creator and human beings is situated within a tradition of spiritual writing with regard to 
its scheme (Arberry 2013: 13).204 Barks provides an abridged though re-designed 
interpretation of the Masnavi. Admittedly, untranslated parts are far more than the 
translated parts; Barks skips most of the stories that are told in the Masnavi. Therefore, it 
would be mere speculation to make deductions based on these omitted parts. Nonetheless 
in addition to skipping parts that are coherent in themselves, Barks also leaves out or 
collapses lines or parts in his translations from certain passages that he claims to 
translate. The deleted parts, as I will demonstrate below, make up a consistent pattern that 
                                                
acknowledges in the course of his poem, to two earlier Persian poets, Sana'i of Ghazna and Farid al-Din 
'Attar of Nishapur.”  
204 Arberry’s note on this specific tradition of writing shed light on some aspects of the Masnavi that some 
people find confusing: “The first mystics in Islam, or rather those of them who were disposed to propagate 
Sufi teachings in writing as well as by example, followed the lead set by the preachers. Ibn al-Mubarak, al-
Muhasibi and al-Kharraz were competent Traditionalists and therefore sprinkled acts and sayings of the 
Prophet, and of his immediate disciples, through the pages of their times, furnished the next generation of 
Sufi writers with supplementary evidence, their own acts and words, to support the rapidly developing 
doctrine. Abu Talib al-Makki, al-Kalabadhi, al-Sarraj, al-Qushairi and Hujviri (who was the fist to write on 
Sufism in Persian), leading up to the great Muhammad al-Ghazali, all used the same scheme in their 
methodical statements: first topic, then citation from the Koran, a Tradition or two of the Prophet, followed 
by appropriate instances from the lives and works of earlier saints and mystics. Biographies of the Sufi 
masters, such as were compiled by al-Sulami, Abu Nu'aim al-Isbahani and al-Ansari (the last in Persian), 
provided rich and varied materials enabling later theorists to enlarge the range of their illustrations.” Also 
note that Rumi ignored in the Masnavi a well-established tradition of beginning a work with the Basmala 
(the statement, in the Name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful.  Though this lack is usually 
explained in commentaries on the Masnavi at least since the fourteenth-century that Rumi begins his 
magnum opus with the word Bishnev (Listen), which is, in fact, a reference to the Basmala on account of 
starting with the letter B (Gölpınarlı: 1990a: 16), about which a tradition is ascribed to Imam Ali, the fourth 
Caliph and cousin of the Prophet. This tradition claims that “the basmala is “all the treasure that is in the 
Qur’an is in the first opening chapter called al-Fatiha; all that is in the Fatiha is in the basmala; all that is in 
the basmala is in the first letter “b”) which has a dot under it in Arabic script); all that is in the b is in the 
dot; and Ali, who was the wasi or trustee of the Prophet, is that dot” (Kassam 2001: 36).  
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can be categorized as the expulsion of Islamic references, specifically to the Quran, to 
Prophet Muhammad, and also in particular to the Day of Judgment, Heaven and Hell.205 
Such omissions constitute major examples of domestication that characterizes the 
translations of Barks.  
To start with the references and allusions to the Qur’an, Rumi’s entire oeuvre, 
specifically the Masnavi, is inextricably woven into Islamic culture, in particular to the 
Qur’an, so much so that the Sufi poet Jami (d. 1492) calls it “the Qur’an in the Persian 
tongue” (Arberry 2004: 1).206 While this affirmation about Masnavi being a commentary 
on the Qur’an is conventionally accepted, Jawid Mojaddedi remarks that what Rumi 
claims in the Masnavi about it indicates being of the same origin as the Qur’an, rather 
than being a commentary on it (2006: 369).207 Whether a commentray or not, the Masnavi 
makes “remarkably frequent use of the Qur’an” (Ibid). Rumi himself underlines 
Masnavi’s organic affiliation with Islam and the Qur’an in his description of his work in 
the preface to the first volume of the Masnavi: as “the roots of the roots of the roots of the 
(Mohammedan) Religion” and “the expounder of the Qur’an” it is intended to “unveil the 
mysteries of attainment (to the Truth) and of certainty” (3).208 References to the Qur’an, 
                                                
205 There is also omission of references to prominent figures, whether religious or lay, that are known quite 
well in the Islamic world. Even though their deletion can be categorized under the concept of 
domestication, due to practical reasons I will not discuss Barks’s treatment of them. 
206 Mojaddedi notes that even though this couplet has conventionally been attributed to Jami, a reference to 
a specific work of Jami has never been provided. The earliest reference given by Nicholson was W. 
Muhammad’s 1728 work Makhzan al-asrar [Treasury of Mysteries] which was published in 1895 as a 
commentary on Masnavi under the title Sharh-i Mathnawi (2006: 372).  
207 The implications of this claim is briefly discussed by Mojaddedi in his entry on “Rumi” in The 
Blackwell Companion to the Qur’an (2006).  
208 Here “the Religion” refers to Islam because in the Islamic tradition it is believed that there has only been 
one religion which has been revealed by Allah in different forms since the time of Adam to prophets such 
as Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and Muhammad. In one of the stories in the Masnavi, for instance, Moses 
rebukes a shepherd for not acting like a proper “Muslim” (vol. II, l. 1727).  
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sometimes in the form of citation (in Persian or in the original Arabic) and sometimes in 
the form of explaining stories from it (Mojaddedi 2006), permeates this extensive 
masterpiece so much that it is said, that it includes more than two thousand direct 
references and allusions to the Qur’an (Gamard 2006). Furthermore, as a detailed analysis 
by James Winston Morris lays out, rhetorical and structural features of the Qur’an are 
adapted in the Masnavi as well (230).209  
With regard to the Quranic references there is no consistent pattern on the part of 
Barks. Rumi usually inserts ayets (verses from the Quran) into his work quite seamlessly, 
usually without mentioning the fact that he is quoting the Quran. The above-mentioned 
tradition that the Masnavi is a part of applies this method quite liberally. Besides, for an 
alim (scholar) of Rumi’s scope to quote the Qur’an or the Sunnah (Tradition) in that 
manner was a very common practice. In such cases the readers of the original text usually 
understand the reference not only because they are already familiar with the Qur’an, but 
also because the inserted lines remain in their original language, that is, Arabic. Rumi 
uses those ayets either to verify a point in the story or sometimes to specifically explicate 
them. In either case they are quite vital in the transmission of the message(s) of the text. 
In Barks’s renderings these ayets sometimes remain (see pages 41; 57; 79; 80; 82; 87; 
115; 179; 332) but usually do not (see pages 4; 10; 11; 55; 69; 80; 141; 153; 169; 174; 
188; 222; 287; 322). The ones that remain, however, are not always stated to be from the 
                                                
209 According to Morris these features and structures can be analyzed under 4 headings: (1) “the constant 
interplay of shifting multiple ‘voices’ emerging from or representing very different (and mysteriously 
uncertain) planes of being or origins;” (2) “the constant ambiguities and uncertainties of time and of the 
relevant contexts and reference-points tied to those temporal options;” (3) “its complex, intentional 
ambiguities of pronoun reference, regarding both the speaking and acting subjects and even more so the 
intended “objects” and audiences of that divine Address;” (4) the “characteristically mirroring, interactive 
dramatic interplay of constantly ambiguous and shifting relational perspectives which is so central in each 
reader or listener’s encounter  with both the Qur’an and the Masnavi” (230-32).  
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Qur’an. Interestingly enough Barks makes the Quranic reference vague without 
completely omitting it. In some instances, he makes it clear that it is from another source 
but the name of the source is not mentioned. It is either “the text” (79; 80; 87; 179), “the 
passage” (41), or even “sacred texts” (69). Given Barks’s stance towards sacred texts it is 
not surprising for Barks to veil the authority of Qur’an that Rumi brings to the fore in 
Masnavi. 
In a parable, for instance, from the first volume of the Masnavi, Rumi says 
“Recite (the text) Every day He is (engaged) in some affair: do not deem Him idle and 
inactive” (l. 3071).210 Here the first part of the sentence is a direct quote from the Qur’an, 
specifically from the 29th ayet of Sura al-rahman which is devoted to the blessings that 
Allah bestows upon His whole creation including human beings. The previous lines in the 
text (Masnavi) commends God’s incomparable power so as to underline God’s active 
continuous involvement in everything. Barks translates the word God (Haq) as “the one” 
and then translates the line with the ayet as “Every day that one does something. / Take 
that as your text” (87). Except for being in italics, neither that specific line nor the 
preceding or the following line indicate its source. This case is not an exception; Barks 
hardly mentions the word Qur’an. This choice, I contend, is not innocent. By de-
specifying the source Barks imposes his own views about sacred texts. As mentioned 
above Barks rejects the exclusive claim of any religion or text thereof and argues to 
embrace the wisdom that is inherent in each and every one of them. In The Soul of Rumi, 
he, once again, explains his stance towards sacred texts as:  
I don’t want to offend Muslims or Christians or Jews, or the Indian subcontinent  
                                                
210 In my analysis, for practical reasons, I use the literal English translations of Nicholson.  
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 or China, but I guess I will: the Bible, the Qur’an, the Torah, the Zen sutras, the  
 Vedas, the Upanishads, the Tao Teh Ching, indigenous stories and aboriginal  
 dream-time drawings in sand have no exclusive claim on scripting beauty and  
 truth, or revelation. John 8, Agee listening to foxes, Yeats casting out remorse,  
 Harrogate killing a shoat, and Samuel hearing his name called, they’re all chapter  
 and verse. (394) 
Therefore, Islam’s claim to be “the religion” since the time of Adam or the 
exclusive sacredness of Qur’an is not something Barks could accept. Maybe because of 
that he omits the part on the guiding role of the Qur’an and the prophets that appear in a 
passage on “the inner sense of ‘Let him who desires to sit with God sit with the Sufis’ (l. 
1529) in the first volume of the Masnavi. Nicholson’s literal translation of the passage is 
When you have fled (for refuge) to the Qur’an of God, you have mingled with the 
spirit of the prophets. 
The Qur’an is (a description of) the states of the prophets, (who are) the fishes of 
the holy sea of (Divine) Majesty. 
And if you read and do not accept (take to heart) the Qur’an, suppose you have 
seen the prophets and saints (what will that avail you?); 
But if you are accepting (the Qur’an), when you read the stories (of the prophets), 
the bird, your soul, will be distressed in its cage. 
 The bird that is a prisoner in a cage, (if it) is not seeking to escape, ’tis from  
ignorance. 
 The spirits which have escaped from their cages are the prophets, (those) worthy  
guides. 
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 From without comes their voice, (telling) of religion, (and crying), “This, this is  
the way of escape for thee. 
 By this we escaped from this narrow cage: there is no means of escape from this  
cage but this way, 
 (That) thou shouldst make thyself ill, exceedingly wretched, in order that thou  
mayst be let out from (the cage of) reputation.” 
 Worldly reputation is a strong chain: in the Way how is this less than a chain of  
iron? (l. 1537-1546) 
Barks’s translation of the same passage reads as:  
   A great joy breaks free of the self 
   and joins the moving river of presence. 
   Read about prophetic states 
   and let your soul grow restless in confinement. 
   Stay close to those who have managed to escape. 
   Don’t do anything to make people applaud. 
   That shuts the cage door tighter. (336) 
When compared the two versions differ markedly. In the original text the guiding role of 
the prophets along with the Qur’an as well as the exclusivity of the way to “freedom” is 
underlined whereas in the more secular version of Barks the message is coached in more 
general terms which, rather than highlighting the role of the Qur’an or religion, supports 
Barks’s above-mentioned ideas. 
A similar translation choice Barks makes also confirms his objection to 
committing solely to one sacred text. The literal translation of the original passage reads: 
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as: Beseech God continually that you may not stumble over these deep  
sayings and that you may arrive at the end, 
For many have been led astray by the Qur’án: by (clinging to) that rope a  
multitude have fallen into the well  
There is no fault in the rope, O perverse man, inasmuch as you had no   
desire for the top (vol. III, l. 4209-11).  
Barks entitles the poem “The Well of Sacred Text” and translates thus:  
  Don’t fall down the well of scripture   
  use the words to keep moving   
  Thousands are trapped in the Qur’an  
  and the Bible, holding to a rope  
  It’s not the rope’s fault.  
  Let the well rope pull you out.  
  Then let the well rope go” (345).  
A couple of points need to be addressed here. First of all, Barks creates a new imagery in 
which the scriptures, not only the Qur’an but also the Bible, are the well itself. Whereas 
in the original one Qur’an is the rope that aids one both in and out of the well; it is up to 
the capabilities as well as to the will of the person to use it to his/her advantage. In 
Barks’s rendering, also, it is not clear what the rope refers to. If the referent is the sacred 
scripture, his final remark to “let it go” is, once again, problematic according to Rumi and 
Islam because neither Islam nor Rumi recommends leaving the Qur’an behind.  
References to Prophet Muhammad are equally problematic because, once again, 
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in most cases Barks prefers to omit such references (see pages 11; 23; 80; 223; 290).211 In 
some stories, taking out the reference is impossible because the Prophet is a character 
within the story. In such cases Barks manipulates the text so as to trivialize him. By 
trivializing I do not mean denigration. Barks does not dispute the prophethood of 
Muhammad; he, rather, minimizes or transforms his role. To give an example, in one of 
the poems that Barks translates an unbeliever named Abu Jahl challenges Prophet 
Muhammad. Abu Jahl holds pebbles in his hand telling Muhammad that he should know 
what he hides in his fist if he is the Messenger of God as he claims to be (vol. I, l. 2154). 
To this challenge, the pebbles in the hands of Abu Jahl begin to pronounce the shadah 
(Islamic profession of faith): “Each said, “There is no god” and (each) said, “except 
Allah”; (each) threaded the pearl of “Ahmad is the Messenger of Allah” (l. 2159).212 
Barks does not translate the whole line; his translation reads as “Immediately, from inside 
the fist come the voices/ of the round stones chanting the zikr. La ‘ilaha il’Allah. There is 
no/ reality but God; there is only God. La ‘ilaha il’Allah. / Every pebble threads” (2002: 
59). This specific omission is an imposition of Barks on Rumi. In the Islamic tradition, 
                                                
211 Annemarie Schimmel criticizes works such as Barks’s that deliberately veils the role that Islam as well 
as its Prophet play in Rumi’s works: "There has been an increasing tendency among Western scholars and, 
even more, lovers and admirers of Mawlana [= Jalaluddin Rumi] to forget the deeply Islamic background 
of his poetry. Did not Jami call his Mathnawi 'the Qur'an in the Persian tongue'!? Modern people tried to 
select from often very vague secondhand translations only those verses that speak of love and ecstasy, of 
intoxication and whirling dance. The role that the Prophet of Islam plays in Mawlana's poetry is hardly 
mentioned in secondary literature. But whosoever has listened with understanding to the na`t-i sharif, that 
introductory musical piece at the very beginning of the Mevlevi [= "Whirling Dervish"] ceremonies, feels, 
nay rather knows, how deep the poet's love for the Prophet Muhammad was, which is expressed in his 
words-- the Prophet, 'cypress of the garden of prophethood, springtime of gnosis, rosebud of the meadow of 
the divine Law and lofty nightingale.' He is the one whose secrets are communicated through Shams-i 
Tabrizi, the inspiring mystical friend. And as Muhammad was the last in the long line of God-inspired 
prophets from Adam to Jesus, it is the believers' duty to acknowledge and honor those who brought in 
divine message in times past. Thus, their stories [= the stories of the Prophets, such as rendered into Persian 
by Rumi in the Masnavi] as related or alluded to in the Qur'an form part and parcel of Muslim faith." 
(1994: x-xi). 
212 Ahmed is another name of the Prophet Muhammad.  
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accepting Prophet Muhammad as the messenger of Allah is an indispensable component 
of the shahada (“the testimony”), which constitutes one of the five pillars of Islam, and 
not reciting the part about the Prophet is considered for almost all Muslims to be an 
indicator of being in kufr, that is, disbelief. Therefore the assumption that Rumi would 
leave the kalima-i shahada (the Islamic testimony of faith) incomplete suggests Rumi to 
be an extra-Islamic figure.213 
Barks’s preference not to include the part about the Prophet, I believe, needs to be 
considered within his general view of religion, not Rumi’s. In the universal religion of 
love that Barks claims to be a part of, there is a God who is all-loving and merciful.214 
Even though this envisioned God share certain characteristics with the God of Islam, it is 
safe to say that they differ noticeably in certain aspects, the most important of which 
regards His wrath and Divine plan. In Islamic theology Allah is known with reference to 
the Qur’an and the hadith (sayings of the Prophet Muhammad) through which Allah’s 99 
“Most Beautiful Names” (al-asma al-husna) are revealed.215 Among His “Most Beautiful 
                                                
213 Even the quatrain that reads as “As long as my soul is in this body,/ I bow to the Qur’an,/ dust on the 
road Muhammad walks. / Do not interpret my words as different from his./ Whoever does that, I break 
with/ and reject what he says” (2011: 476) does not change Barks’s approach to Rumi’s treatment of 
Qur’an and the Prophet. In the endnote to this poem Barks says “I do not hear this quatrain as a claim that 
Islam has an exclusive truth. Rumi is honoring the presence of Muhammad and the truth of the Qur’an. 
Others have heard this poem as proof that Rumi should be considered an Islamic poet, and that only. I 
would claim that there are many other passages that show how he and Shams honor the living, gnostic, 
experiential truth of every unique life, and that core of longing that is beyond doctrine and religion. I hear 
him as a planetary poet,…” (486). To highlight his point the quatrain that precedes the above one 
suggestively leaves the reader in ambiguity: “A lover is not a Muslim or a Christian, / or part of any faith. / 
The love religion has no doctrine / to be faithful or unfaithful to” (476).   
214 Barks explains his stance toward religion and sacred texts by means of an anecdote he has with 
Jelaluddin Chelebi, who is directly descended from Rumi and is the head of the Mevlevi dervishes. Barks’s 
answer to his question, “What religion are you?” was a simple who-knows gesture in the form of arms-
open, palm-up. To this reply Chelebi said “Good, Love is the religion, and the universe is the book” 
(AYWR: 8).   
215 These names are not actually “names” of Allah; they are, rather, attributes of Allah that are either 
sporadically mentioned in the Qur’an or in the sayings attributed to the Islamic Prophet (hadith). Each of 
the 99 names of Allah evokes a distinct attribute of God. They are specifically revered in the Sufi tradition; 
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Names,” the most widely referred ones are al-Rahman (the merciful) and al-Rahim (the 
compassionate).216 In fact, many of these names put emphasis on the forgiveness and 
mercifulness of Allah (e.g. al-ghafur [the forgiver and hider of faults], ash-shakur [the 
rewarder of thankfulness], al-afu [the forgiver], ar-ra’uf [the clement], al-mani [the 
preventer of harm], al-ghaffar [the forgiving], as-salam [the source of peace], etc). 
However, as in the case of many other religions, He is also the one who brings 
destruction upon those who transgress his laws (e.g. al-qahhar (the subduer), al-mudhill 
(the humiliator), ad-darr (the creator of the harmful)).217 Accordingly, on the Day of 
Judgment all human beings will be resurrected to be judged, based on their deeds, by 
Allah. Consequently, some will go to Heaven and some to Hell. The centrality of the 
promise of Paradise or the punishment of Hell in Islam is impossible to overlook, so 
much so that belief in the Day of Judgment and in Heaven and Hell are components of 
the pillars of faith. 
 On the other hand, the Sufi tradition strongly emphasizes selfless love that 
esteems Primordial Beauty and Essential Love over the desire for Paradise or the fear of 
Hell.218 Without denying the presence of the afterlife, most Sufis argue to focus on 
attaining unity with Allah  rather than the promise of Paradise. Rabi‘a al-Adawiyya (d. 
                                                
meditation through either recitation of or reflection on them is a widely used method in attempts at 
comprehending the essence of divinity.    
216 These two adjectives are the most quoted ones because they appear in the Basmala (i.e. In the name of 
Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful). This phrase is recited before each sura (chapter) of the 
Qur’an. In the Islamic tradition Muslims begin numerous tasks including prayer with the recitation of the 
Basmala.  
217 The Qur’an warns Muslims by describing the fate of past nations (e.g. The People of Lut) or 
personalities (Pharaoh) who became subjects of God’s wrath because of such transgressions.   
218 In its earliest phase of Sufism, Sufis were predominantly ascetics and quietists who are said to act on 
“fear of God, fear of Hell, fear of death, and fear of sin” (Nicholson 2009: 4). By the eighth century, 
however, a concomitant approach towards Heaven and Hell flourished, particularly in Basra where the 
female mystic Rabi‘a al-Adawiyya has preached pure, disinterested love for God. 
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752 or 801), for instance, is thought to have said “If I adore You out of fear of Hell, burn 
me in Hell! / If I adore you out of desire for Paradise, Lock me out of Paradise. / But if I 
adore you for Yourself alone, / Do not deny to me Your eternal beauty.”  
The fear of Hell or the promise of Paradise is not central to Rumi’s thought or 
oeuvre. What is more, most of the references to resurrection simply alludes to spiritual 
resurrection, rather than an eschatological one. Nonetheless, Rumi does not seem to 
challenge the conventional Islamic approach in his utilization of the eschatological 
resurrection. In some of his parables or stories he either alludes to or brings up the reality 
of the Resurrection, Heaven and Hell. In the Masnavi, for instance, Rumi quite regularly 
makes references to the Day of Judgment, and the consequences thereof. His treatment of 
the Resurrection and the Day of Judgment is in line with the Islamic understanding: he 
says “even so in death: we go all alike, (but) half of us are losers and half are (fortunate 
as) emperors” (vol. III, l. 3516). Rumi’s descriptions of Heaven and Hell also fit into the 
Islamic view as well; Hell is depicted to be “the awful torment” (vol. V, l. 2210) “full of 
fire and fury” (vol. VI, l. 3965) and Paradise is a garden “abounding in verdure” (vol. III, 
l. 4579).  
According to Barks, however, God is all Love and there can be no need for such 
rewards or punishments; hence no need for critical assessment of one’s deeds as 
imagined to be done on the Day of Judgment. Once again I should note that Barks is not 
alone in his interpretation of God as Love and the irrelevance of afterlife. Most of the 
spiritual seekers share his worldview in this regard. According to Robert Fuller, most 
self-proclaimed “metaphysical seekers” believe that religion should primarily focus on 
the here and now of this life rather than “devoting most of its attention to some 
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speculative afterlife” (99). 
To no surprise, in the translations by Barks, references to the resurrection, heaven 
and hell are treated accordingly. Most of the Resurrection and Day of Judgment 
references are omitted (see pages 9; 25; 112; 118; 177; 188; 241; 282; 290; 341). 
References to Hell share the same destiny (see pages 164; 171; 175; 180; 185; 189; 197; 
259). Specifically, the ones that describe the Hell in terms of fire, wrath, torment and 
such are excluded. In a similar line Barks also omits lines or passages that refer to God’s 
wrath (see pages 163; 204; 263; 326). For example, in one of the parables Rumi 
comments on the instinct to flee from tribulation and impatience in affliction by 
comparing it to the agitation and restlessness of chickpeas and other pot-herbs when 
boiling in the pot (Vol. III, l. 4160-4208). In his explanation Rumi refers to God’s plan 
for human beings:  
His (God's) mercy is prior to His wrath, to the end that by (God's) mercy  
 he (the  afflicted person) may suffer affliction. 
His (God's) mercy (eternally) preceded His wrath in order that the stock- 
 in-trade, (which is) existence, should come to hand (be acquired); 
For, without pleasure, flesh and skin do not grow; and unless they grow,  
 what shall the love of the Friend consume?” (l. 4166-68).  
Barks transforms this passage by abbreviating it in such a manner that it not only 
becomes vague but also gains an additional signification. His translation reads as:  
  Grace first. Sexual pleasure, 
  then a boiling new life begins, 
             and the Friend has something good to eat. (132) 
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In another parable Rumi explains why Jesus avoids “foolish people” even though 
he does not avoid the most afflicted ones. In the story Jesus is asked why “the Name of 
God,” which has worked in the healing of physical afflictions, does not cure the folly if 
both cases are forms of disease. Jesus replies: “The disease of folly is (the result of) the 
wrath of God; (physical) disease and blindness are not (the result of Divine) wrath: they 
are (a means) of probation/ Probation is a disease that brings (Divine) mercy (in its train); 
folly is a disease that brings (Divine) rejection/ That which is branded on him (the fool) 
He (God) hath sealed: no hand can apply a remedy to it.” (vol III, l. 2592-4). Apparently 
Barks does not like the answer of Jesus because he does not translate this part, which 
reads in his version as “Other diseases are ways for mercy to enter, but this non-
responding breeds violence and coldness toward God” (204). The God image presented 
by this answer does not overlap with the one Barks has. A God that inflict afflictions, 
both physical and spiritual, on the people He created is not the God that religious liberals 
like Barks prefer to believe in.  
The most significant point of this specific translation, I believe, is not the veil put 
on the “negative” aspects of God. Barks not only silences the wrath of God but also 
silences His agency. The parable in the original text suggests that all is in the hands of 
Allah. If He wills to seal the heart and mind of a person, nobody, even Jesus, can cure 
him. Again He is the one who afflicts people with psychical infirmity and only swearing 
“By the holy Essence of God, the Maker of the body and the Creator of the soul in 
eternity/ By the sanctity of the pure Essence and Attributes of Him, …” Jesus was able to 
cure the blind, raise the dead, and mantle a mountain (l. 2583-88). A similar point made 
in the story about Solomon’s crooked crown in the 4th volume of the Masnavi. By the 
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end of the story Rumi recommends the reader to be wary of his/her judgments because as 
the story indicates even the King Solomon is capable of making bad judgments. Again 
this imperfection is a decree of God. Rumi says Pharaoh’s “understanding was superior to 
that of (other) kings: God's ordainment had made him without understanding and blind. / 
God's seal upon the eye and ear of the intelligence makes him (the  intelligent man) an 
animal, (even) if he is a Plato. / God's ordainment comes into view on the tablet (of the 
heart) in such wise as Bayazid's prediction of the hidden (future event)” (l. 1922-25). 
Barks translates this part as  
  When something goes wrong, accuse yourself first.  
  Even the wisdom of Plato or Solomon 
  can wobble and go blind. (191) 
This silencing is not an exception; it is, in fact, one of the most interesting points 
of Barks’s renderings. In the Sufi tradition, which evidently relies on Islamic theology, 
Allah is omnipotent in every conceivable way; He not only created the universe but also 
actively oversees every single incident. He is never regarded to be reticent or withdrawn; 
on the contrary He is always actively involved in the creation and destruction of 
everything. That potency is somehow diminished in Barks’s renderings. Similar to the 
example presented by Christina Schaffner the choice to use passive structure to “avoid an 
expression of agency” is Barks’s technique to curtail the agency of Allah. By silencing 
the His agency, Barks appropriates the text to his own world-view which underlines 
personal will and determination as opposed to a form of Divine involvement. Examples 
of this tactic abound (see pages 14; 23; 74; 98; 112; 132; 172; 187; 191; 239; 241; 258; 
263; 265; 275; 296; 326; 349). To give a simple example the line that reads “grace 
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awakened the worm, …” (vol. IV, l. 2538) is quite illustrative. Barks changes the tone of 
it by translating as “suddenly, he wakes up, call it grace, whatever, something” (265). 
With this maneuver Barks effaces the clarity of the original line by casting doubt on the 
agent of the sentence.  
A more interesting example is from a passage from the fifth volume, in which 
Rumi elucidates on the vital role conditions play in “the apprehension of the vulgar” (l. 
228). At one point Rumi says “satiety is from God, but how should the unclean attain 
unto satiety without the mediation of bread? / Beauty is from God, but the corporealist 
does not feel (the charm of) beauty without the veil (medium) of the garden” (l. 232-33). 
These lines are translated by Barks as:  
  A feeling of fullness comes, 
  but usually it takes some bread 
  to bring it. 
   Beauty surrounds us, 
   but usually we need to be walking 
   in a garden to know it. (172) 
In his version Barks renders the point of the passage regarding the role of material 
instruments, be it bread or garden, in sensual appreciation but the original text also 
underlines the fact that an actively involved God is the source of everything.   
 Silencing God takes another form in a short passage taken from the story of an old 
minstrel from the first volume of the Masnavi. In the story the minstrel addresses God 
and says: “For seventy years I have been committing sin, (yet) not for one day hast Thou 
withheld Thy bounty from me. / I (can) earn nothing: to-day I am Thy guest, I will play 
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the harp for Thee, I am Thine” (l. 20084-85). Barks personalizes the text and alters the 
direction of the address. His version, which is entitled “The Music,” reads as: 
   For sixty years I have been forgetful, 
   Every minute, but not for a second 
   has this flowing toward me stopped or slowed. 
   I deserve nothing. Today I recognize 
   that I am the guest the mystics talk about. 
   I play this living music for my host. 
   Everything today is for the host. (98) 
In this translation Barks, first of all, personalizes the text by changing the number of 
years from seventy to sixty — perhaps he was sixty years-old at the time of translation. 
He further alters the ethos of the passage by changing the addressee.219 While the 
minstrel’s modest addressing of God in the original text suggests atonement in addition to 
gratitude, Barks’s utterance, which does not have a specific addressee, reflects humility 
and gratitude. The feeling of atonement in the original one is reinforced through the use 
of the word “sin” which inevitably evokes a religious sense. Barks’s choice of changing 
the line “I have been committing sin” to “I have been forgetful” makes the poem a-
religious/worldly.220 
 Barks further manipulates the text by employing maneuvers that make the text 
specifically palatable to the taste and life-choices of the body of “implied reader” that 
mostly consists of like-minded spiritual seekers who are quite familiar with, if not 
                                                
219 Though it would be unfair to suggest that Barks has taken God out of the poem here; he rather makes the 
reference concealed. It is quite obvious for many that the host mentioned in his version is God. 
220 A similar omission of the concept of “sin” from the poetry of Rumi occurs in other instances as well (see 
pages 164 and 345). 
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believers of, Christianity. First of all, probably not to offend those who esteem Christian 
values Barks prefers not to translate the parts that contradict the very heart of 
Christianity. For instance, contrary to the Christian belief Muslims do not consider Jesus 
the son of God; he is a prophet saved from death by God by raising “him unto Himself” 
(Qur’an 4:158).221  
 In Barks’s renderings, lines about Jesus are somehow appropriated to the 
Christian perception of him. In the third volume of the Masnavi, Rumi is reflecting on the 
importance of deliberation in any decision one has to make. At one point he says God 
created the world in six days even though He is potent to create at an instant with the 
single command “Be!” The following lines expound on the potency of God with 
reference to His relationship with the prophets among which Jesus is mentioned in a line 
that reads as “Jesus by means of one prayer was able to make the dead spring up (to life) 
without delay/ Is the creator of Jesus unable, without delays, to bring men in manifold 
succession/ This deliberation is for the purpose of teaching you that you must seek (God) 
slowly, without (any) break” (vol. III, l. 3504-6). In the version of Barks, the implication 
about Jesus to be a mere messenger of God is omitted. He keeps the fact that Jesus raised 
a dead man but omits the line that emphasizes the will and potency of God. His 
translation reads as: “Jesus said one word, and a dead man sat up,/ but creation usually 
unfolds, like calm breakers” (258). This rendering is more in line with the Christian 
                                                
221 According to the Qur’an God put over the likeness of Jesus over another man and it was this man that 
the Romans took for Jesus and crucified. In the Qur’an it says: “They said, ‘We killed the Messiah Jesus, 
son of Mary, the messenger of God,’ They did not kill him, nor did they crucify him, but the likeness of 
him was put on another man (and they killed that man)” (4: 157). For a detailed analysis of Jesus in Islam 
see Oddbjørn Leirvik’s Images of Jesus Christ in Islam (2010). For Rumi’s utilization of Jesus in his 
poetry, see Renard "Jesus and Other Gospel Figures in the Writings of Jalal Al-Din Rumi.”  
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understanding of Jesus as God.222 In the version of Barks the potency lies in Jesus who is 
able to raise a dead man with “one word.” Whereas in the original text, where Jesus 
invokes God by du’a (prayer or invocation), God is the one who actually “make the dead 
spring up” through the instrument of Jesus. 
 A similar twist is performed in the translation of a line from the sixth volume.  
The line reads as “That (miracle) which Jesus had wrought by (pronouncing) the Name of 
Hu (God) was manifested to her (Zalikha) through the name of him (Joseph)” (l. 4039). 
Barks’s translation reads “The miracle Jesus did by being the name of God / Zuleikha felt 
in the name of Joseph” (p. 108). Here Barks identifies Jesus as “the name of God,” which 
is in itself the miracle.223 The original, on the other hand, bestows a certain power to Jesus 
who is able to execute it because of the source of the power, which is God.  
 The issue of Jesus’s prophethood, or to be more correct, him not being God is 
addressed in a veiled manner in another poem from the third volume of the Masnavi. In 
his rendering, Barks omits the implied refutation of the doctrine of Trinity by 
transforming it into an irrelevant remark. In the story the Lover in his explanation of his 
love to the Beloved says that, “Thirdly, since I have gone away from thee, ‘tis as though I 
have said, ‘the third of three’” (vol. III, l. 4703-5). Here the Beloved/Prince is God and 
“the third of the three” is a direct reference to the Qur’an which says that “They have 
certainly disbelieved who say, Allah is the third of three. And there is no god except one 
                                                
222 In one of the ghazals (#631), which is about being hopeful of the mercy of God, one of the lines reads as 
“Do not despair, though Mary has gone from your hands, for that light which drew Jesus to heaven has 
come” (l. 3-4). This line, which contradicts with Christian version of Jesus’ “death,” does not appear in 
Barks’s version as well (286). 
223 In the Islamic tradition, Jesus is known with the title kalimatullah, which means “the Word of God.” 
Even though it bears resemblance to what Barks attributes to Jesus in this line, “i.e. the name of God”, from 
an ontological point of view they are quite apart.   
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God. And if they do not desist from what they are saying, there will surely afflict the 
disbelievers among them a painful punishment” (5:73).224 Rumi uses this reference to hint 
at the extent of lover’s misery. Barks did not translate the allusion at all and replaces it 
with a completely unrelated remark “Third, why did I ever learn to count to three?” (9) 
which not only silences the Quranic reference but also affects the meaning of the poem.225  
 Another example of appropriation of the text to Judeo-Christian taste regards the 
replacement of a hadith with a Biblical allusion. It once again includes Jesus but this time 
the original does not have anything to do with him. In the sixth volume of the Masnavi 
Rumi tells the allegorical story of a mouse and a frog who are depicted as close friends. 
One of the lines of the story reads in Nicholson’s translation as “Telling secrets with and 
without tongue, knowing how to interpret (the Tradition), ‘A united party is a (Divine) 
mercy’” (l. 2636). The line is used to describe the sincerity of the friendship between the 
mouse and the frog. The quoted part of the line is a hadith attributed to Prophet 
Muhammad; it basically means the gathering together or the union of the believers (al-
jamaat) is a mercy (from God) (rahman). Barks translates this specific line as “to watch 
and listen to those two / is to understand how, as it’s written, / sometimes when two 
beings come together, / Christ becomes visible” (79). The de-Islamization is quite 
apparent in this example because Barks switches the Hadith reference with a Christian 
one which alludes to the Biblical saying “For where two or three have gathered together 
                                                
224 The rest of the sura goes as “The Messiah, son of Mary, was not but a messenger; [other] messengers 
have passed on before him. And his mother was a supporter of truth. They both used to eat food. Look how 
We make clear to them the signs; then look how they are deluded” (5: 76). 
225 The rest of the translation is also quite problematic as well due to the licenses Barks takes.  
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in My name, there I am in the midst of them” (Matt 18:20). Admittedly this time meaning 
is not marred but the implication of Jesus’ divinity is not present in the original.226 
 Accommodating the text to Judeo-Christian sensitivities is not limited to Christ 
references. When the Qur’anic version of a Biblical story contradicts the Bible, Barks 
chooses to translate it in line with the Bible as it is the case with references to Ishmael, 
son of Abraham. In ghazal No.728 Rumi refers to the story of Prophet Abraham who in 
the Islamic tradition is believed to sacrifice his son Ishmael, not Isaac as both Jews and 
Christians believe. In the ghazal Rumi says that “Like Ishmael, cheerfully lay your neck 
before the knife; do not steal your throat away from Him, if He is slaying, until He slays” 
(Arberry 2009: 5). Even though Barks does not claim to be a Christian, he prefers to 
allude to the Judeo-Christian version by changing Ishmael to Isaac: “At the banquet 
where we will be a main dish, / Isaac leans his head down for the blade” (287). This is 
not the only Ishmael reference that Barks manipulates. In another instance which reads as 
“He offers his throat like Ismail: the knife cannot do anything to hurt his throat” (vol. II, 
l. 283), Barks did not replace it with Isaac but omits the relevant line altogether (158). A 
similar omission is observed in the translation of a passage from the third volume (l. 
4175-80) (133). 
 Making the text palatable to the taste of the implied reader involves other types of 
omissions as well. In one of the stories in Masnavi (vol. IV, l. 83-84), for instance, a 
preacher’s prayer reads as “O Lord, /let mercy fall upon evil men and corrupters and 
insolent transgressors, / upon all who make a mock of the good people, / upon all whose 
                                                
226 A quick search on the Internet reveals the unquestioned reliance on Barks’s translation which is used by 
several books and websites. None of these sources, however, attribute the line to Barks. They interpret the 
story, and the line within, as what Rumi originally said. 
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hearts are unbelieving /and those who dwell in the Christian monastery.” Barks chooses 
to translate it simply as ““Let your mercy, O Lord, / cover their insolence”” (176). Rumi 
does not necessarily focus on the “insolence” of monastery dwellers but they are 
nonetheless examples of such behavior.  
 This specific example does not, of course, prove that Barks is partial to 
Christianity. It could very well be the result of a poetic choice. However further examples 
all point that Barks lets the views of the implied reader, or more probably, personal ones 
interfere in his translation choices. For instance, as a religious liberal Barks does not 
spurn or condemn any belief, be it monotheist, pantheist or polytheist, as long as they 
convey some sort of wisdom. In accordance with this line of thinking he prefers not to 
translate the line “the spirit of polytheism is quit (devoid) of belief in God” (Vol. IV, l. 
3295) (Barks 2004: 241). Such maneuvers of “political correctness” abound probably 
because the Rumi he imagines is not capable of making such remarks. In an instance, for 
example, Rumi says “The road of religion is full of trouble and bale for the reason that it 
is not the road for any one whose nature is effeminate” (vol. VI, l. 508). Barks apparently 
finds the word “effeminate” problematic and translates the line simply as “This road 
demands courage and stamina” (246).  Similarly, the line that reads as “… for a woman’s 
counsel will keep thy foot lame” (vol. IV, l. 2210) is translated by Barks as “when you’re 
traveling, ask a traveler for advice, not someone whose lameness keeps him in one place” 
(194). It appears that the ideal Rumi that Barks has in mind could not, in essence, make 
such a sexist remark.  
Less significant changes occur in Barks’s renderings as well. In addition to 
omission of Islamic references, both in terms of culture and religion, Barks domesticates 
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certain terms and concepts; the translation of “jinni” as “spirit” (30), “nafs” as “impulse” 
(62); of “miraj” simply as “night-journey” (328) constitute such examples.227 
Domestication efforts also includes rectification of matters related to science. If a line in 
the original text contradicts modern science Barks revises it. He translates “the seven 
wheels” (seven heavens) (haft charkh) (vol. IV, l. 3767) as “the Universe” (259) and 
“wheeling heavens/motion of the spheres” (dawr-i gardunha) (vol. V, l. 3854) as “world” 
(55). Another interesting example, again, concerns the medieval perception of the 
universe. In a story Rumi’s recounting Daquqi, a fellow soul, has witnessed an 
extraordinary event by the shore where seven candles had turned into seven men who, in 
turn, transformed into seven trees.  In his explanation of the expansiveness of the trees 
Daquqi says “On account of the denseness of the leaves no boughs were visible; the 
leaves too had become scant (had almost vanished) on account of the plenteous fruit. / 
Every tree had thrown its boughs above the Sidra: what of the Sidra? They had reached 
beyond the Void. / the root of each had gone into the bottom of the earth: assuredly it was 
lower than the Ox and the Fish (vol. III, l. 2006-7). Sidra, which is the short name for 
Sidrat al-Muntahā, refers to the Lote tree which marks the end of the seventh Heaven, the 
boundary where no creation can pass. The Ox and the Fish refers to the hadith “the earth 
stands on the ox and fish.” In his rendering Barks did not correct it but omits both 
references altogether: “They became seven men, and then seven trees, / so dense with 
leaves and fruit / that no limbs were visible” (263).  
                                                
227 Jinnis, or genies, are the mythological creatures that are believed to be lower rank than the angels, able 
to appear in human and animal forms and to possess humans. Nafs is an Arabic word vaguely meaning self, 
psyche, ego or soul. In the Sufi tradition it has become a crucial concept, pejoratively referring to the 
animal spirit of human beings, usually an obstacle on the path to reach Divine Knowledge or Love. Miraj is 
the specific physical & spiritual “night-journey” of Prophet Muhammad to Paradise. The journey itself is 
outlined in the Qur’an (Sura Al-Nisra).   
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 The overall effect of the examples cited in this chapter is a Rumi who writes more 
in line with a twentieth-century spiritual seeker than like a thirteenth-century Muslim 
scholar-mystic-poet. This specific feature has been mentioned in scholarly works as well. 
Jawid Mojaddedi, an eminent Rumi scholar, argues that Barks’s secular translations may 
not be word-for-word, but the message they convey is representative of Rumi’s poetry 
(2012: 3). According to Mojaddedi, “at the root of the appeal of Rumi’s poetry” lies “the 
celebration of God’s presence and its effect in everyday life” which the translations of 
Barks manage to reflect to a certain extent (Ibid). Though many other scholars of Sufism, 
such as Franklin Lewis, Annemarie Schimmel, and William Chittick, beg to differ,228 the 
continuing popularity as well as “authority”229 of the versions of Barks proves the 
irrelevance of the scholarly reviews for the common readers who are comprised of, for 
the most part, spiritual seekers who think along the lines of Barks.230 Taken out of its 
context both Rumi and his poetry have gained a cosmopolitan appeal that seekers from all 
over the world see a mirror image. Rumi is believed to be a spiritually enhanced person 
who, thanks to his hazy friendship with Shams, liberated himself from the chains of an 
organized religion, namely, Islam. Particularly in the post-9/11 world, which is marked 
by Islamaphobia, many consider Rumi a supra-Islamic figure who does not intimidate the 
reader by emphasizing particulars of religion such as ritual, sin, and preoccupation with 
the afterlife. As this chapter has demonstrated, this specific interpretation of Rumi owes 
                                                
228 They are critical of Barks’s rendering precisely because of his domestication strategy. Most of them 
problematize Barks’s lack of Persian but also are disturbed by his selective interpretation and the 
terminological misconceptions he holds. 
229 Numerous websites and books use the versions of Barks in their references and allusions to Rumi. As far 
as I can see very few of them mention the poetic licenses Barks employs.  
230 An interesting way to analyze the reader of Barks is to examine the reader reviews that are posted on 
sites such as Amazon and www.goodreads.com 
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its existence largely to the “translations” by Coleman Barks, who not only eliminates 
particulars of Islamic culture but also appropriates the text to the taste and sensitivities of 
his readers by means of smoothing parts that can be considered controversial. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RUMI MEETS MEVLANA: THE 40 RULES OF LOVE / AŞK BY ELIF SHAFAK 
 
 “So what would Rumi say to Osama bin Laden if the two met?” 
 "What he would say is that you are a total stranger to Islam.”  
In a 2003 article on Rumi entitled “A Love That Conquers Barriers of Time, Culture,” 
The Washington Post reporter Caryle Murphy juxtaposes Bin Laden with Rumi in his 
question to Abdul Aziz Said, director of the International Peace and Conflict Resolution 
Program in the School of International Service at American University. This simple 
juxtaposition, which by no means is a singular incident, resonates significantly in a post-
9/11 world that has been marked by the dichotomous subjectifiction of Muslims as 
“good” and “bad.” Within this politically determined dichotomy the “good Muslims” that 
stand in opposition to radical Muslims such as Usama bin Laden and the like, are Sufis.231 
And Rumi, who had already been hailed as the universal poet of love and peace, emerges 
as the epitome of the “good Muslim” that would ideally “bridge the gap between 
Americans and Muslims” (Holgate 2005: para. 13). 
 Interestingly enough, a similar discourse, marked by its socio-cultural specificities, 
is also adopted in Turkey, where the cult of Rumi has survived till this day, despite the 
official anti-Sufi position. The renowned musician-cum-politician-cum-novelist Zülfü 
                                                
231 In 2004 a group of scholars of Sufism, leaders of various Sufi orders and US bureaucrats convened at the 
Nixon Center to discuss the potential role Sufis could play in US foreign policy. At that meeting not only 
Bernard Lewis, one of the leading specialists on the Middle East, but also the Sufi leaders who were 
present put special emphasis on the peaceful characteristic of Sufism as opposed to Wahhabism. 
Juxtaposition of Sufism with radical Islam, be it Wahabism or Salafism, is further propagated by the media 
in the ensuing decade.  
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Livaneli, for instance, describes the relevance of Rumi in a 2014 interview with New 
York Times as follows: “Fundamentalists hate Rumi. He was a poet, not a religious 
figure. He was very progressive-minded and wasn’t against wine. […] Rumi was against 
racist and religious and sexual discrimination. We need this kind of bright understanding 
now.”232 Aside from its anachronism, this approach is significant on numerous levels. 
Once again Rumi is brought to the fore as the Muslim to be emulated. Just like the 
American commendation of Rumi as a bridge between Muslims and “regular” 
Americans, it highlights the necessity of an understanding that could be utilized against 
fundamentalists.  
 And yet who is this Rumi from whom we all desperately need to learn?  What is the 
discourse that shapes the presentation of this specific Rumi? As discussed in the previous 
chapter Rumi had already been allocated to the sphere of liberal spirituality that is 
defined and experienced beyond the confines of institutionalized religions; therefore 
Rumi’s re-location into the Islamic sphere and re-conceptualization as the ideal Muslim 
inevitably bring into question the influence of “New Age”233 readings of Rumi. To what 
extent has the Muslim Rumi has been read and presented through the lens of New Age 
                                                
232 In June 2014 Zülfü Livaneli's musical piece “Rumi Suite: The Eternal Day” was presented during the 
Istanbul Jazz Festival after having premiered in Berlin. It is described as an “an engaging contemporary 
fusion of jazz, traditional Turkish tunes and other genres” (Schweitzer).  In other interviews, though not 
necessarily on this musical piece, Livaneli makes similar comments about Rumi. He also mentions, 
curious, as it is, that he prefers to read the English translations of Rumi, which is most probably those of 
Coleman Barks. Livaneli says that he realizes the greatness of Rumi as a poet after reading those English 
translations. He adds: “Yes, we do have good translations as well but we know Mevlana through his 
religious stories. Whereas in the USA he is known as a modern poet and a best-seller. (2010 Haberturk 
interview) 
233 I use the term “New Age” as an umbrella term to refer to forms of religiosity conveniently described as 
the “combination of self-help systems, subjectivity, devolved authority structures, iconic discourses and 
experimental syncretism” (Turner: 205) that is briefly outlined in the previous chapter. Bryan Turner 
(2011) suggests using terms that more aptly capture the post-modern flavor, such as “liquid religiosity,” 
“post-institutional religiosity,” and “low-intensity religion” but none of these terms have been extensively 
used in the pertinent literature.  
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Rumi? In what contexts have the re-Islamized Rumi been utilized?  
 The answers to such questions can be gleaned from various sources in areas as 
diverse as the academia, politics, religious platforms, popular culture, and literature. 
Political science professor Cyrus Masroori’s 2010 article, “An Islamic Language of 
Toleration: Rumi's Criticism of Religious Persecution,” for instance, argues that Rumi 
“presents one of the most extensive and vigorous Islamic theories of toleration” (243). 
Similar arguments are voiced by Muslim groups who subscribe to the discourse of 
“good” Muslims in their attempt at ameliorating the image of Islam.234 Whether they 
follow Rumi's path or not, some of them specifically utilize the figure of Rumi in their 
apologetic discourse of Islam by “marketing” Rumi as the tolerant face of Islam.235 
Depiction of Rumi as the voice of peace in Islam also occurred on a more popular level; 
on the final episode of the controversial TV series 24, the “goodness” of a Muslim 
character is further fortified by a Rumi quote through which he appeals to the conscience 
of the president of the United States.236 
 Notwithstanding the importance of these diverse discourses on Rumi, the literary 
usage of Rumi is more significant for the purposes of this dissertation. Since 9/11 Rumi 
has become an inspiration, if not a character, for several novels. Roger Houdsen's 
Chasing Rumi (2002), Pico Iyer's Abandon (2003), Saideh Ghods's Kimya Khatun (2004; 
                                                
234 Jamal Malik notes that Sufism has been popular particularly among immigrant groups, some of whom 
pay particular attention to restoring Islam’s image in the eyes of the host culture (24). 
235 Among such groups the sympathizers of the Gülen movement, who try to discredit the claims regarding 
the “belligerent” nature of Islam, stand out.  
236 On the show Omar Hassan, to-be-assassinated president of the fictional country Islamic Republic of 
Kamistan (IRK), was planning to give an inscribed pen box to the president of the United States to sign a 
historic peace treaty between the US, Russia and the IRK. The Persian inscription on the box, which 
supposedly represent the deceased president’s feelings about the treaty, is from Rumi, and is explained by 
the wife of the president in Coleman Barks’s translation: “All religions, all this singing / One Song.” The 
quote, which makes the US president realize how grave a mistake she is about to commit, reminds her the 
common ground they all share. 
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translation to English in 2011), Muriel Maufroy's Rumi’s Daughter (2005), Connie 
Zweig's A Moth to the Flame (2005) and Elif Shafak's The 40 Rules of Love: A Novel of 
Rumi (2010) are examples of such novels. In my analysis I focus on Elif Shafak's novel 
The 40 Rules of Love (Aşk [Love] in Turkish), which interweaves two parallel but 
historically and geographically remote stories of self-realization-via-love.  
 The novel is noteworthy on two accounts. First, it targets American and Turkish 
readers at the same time. Shafak wrote the novel in English primarily for an American 
audience and then edited a Turkish translation that was made by K. Yiğit Us and contains 
noteworthy modifications. Second, the novel resonates significantly within the discourse 
of New Age spirituality, which is roughly defined as an extremely personalized and 
hybrid form of religiosity, one that is based on the “sacredness of the self.”  In this sense, 
Rumi and Shams depicted in the novel parallels Coleman Barks’s representation both in 
terms of content and language. The novel's reception in Turkey, where Rumi occupies 
varied, interconnected, and sometimes contradictory positions, is another aspect to be 
grappled with. Rumi's contested identity has become a field to discuss what being a 
“good Muslim” entails.  
  I start my analysis with a discussion on the extent of the congruency of Elif 
Shafak's portrayal of Rumi and Sufism The Forty Rules of Love with New Age 
religiosity. Because I consider her representation of Sufism as a form of cultural 
translation, the domestication tactics utilized by Shafak constitute the focus of my 
analysis. Then I move onto discussing the roots of contemporary understanding of 
religion and Sufism in Turkey so as to contextualize the following examination of the 
Turkish version of the novel’s, that is Aşk’s (Love), engagement with discussions in 
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Turkey on the contested identity of Rumi. I argue that the New Age Rumi as depicted in 
Shafak’s novel agrees to a significant degree with the current notion of Islam as a 
privatized belief system. 
 
(i) The 40 Rules of Love: Catering an Islamic Rumi to American Spiritual Seekers 
 Elif Shafak's novel The Forty Rules of Love centers around the American housewife 
Ella Rubinstein's unintended soul-searching that commences with her new job reviewing 
a novel entitled “Sweet Blasphemy.” Ella, the main character to be identified with by the 
potential American reader, pursues a suburban middle-class life in Northampton, 
Massachusetts with her dentist husband and three children. The historical novel she is 
assigned to review is written by a man named Aziz Zahara, originally a Scottish wanderer 
who has eventually found peace in Sufism. Aziz's novel “Sweet Blasphemy,” constituting 
a substantial part of Shafak's book, speculates on the extent and nature of Shams's role in 
the transformation that Rumi had undergone from an unhappy religious scholar to a 
passionate mystic.  As Ella becomes immersed in her e-mail relationship with Aziz, soon 
the major problems in her life, including her unfaithful husband and distant children, 
become meaningless.  By the end of the novel Ella realizes that just as Shams had set 
Rumi free, Aziz, the contemporary reincarnation of Shams, liberated her from the chains 
of her depressing life.237 
                                                
237 The parallels drawn between Aziz and Shams is to such an extent that Aziz is suggested to be the 
reincarnation of Shams. At first Ella draws attention to the physical resemblance between the two and then 
by the end of Aziz's novel Rumi says in confirmation of the thirty-ninth rule of Sham's list “The Basic 
Principles of the Itinerant Mystics of Islam” that “for every Shams of Tabriz who has passed away, there 
will emerge a new one in a different age, under a different name” (343). Apparently the twentieth-century 
Shams happens to be Aziz who not only introduces the power of love as experienced by Sufis to an 
American readership but also validates his point by helping Ella to “realize” herself via love. 
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 The central theme of the novel is the transformative power of love. Both Ella and 
Rumi turn into different people by virtue of the love they feel for Aziz and Shams 
respectively. Shafak does not narrate a simple love story, however. Through the voice of 
Aziz, she attempts to demonstrate how true love should guide a person in her journey of 
self-realization. In this endeavor, Shafak draws heavily on Sufism, specifically on its 
love-oriented interpretation by Rumi. Due to Shafak's representation of Sufism, her 
rendition has proven to be a valuable tool in my attempt to understand the contemporary 
contextualization of Sufism within the larger discourse on Muslims.  
 Being well-aware of the anti-Islamic sentiments that prevail in the Western world, 
Elif Shafak presents an interpretation of Islam that challenges the negative image 
associated with it. Yet her repackaging is inspired by the target audience. In the novel 
Shafak particularly speaks to a Western audience informed by “New Age religiosity,” or 
in other words, “spiritual seekers,” who disparage institutionalized religions but 
appreciate the universal essentials that religions, spiritual traditions, and ethical teachings 
supposedly share. To Shafak’s version of Islam not only such seekers would not object, 
they would also find valuable in their personal spiritual quests. I contend that the 
“likeable” or “good” Islam as presented by Shafak is her New Age-inspired interpretation 
of Sufism, and Rumi is its main representative.  
 Shafak's portrayal of Sufism works on two levels, mirroring the nested structure of 
the novel. The outer story, that is, the story of Aziz and Ella, presents a version of Sufism 
as embodied by Aziz, a “Neo-Sufi,” who interprets Sufism as “universal spirituality” 
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which is not necessarily defined by Islam or any particular religion.238 In fact, Aziz 
admits partaking in the spiritualist ethos of contemporary American culture by describing 
himself “spiritual but not religious” (145). Though he avows to be a convert to Islam 
from atheism,239 Aziz acknowledges avoiding “religion” in his personalized search. In 
one of his e-mails to Ella, he talks about the nature of his surrender to the will of God. In 
order to clear any future confusion, he adds, unmistakably echoing the self-identification 
of numerous members of the quest culture, that: “Now you think I am a religious man. 
But I am not. I am spiritual, which is different. Religiosity and spirituality are not the 
same thing, and I believe that the gap between the two has never been greater than it is 
today.” (145). Aziz's preference to act like a “Neo-Sufi” proves to be efficient; despite 
her prejudice towards religious people, Ella the average reader is not bothered by Aziz or 
his preachy e-mails and novel. On the contrary, she feels a connection, probably because 
Aziz speaks not as a self-righteous religious man but as “a spiritual man who took 
matters of religion and faiths seriously, stayed away from all contemporary politics, and 
didn't 'hate' anything or anyone” (159).240 
 The second level where the representation of Sufism operates is a meta-level, 
                                                
238 “Neo-Sufism” as called by Mark Sedgwick, is a specific line of interpretation of Sufism that is 
essentially informed by New Age religiosity. As diverse and heterogeneous as New Age spirituality, Neo-
Sufism stands apart from “Sufism as found in the Muslim world” with its presentation of Sufism as 
“somehow above and beyond religions such as Christianity, Islam and Hinduism, building on the 
understanding of Sufism that had been established during the nineteenth century” (Sedgwick 2009: 184). 
239 Aziz embraces Sufism after an absurdly interesting life as a village boy, photographer, well-to-do 
banker, mourning husband, clubber/drug-addict/squatter, and travel-writer. 
240 As a Jewish woman, who “enjoys performing a few rituals every now and then,” Ella considers religion, 
at least at the beginning of her unintentional journey, detrimental to world peace. On top of that she is 
irritated by religious people, specifically by Muslim fanatics: “Ella believed that the major problem 
consuming the world today, just as in the past, was religion. With their unparalleled arrogance and self-
proclaimed belief in the supremacy of their ways, religious people got on her nerves. Fanatics of all 
religions were bad and unbearable, but deep inside she thought that fanatics of Islam were the worst” (159). 
Soon Ella's view on religion and Islam changes thanks to her friendship with Aziz. 
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produced by Aziz. This derivative version presents a domesticated form of Sufism, 
informed by contemporary socio-politics.241 The need for domestication arises first and 
foremost from the cultural remoteness of the inner story, which takes place in the 
thirteenth-century Baghdad and Konya. By means of cultural translation in the form of a 
historical novel, Aziz provides a domesticated yet de-contextualized interpretation of 
Sufism for readers who are represented by Ella with her ignorance of, as well as 
indifference towards, Islam and Sufism. In accordance with the conventions of historical 
novel, Aziz aims to narrate the past in a relatable manner. This aim is partially marked by 
Aziz's conviction that the twenty-first century and the thirteenth century are not 
dissimilar on account of both being “times of unprecedented religious clashes, cultural 
misunderstandings, and a general sense of insecurity and fear of the Other” (15).242 And 
yet  Aziz takes this attempt to familiarize the past for the modern reader a step too far: he 
projects the fears and prejudices of today onto thirteenth-century century Anatolia, so 
much so that almost all of the characters speak as if they are giving a message to their 
Western audience about what “real” Islam is and how Sufism embodies this pacifist, 
                                                
241 Shafak's employment of Aziz's perspective in her domestication endeavor is quite intelligent; she 
removes herself from the domesticated version by showing the appropriation of Sufism by a contemporary 
spiritual seeker from the West. I should, however, note that no other character appears in the novel to 
comment on Aziz's rendition of Sufism. In this regard, The 40 Rules of Love cannot function as a proper 
polyphonic novel in the sense that Mikhail Bakhtin uses the term. Aziz's voice, in general, subsumes other 
voices because of the same domestication tactic that is supposed to present a familiarized form of Islam and 
Sufism for an American audience. 
242 Elena Furlanetto notes that the analogy between thirteenth-century Anatolia and post 9/11 America is 
not limited to the themes of conflict and fear of the Other; two regions are comparable in terms of their 
multiculturalism and ethnic heterogeneity, characterized by the presence of numerous ethnic groups 
coexisting peacefully (207).  In the novel, Shams' first impression of Konya, for instance, invokes the 
melting pot narrative of America: “I ran into gypsy musicians, Arab travelers, Christian pilgrims, Jewish 
merchants, Buddhist priests, Frankish troubadours, Persian artists … Despite their seemingly endless 
difference, all of these people gave off a similar air of incompleteness, of the work in progress that they 
were, each an unfinished masterwork” (109). Shams considers the heterogeneity of Konya as a godly 
achievement as part of a divine plan, once again, reminding the reader the narrative of America's manifest 
destiny (Furlanetto: 207). 
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spiritualist interpretation of it, regarding either its stance towards jihad (holy war) or 
towards women's place in society. Aziz/Shafak domesticates partly because he/she tries 
to show the congruency of Sufism with New Age religiosity. The intended effect is 
displayed on Ella's changing views on religion and Islam. As a person who has found 
peace in Sufism, Aziz shows Ella, both by means of his own character and his novel, that 
a likeable form of Islam is actually available. Predictably the good Muslims are the Sufis.   
 The Sufis are presented as sympathetic Muslims but the question remains: what 
distinguishes them from other Muslims? Why they are to be liked and the others avoided? 
Why and how is Sufism made appealing to contemporary American audience? I believe 
the answers to these questions lie in the novel's engagement with New Age religiosity 
which is crafted in the general spiritual market by seekers who do not feel connected to 
any institutionalized religions, but who are nonetheless in search of some “higher 
meaning” of life. Historically embedded into Protestant, Schleiermacherian, and 
Transcendentalist interpretations of religion the New Age religiosity, or “post-
institutional religiosity,” such seekers seldom recognize any authority other than the 
emotions and the inner self.243 As discussed in the previous chapter, this extremely 
individualistic and hybrid form of religiosity with no official creed or manifesto, allows 
the sympathizers to create their own personal, yet somehow potentially universal, 
synthesis of diverse religious, ethical, spiritual and mystical traditions.  In close 
proximity to the centrality of the self, the diverse traditions utilized are deemed valuable 
as long as the seeker is able to find peace and/or enhance the self by means of methods 
                                                
243 Amanda Porterfield notes that specifically the conception of “divine reality as an impersonal flow of 
spiritual energy works to equalize all religious traditions as well as to validate internal experience as the 
apotheosis of religious authority” (16). 
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that accompany those traditions. This is precisely why they are often associated with 
therapeutic or healing services, or the promise of personal enhancement through 
meditation (Turner: 204). It is difficult to come up with a comprehensive definition of 
this “liquid religiosity” as it defies conceptualizations that come along with systematic 
analysis of religions. Usually appropriated by the members of “quest culture,” the diverse 
interpretations of it usually provide “a sacralized rendering of widely-held values 
(freedom, authenticity, self-responsibility, self-reliance, self-determination, equality, 
dignity, tranquility, harmony, love, peace, creative expressivity, being positive, and 
above all, “the self” as a value in and of itself)” and assumptions that are associated with 
them such as “the intrinsic goodness of human nature,” “the idea that it is possible to 
change for the better,” “the person as the primary locus of authority,” and “the efficacy of 
positive thinking” (Heelas: 169).  
 The New Age religiosity is central in any attempt at understanding the presentation 
of Sufism in The 40 Rules of Love because Shafak's portrayal of Sufism agrees, in 
general, with the basic tenets of New-Age religiosity, such as the importance of achieving 
supreme consciousness, the realization of the self and the belief in the guidance of the 
self. In that sense, her version is quite similar to the domestication of Rumi by Coleman 
Barks, which I have explored in the previous chapter, but there are some important 
differences between the two as well. Most significant difference is that Shafak presents 
Sufism, through the personalities of Rumi and Shams, as an interpretation of Islam, 
though paradoxically supra-Islamic at the same time. According to her account, Sufism, 
on the one hand, is the pacifist, harmonious and more profound version of Islam as 
opposed to the literalist interpretations of it. On the other hand, because of its engagement 
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with what is universal and eternal, it is above and beyond Islam. By prioritizing what is 
deemed to be universal and eternal, Shafak appropriates Sufism to the taste of American 
audience who has already shown its appreciation of Neo-Sufism. Therefore, by means of 
domesticating Sufism, Shafak metonymically domesticates Islam, bringing into mind 
Bryan Turner's remark about Islam in America. Turner says, “In the United States, Islam 
could become acceptable as a denomination in the melting pot of multiculturalism, but 
only on the condition that it becomes a ‘religion’ in our terms” (169).  
 In The 40 Rules of Love Shafak administers domestication quite intelligently 
through the voice of Aziz, who inevitably reflects onto his novel his ideas and views 
about religion and Islam that have grown out of his experience as a contemporary 
spiritual seeker. By means of Aziz, Shafak re-conceptualizes a specific interpretation of 
Sufism that is contextually bound by its own discursive tradition as well as the conditions 
particular to the thirteenth-century Anatolia in the language of New Age religiosity. Just 
as important, this re-designation is conducted with reference to the post-9/11 discourse on 
Muslims. Since 2001, Sufism, once merely identified as “mystical Islam,” has come to be 
described as “pacifist,” “peaceful,” “tolerant,” “flexible,” and “moderate” Islam, usually 
in opposition to the Taliban, al-Qaida or any other hard-liner Islamist group. With their 
music, dance and tolerance, Sufis are presented as the Muslims to be supported against 
fundamentalists. From the beginning, Aziz's novel subscribes to this topos of good 
Muslim vs. bad Muslim and presents two types of Muslims: Sufis and “literalists.”244 
                                                
244 One might argue for the presence of a third category, namely the in-betweeners such as Kimya and Kera, 
both female, who intuitively opposed the literalist view but are not Sufis either. Though they are not Sufis 
they tend to agree with Sufis on most of the issues. Rumi's wife Kera, for instance, as a former Christian 
still has doubts regarding her love for Virgin Mary. Shams assures her that it is extremely understandable 
and not contradictory to Islam to still love and pray for Virgin Mary, who is also highly revered by 
Muslims.  
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While the first group is defined by pacifism, spiritualism, tolerance, and open-
mindedness, the second one emerges as the polar opposite of the former. Limited by their 
literalist interpretation of Islam the characters belonging to the latter group (e.g. the judge 
in Baghdad; the “zealot” in Konya; Baybars) argue for waging war against everyone but 
themselves, show intolerance towards those that are identified as sinful such as drunkards 
and prostitutes, and nurture hostility towards Sufis.  
 Even though Rumi is represented as the perfect Muslim, it is usually through the 
character of Shams that the dichotomization is administered.  Shams is the one that stands 
up against the literalists and does not hold himself back from criticizing them, usually by 
means of juxtaposing his stance towards the issue in question with that of the literalists. 
The difference between the two “camps” is displayed most manifestly in a passage where 
Shams and Kimya, Rumi's adopted daughter, discuss several verses from one of the suras 
(chapter) (“al-Nisa”) in the Qur'an on the relationship between man and woman (196). 
Shams recites two different translations, hence interpretations of the same verse, one of 
the versions of which permits men to beat their wives.245 Another version, or to be more 
correct, another translation simply tells men to stay away from their wives when there is 
disagreement. Through the diversity of interpretations that determine the meaning and 
sense of the translations Shams shows Kimya the decisive role of the reader in the 
interpretation of a text as multilayered as the Qur'an. Shams explains to Kimya that from 
afar the Qur'an seems to have, just like “a gushing river,” only one watercourse but as 
one plunges into it, she/he would realize that there are, in deed, four currents, all of which 
“flow in harmony and yet completely separate from one another” (196). Literalists are the 
                                                
245 It is interesting that Shams, a learned mystic well-read in Qur'an explains the verse to Kimya, a student 
of Islamic sciences under the supervision of Rumi, in translation rather than using the original Arabic text. 
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ones who swim closer to the surface and are content with the outer meaning of the 
Qur'an. The other currents remain unknown to them. These are the people who read a 
sura like the Nisa and “arrive at the conclusion that men are held superior to women 
because this is exactly what they want to see” (Ibid). The novel makes it clear that the 
“zealot” and  the like read as such and almost always prefer the version that leaves no 
place for good intentions, tolerance, and peace. Whereas Sufis such as Shams even go 
beyond the second level of reading, that is the “moderate” interpretation, and swim 
within the “esoteric, (batıni)” which is a much more profound yet hard to reach level, 
where the discussed verse is not even about men and women but “about womanhood and 
manhood,” about “how each and every one of us has both femininity and masculinity in 
us, in varying degrees and shades.” Shams adds, in Jungian fashion, “only when we learn 
to embrace both can we attain harmonious Oneness.”246  
 Hence Shams himself makes it clear that the literalists and Sufis practice different 
Islams because they read the Qur'an differently. As someone capable of reading “the 
Qur'an in the budding flowers and migrating birds,” and “the Breathing Qur'an secreted 
in human beings” (112), Shams disparages Muslims who, according to his observations, 
“spend their whole lives hunched on prayer rugs while their eyes and hearts remain 
closed to the outside world” and “read the Qur'an only on the surface” (112). Ironically 
Shams claims that Sufis do not judge other people (51), althoughhe himself continues to 
                                                
246 More than once Shams refers to the four levels of reading the Qur'an. In another instance he says “Each 
and every reader comprehends the Holy Qur’an on a different level in tandem with the depth of his 
understanding. There are four levels of insight. The first level is the outer meaning and it is the one that the 
majority of the people are content with. Next is the Batini — the inner level. Third, there is the inner of the 
inner. And the fourth level is so deep it cannot be put into words and is therefore bound to remain 
indescribable. Scholars who focus on the sharia know the outer meaning. Sufis know the inner meaning. 
Saints know the inner of the inner. And as the fourth level, that is known only by prophets and those closest 
to God” (50).  Rumi, once, says that the companionship of Shams is “like the fourth reading of the Qur'an – 
a journey that can only be experienced from within but never grasped from the outside” (193). 
 183 
criticize people throughout the novel, specifically those who, according to Shams, stick to 
the literalist interpretation of the Qur'an.  
 A direct consequence of reading the Qur'an at different levels manifests itself in the 
stance toward engagement with violence. At the beginning of “Sweet Blasphemy” Shams 
makes it clear that Sufis do not resort to violence no matter what: “As a Sufi I had sworn 
to protect life and do no harm. In this world of illusions, so many people were ready to 
fight without any reason, and so many others fought for a reason. But the Sufi was the 
one who wouldn’t fight even if he had a reason. There was no way I could resort to 
violence” (31). In another instance he says, “The true Sufi is such that even when he is 
unjustly accused, attacked, and condemned from all sides, he patiently endures, uttering 
not a single bad word about any of his critics” (225). Literalist Muslims, on the other 
hand, promote war in the name of Islam and vehemently criticize the pacifist stance of 
Sufis. Representatives of the “bad Muslims,” such as the judge in Baghdad, the “zealot” 
in Konya and Rumi's elder son Aladdin, all make comments in favor of war and violence, 
widening the gap between them and Sufi-minded pacifist people, represented first and 
foremost by Rumi. Take Baybars, for instance, who strongly rails against Rumi and 
Shams:  
…  when surrounded by cold-blooded enemies on all sides, how can we afford to be 
peaceful? This is why people like Rumi get on my nerves. I don’t care how highly 
everyone thinks of him. For me he is a coward who spreads nothing but cowardice. 
He might have been a good scholar in the past, but nowadays he is clearly under the 
influence of that heretic Shams. At a time when the enemies of Islam are looming 
large, what does Rumi preach? Peace! Passivity! Submission! Rumi preaches 
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submissiveness, turning Muslims into a flock of sheep, meek and timid. … Other 
than “love,” his favorite words seem to be “patience,” “balance,” and “tolerance.” 
(188) 
 Of course, on the issue of violence, Aziz's suggestion to read today in thirteenth-
century conflicts inevitably engages the novel, which is already replete with anachronistic 
projections and allusions to contemporary anxieties, with current debates on whether 
Islam promotes violence. From the beginning, Aziz urges his readers to pay attention to 
the similarities between thirteenth-century Anatolia and the twenty-first-century Western 
world. In this respect, Shams' disparagement of literalists brings into mind the 
contemporary criticism towards Salafis for selectively reading the Qur'an in accordance 
with their agenda. Shams says that  
Instead of losing themselves in the Love of God and waging a war against their ego, 
religious zealots fight other people, generating wave after wave of fear. [...] Instead 
of searching for the essence of the Qur’an and embracing it as a whole, however, 
the bigots single out a specific verse or two, giving priority to the divine commands 
that they deem to be in tune with their fearful minds. (181)  
 The message given above is quite clear: the literalists are bigots in every sense of 
the word and they are wrong. Opposed to such literalists who swim in the shalloWestern 
waters of the river of Qur'an stands Rumi with his unhesitating plunge into the deepest 
streams. Islam promoted by Rumi in the novel, however, is not only compatible with but 
also similar to the spiritually enhancing, privatized, non-parochial, post-institutionalized, 
hybrid religiosity to which an increasing number of Americans turn for comfort. Aziz’s 
Rumi is a proponent of a universal religion of love that is not only above and beyond 
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doctrines and creeds but is, also, free from the bounds of time and society. In fact, Aziz's 
introduction of Rumi underlines Rumi's distinction from other Muslims with regard to his 
promotion of “universal spirituality,” inclusiveness, and pacifism:  
Beset with religious clashes, political disputes, and endless power struggles, the 
thirteenth century was a turbulent period in Anatolia. […] It was a time of 
unprecedented chaos when Christians fought Christians, Christians fought Muslims, 
and Muslims fought Muslims. Everywhere one turned, there was hostility and 
anguish and an intense fear of what might happen next. In the midst of this chaos 
lived a distinguished Islamic scholar, [...] In an age of deeply embedded bigotries 
and clashes, he stood for a universal spirituality, openings doors to people of all 
backgrounds. Instead of an outer-oriented jihad —defined as “the war against 
infidels” and carried out by many in those days just as in the present — Rumi stood 
up for an inner-oriented jihad where the aim was to struggle against and ultimately 
prevail over one’s ego, nafs. (19-20) 
 The density and the pervasiveness of this dichotomy to the texture of the novel is 
quite significant because of the effect it generates. The authorial voice, that is the New 
Age voice of Aziz, situates everyone on the axis of the good Muslim / bad Muslim 
dichotomy. Such projection of today into the past brings into mind Mikhail Bakhtin's 
warning about distortion of the past in the form of modernization of it: 
The depiction of the past in the novel in no sense presumes the modernization of 
this past. On the contrary, only in the novel have we the possibility of an 
authentically objective portrayal of the past as the past. Contemporary reality with 
its new experience is retained as a way of seeing, it has the depth, sharpness, 
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breadth and vividness of that way of seeing, should not in any way penetrate into 
the already portrayed content of the past, as a force of modernizing and distorting 
the uniqueness of that past.” (29)  
The distortion in the novel occurs in two areas. Aziz, as the writer of a historical novel, is 
ideally expected to “devise various forms and methods for employing the surplus of 
knowledge” that we as contemporary readers know but the hero does not know or see 
(Bakhtin: 32). None of these forms and methods, however, is supposed to precipitate an 
ahistorical presentation of the past as the novel does here.247 Aziz's description of Rumi 
from the mouth of a Sufi sheikh as “a great enlightener who will generate a significant 
positive change in the history of Islam, if not in the history of the world” (68) or Shams's 
ominous prediction about the fate of Baghdad, which, then, was at the peak of its glory 
constitute considerable examples of ahistorical projection. Of course, the most significant 
of such comments revolves around the auspicious friendship and its concomitant effect 
on Rumi. Prior to the meeting of Rumi and Shams, Sheikh Zaman introduces Rumi to 
Shams as someone “good with words, but not with metaphors, for he is no poet. He is 
loved, respected, and admired by thousands, but he himself is not a lover” (72).248 He 
knows that only by means of Shams, Rumi would be able to become the poet that he 
needs to be.  
                                                
247 Of course, in post-modern historical novels we see the utilization of ahistorical perspective but in those 
cases the novel's self-reflexivity makes the reader question the ahistorical presentation as well. In the case 
of “Sweet Blasphemy” we cannot talk about self-reflexivity. To the contrary it quite agrees with the 
conventional definition of the historical novel. 
248 Seyyid Burhaneddin, a disciple of Rumi's father and a teacher of Rumi, writes a letter to Sheikh Zaman 
in Baghdad to see if there lives the spiritual companion that would be of help to heal Rumi's existentialist 
crisis. In his letter Burhaneddin describes Rumi as “a spiritual leader,” “a role model,” who “has excelled at 
law, philosophy, theology, astronomy, history, chemistry, and algebra” but nonetheless unhappy and 
discontent. Burhaneddin sums up Rumi's state as “though he was anything but raw, he wasn't burned 
either” (68). Upon receiving the letter Sheikh Zaman recommends Shams to go to Konya and meet Rumi. 
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 The second area in which the novel creates a distortion is that of language. The 
imposition of contemporary language couched in New Age jargon is a means of 
domestication that has been used throughout the inner novel. Shams, in particular, speaks 
like a contemporary New Ager. For instance, by the beginning of “Sweet Blasphemy” he 
comes across an innkeeper whose heart was hardened by the trials and tribulations he had 
to go through. Shams proposes to read the palm of the innkeeper in return for the money 
he owes for the accommodation. Shams recounts his impression of the session in a New-
Agey language:  
Bit by bit, the colors in his aura appeared to me: a rusty brown and a blue so pale as 
to be  almost gray. His spiritual energy was hollowed out and thinned around the 
edges, as if it had no more strength to defend itself against the outside world.  (32) 
 There are other similar incidents in which Shams explains “spiritual growth” as 
being “about the totality of our consciousness” (246), warns about “fake gurus” (88) or 
teaches how to avoid “vicious circle of malevolent energy” (211), and “arrive at a 
supreme form of consciousness” (112). More significant than such incidents, however, is 
the “Forty Rules of the Religion of Love,” a list allegedly compiled by Shams and gives 
the novel its title.249 The list, entitled by Shams as “The Basic Principles of the Itinerant 
Mystics of Islam,” is recited one by one, mostly by Shams, throughout the nested novel 
befitting the situation at hand. Most of the rules, in the form of aphorisms, sound as if 
quoted from a self-help book. They are, as a matter of fact, in agreement with New Age 
religiosity's emphasis on the centrality of “the self.” Rather than recommending how to 
                                                
249 The list is apparently based on William Chittick's edition of Shams & Me, which Aziz reads even in his 
deathbed. The book is the collection of notes that are ascribed to Shams but as Chittick acknowledges 
Shams himself did not leave any written material behind. These disconnected notes are probably taken by 
the disciples of Rumi, who later on compiled them as Makalat.  
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annihilate or subjugate the self, as one would expect from a Sufi mystic, they speak of the 
ways to enhance self-awareness, find happiness and inner peace, and become content.250 
To give an idea, here are a few examples:  
If you want to change the ways others treat you, you should first change the way 
you treat yourself, fully and sincerely, there is no way you can be loved. Once you 
achieve that stage, however, be thankful for every thorn that others might throw at 
you. It is a sign that you will soon  be showered in roses. (135)  
 
Try not to resist the changes that come your way. Instead let life live through you. 
And do not worry that your life is turning upside down. How do you know that the 
side you are used to is better than the one to come? (101)  
 
If you get to know yourself fully, facing with honesty and hardness both your dark 
and bright sides, you will arrive at a supreme form of consciousness. (112)  
 
Fret not where the road will take you. Instead concentrate on the first step. That is 
the hardest part and that is what you are responsible for. Once you take that step let 
everything do what it naturally does and the rest will follow. Don’t go with the 
flow. Be the flow. (177)  
                                                
250 As noted by Mark Sedgwick one of the objectives of a Sufi on her/his path to tawhid 
(existential/experiential union with Allah) is to subjugate the nafs (ego), not to discover it (2009: 119). 
Also, Sufism conventionally urges guided journey to the point of discrediting the individual search. A well-
known Sufi adage says that “He who does not have a murshid (spiritual master) has Satan for his murshid.” 
Shams's list, on the other hand, except for one rule, does not mention the significance of murshid (spiritual 
master). 
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Hell is in the here and now. So is heaven. Quit worrying about hell or dreaming 
about heaven, as they are both present inside this very moment. Every time we fall 
in love, we ascend to heaven. Every time we hate, envy or fight someone we tumble 
straight into the fires of hell. (182) 
 In the words of fictional Shams these “rules” are “universal, dependable, invariable 
as the laws of nature” and “could be attained through love and love only” (39). Shams' 
claim to be able to identify such universal and invariable rules agrees with the novel's 
general insistence on the universal message Sufism embodies. The claim to universality 
is worth examining because I believe “universal” to be the key word for understanding 
the entirety of Shams’ and Rumi’s philosophy represented by Shafak: as a defender of 
“universal spirituality” (19), Rumi is said to know how to differentiate the “universal and 
eternal” aspects of religion from the husk of it (68).251 Furthermore his latent capabilities 
as a supreme mystic are set into motion by the spiritual friendship of Shams, who taught 
him the “universal rules of love” that the “Religion of Love” entails.252   
 Of course, Sufism – and Islam itself – just like many other religious and spiritual 
traditions claim to embody and teach universal truths. In that respect it is completely 
reasonable for Shams to articulate such a claim. The significant point of this claim 
concerns its form, the language in which these “forty rules” are couched in because of its 
sure effect on the content. As Judith Butler notes, “the claim to universality always takes 
                                                
251 In “Sweet Blasphemy” Rumi is introduced by a fellow sheikh as someone who has the “rare ability to 
dig deep below the husk of religion and pull out from its core the gem that is universal and eternal” (68). 
This distinction brings into mind the suggestions made by the Transcendentalists to dissect any given 
religion into moral, ethical and self-transcending features as opposed to the “civil-historical and ritual 
portions.” 
252 Needless to say, these rules are appropriated by Rumi as well; the fortieth rule, for instance, is 
articulated by Rumi long after the death of Shams. 
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place in a given syntax, through a certain set of cultural conventions in a recognizable 
venue” (Butler 2000: 35) even though the universal, by definition, has to remain 
“untainted by what is particular, concrete, and individual” (23). Therefore, because “the 
meaning of 'the universal' proves to be culturally variable, [...] the specific cultural 
articulations of the universal work against its claim to a transcultural status (Butler 2004: 
190). The universals espoused by Sufism, particularly the ones by Rumi, are determined 
by the Sufi tradition, which, as a discursive tradition, reproduces and re-signifies itself in 
a continuous manner just like the Islamic tradition out of which it organically has grown. 
As such the universalistic claims that these traditions convey inevitably carry their mark.  
 But then how could they be translated? How can one assure that the claim of 
universality will work if it is always already affected by language? Judith Butler argues 
that for a universalist claim to work, “for it to compel consensus, and for the claim, 
performatively, to enact the very universality it enunciates, it must undergo a set of 
translations into the various rhetorical and cultural contexts in which the meaning and 
force of universal claims are made” (2000: 35). Butler basically argues that proponents of 
a universalism rely upon a certain type of domestication or appropriation. Though 
domestication is an inevitable condition of cultural translation, with regard to the 
translation of religion, in particular of Islam, one has to keep in mind that religions 
ideally claim to appropriate, not to be appropriated. The whole point of “religious 
conversion” is to domesticate the subject to the cultural text of the said religion. In 
reality, of course, this is rarely the case. The subject appropriates religion as much as it is 
appropriated by it. It is the same with the engagement with the universals espoused by 
religions.    
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 Elif Shafak, in The 40 Rules of Love, domesticates what she deems to be universal 
in Sufism by equating it with another set of universals. She interprets Sufism as practiced 
by Shams and Rumi as the universal aspect of Islam and translates it into a contemporary 
American context. In order for the universal claim to work in the American context, she 
naturalizes Rumi and Shams to the degree of assimilating them into New Age religiosity, 
which not only accommodates diverse religious, ethical, spiritual and mystical traditions 
but also, on account of its inclusiveness, claims to be universal. So, Shafak basically 
equates the universals espoused by Rumi as articulated in the thirteenth-century Anatolia 
to the universals promoted by New Agers as articulated in the twenty-first-century 
America. That is why, even though Sham's list is entitled “The Basic Principles of the 
Itinerant Mystics of Islam” it barely includes any references to Islam or Islamic culture 
whatsoever, at least in the English version. It is as if the universality that Shams attributes 
to them requires some kind of zero culture-specificity, negating any kind of contingency. 
It is implicated that the more “neutralized” or “decontextualized” the list is the more it 
would become universal. But yet again its “neutralized” or “decontextualized” state is, in 
fact, is a product of a certain context as, first and foremost, the language of the novel 
suggests. 
 So apparently Shafak finds the “universal language” of New Age religiosity as the 
most appropriate equivalent of the universal language of Sufism, but her “cultural 
translation” is problematic because of the incongruence of the basic notions that these 
two universal languages espouse. Particularly, the concept of the “religion of love,” 
which both traditions incorporate under the same name but has different connotations, 
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raises questions.253 The semantic fields of this concept in the traditions of Sufism and 
New Age-ism hardly overlap because of the different socio-historical contexts from 
which these two concepts with the same designation arose. While both “religions of love” 
claim to be universal and are based on an experiential understanding of religion, we have 
to consider the defining effect of the differences that are shaped within the specific 
traditions to which they belong. While the Sufi “religion of love” primarily emerged from 
the religious and cultural traditions of the Islamic world (Chittick 2013; Mojaddedi 
2012),  the New Age conceptualization of “religion of love” has, as one would expect, 
organic ties with the Christian conceptualization of love, in addition to the tenets it has 
incorporated from other spiritual and religious traditions such as Hinduism and 
Buddhism.  
 So this is how Rumi as a Muslim gets transplanted into another tradition of 
religiosity. This specific attempt of Shafak has been interpreted as assimilating into 
“American hegemonic narratives and the Western instrumentalisation of the East” 
(Furlanetto: 208) in her attempt at creating  “a cosmopolitan narrative that speaks to the 
West and the East” (Ibid). 254 Admitting the validity of this point, I must add that I am not 
convinced that giving into American hegemony in order to create a “cosmopolitan 
                                                
253 The concept of “religion of love” is, in fact, a common theme in Sufi literature; from Ibn Arabi to Ansari 
many Sufis contemplate on the meaning of this concept. Rumi mentions it numerous times in his works. 
For instance, he says “The religion of Love is apart from all religions: for lovers, the (only) religion and 
creed — is God. (Masnavi II: l. 1770); “My religion is to live through love / life through the spirit and head 
is my shame” (Masnavi VI: l. 4059); “What is the miraj of the heavens? Nonexistence. The religion and 
creed of the lovers is nonexistence” (Masnavi VI: 233); “Fear is not even a hair before Love; in the 
Religion of Love, all things are sacrificed” ( Masnavi V: 2185);  “The intellect does not know and is 
bewildered by the Religion of Love – even if it should be aware of all religions” (Divan 2610); “In the 
religion of the lovers, that spirit is mortally ill whose illness does not make him worse every day” (Divan 
3610); “I am an utter profligate and scoundrel, I am brazen in the Religion of Love – what property have I 
that I should send as a gift?” (Divan 17685) (Chittick 1983: 212-213 ). 
254 Furlanetto argues that Shafak's contribution to the American Rumi discourse is a case of self-
Orientalisation, as she has internalised a Western perspective in her account of one of the most significant 
figures of the Islamic heterodox tradition” (208). 
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narrative” fully explains the domestication of Rumi in The Forty Rules of Love. I contend 
that Shafak's portrayal has been affected by the Turkish context as much as it has been 
shaped by her desire to become a global/cosmopolitan writer. The intricacies presented 
by the Turkish socio-historical context, however, requires a brief exploration of the 
reception of Rumi in Turkey with reference to the secularization project.  
 
(ii) Aşk (Love): The Secularist Dream of Religion in Turkey 
The 40 Rules of Love, published under the name Aşk (Love), was an instant best-seller in 
Turkey.255 Though dismissed, specifically by conservative intellectuals, as “new Age … 
kitsch” (Cündioğlu: 2009), the novel was embraced enthusiastically by a significant 
portion of Turkish society. Its reception in Turkey is of consequence for the purposes of 
this chapter, because it falls right into a debate on the nature of the exemplariness of 
Mevlana as a Muslim.256 As will be outlined below, Mevlana’s Muslim identity has long 
been a topic of discussion among different factions from Turkish society and Shafak’s 
representation of Mevlana, Şems (Shams) and their relationship resonates effectively 
within this discussion.  
 Out of the diverse interpretations about Mevlana’s Muslimhood two specific 
positions stand apart due to the ways in which they exploit the contested identity within 
their own discourse on how to be a Muslim or how to live Islam. These two 
interpretations are largely utilized by two segments of Turkish society that are historically 
                                                
255 Initially 100,000 copies were published which is an extremely high number for Turkey. In no time sales 
have mounted over 500,000. Even a grey-jacketed version of the book was published as well because male 
readers were embarrassed to be seen reading the original pink edition. 
256 In this section of the chapter, instead of “Rumi” I will use “Mevlana” by which Rumi is widely known in 
Turkey. 
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counterposed to each other. It is not easy to describe these two camps. They are usually 
identified as “Islamists” and “secularists” and for practical reasons I will stick to that, but 
I believe the convoluted history of Turkish modernization precludes rigid subjectivities, 
and instead encourages hybrid ones.257 A very small portion of Turkish society would be 
defined strictly secularist or strictly Islamist if one assumes the two categories mutually 
exclusive. Today, though it may be one of the feats of the Republican project, many 
people identify themselves as Muslim (either nominal or practicing at varying degrees) 
and secular at the same time. It is, however, also correct that there is a defining 
ideological framework that determines how one defines himself/herself vis-à-vis religion, 
which, in turn, differentiates one camp from another. In the Turkish context, the early 
Republican conceptualization of religion is the major constituent of that framework, and 
one’s compliance with that conceptualization determines which stance he/she identifies 
with. The respective outlooks of the members of these camps is of importance because 
any reading and representation of Mevlana in Turkey has been inevitably shaped, besides 
other factors, by the reader's conceptualization of religion and morality, in particular, by 
the personal stance of the reader towards Islam.  
 On the one hand, secularists maintain the perfectness of Mevlana as a Muslim, but 
they draw attention to his presumed anti-orthodox, love-oriented philosophy, which, 
according to their readings, highlights the importance of “purity of heart” in comparison 
to Islamic rituals such as daily prayer, and fasting that Islamists supposedly valorize 
above all else. For instance, Zülfü Livaneli, a staunch secularist, posits Rumi to be first 
                                                
257 Some prefer to identify these camps as traditional vs. progressive/modern, Islamist vs. Kemalist, secular 
vs. religious, or left vs. right. None of them, however, captures the nuances of the differentiation, partly 
because of the elusive nature of identities that are always in the process of becoming.  
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and foremost a poet, suggesting that the Turkish people “made a religious leader out of a 
poet who loves to dance, drink wine and fall in love” (2010: para. 5). On the other hand, 
another group agrees with the former with regard to the perfection of Mevlana as a 
Muslim, but they strive to prove that Mevlana, in addition to promoting love and peace in 
every aspect of life, never failed to faithfully perform his religious duties. Furthermore, 
they strongly object to portraying Rumi outside orthodox Islam. Ömer Tuğrul İnançer, for 
instance, a controversial Sufi, vehemently criticizes those who overlook the Islamic piety 
of Mevlana.  
 Elif Shafak, apparently in agreement with both camps presents Mevlana as the ideal 
Muslim to be emulated. Her Mevlana is not a non-practicing, wine-loving poet as some 
secularists imagine him to be. In the novel Mevlana is presented as an observant Islamic 
scholar who transforms into a poet burning with divine love. Furthermore, there are 
numerous references to Mevlana’s, and Şems’s as well, observance of Islamic rituals. On 
the other hand, her domestication of Mevlana to the taste of New Age religiosity agrees 
with the secularist reading of Mevlana due to the congruence of their religion 
conceptualization. In this sense, it can be said that out of different historical backgrounds 
there emerged an overlap of interpretations regarding Mevlana Rumi. In order to 
understand the dynamics of the overlap we need to examine the secularists’ stance toward 
religion and Islam which is manipulated, or at least attempted to be manipulated, by the 
state by means of various regulatory/disciplinary tools that include but are not limited to 
secularization and nationalization.  
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  The grand modernization project that was initiated by the elite cadres258 of the 
newly founded Turkish Republic entails a radical interpretation of secularism, the 
applications of which have touched upon every single realm of life. This has largely to do 
with the Republican elite's understanding of religion that apparently developed under the 
influence of Western conceptualization of religion, which is considered to be a private 
matter and is seen as the antithesis of reason and scientific progress.259  
Islam further complicates the matter for Mustafa Kemal and his fellow reformers 
because of its inherent incongruity with the definition of “religion” in the Western sense 
of the word. The concept of “religion” as understood today in the Western world as a 
private matter is formed by a specific series of European phenomena, such as the 
Protestant Reformation, Enlightenment, and German idealism.260 Islam, on the other 
                                                
258 The stance and the policies of the political elite is central in any attempt to understand Turkish 
modernization project because, as noted by Resat Kasaba, for long stretches of time in Turkey's modern 
history, the relatively small political elite “has appropriated the right to determine the pace and the shape of 
its modernisation” which was modeled after Western European experience (302). On account of being an 
extremely comprehensive project of social engineering it “required a very heavy dose of state intervention 
to mould the nation's broader social transformation so that it could fit into this new riverbed” (Ibid). 
259 As staunch believers of “scientific materialism” many members of the Republican cadre, including 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, regarded religion to be an obstacle in the envisioned future of modern Turkey. 
Şükri Hanioğlu notes that as social Darwinists and scientific materialists, many members of the intellectual 
cadre of the Ittihat ve Terakki Partisi (The Committee of Union and Progress, or CUP), which was in 
power from 1908 to 1918, “expected the Darwinian triumph of science over religion in their time” (2010: 
138). As the materialist movement gained traction within the Ottoman elite, argues Hanioğlu, it evolved 
into a peculiar form of scientism that rejected religion and attributed European progress to the alleged 
adoption of materialist doctrine in Europe (140). 
260 As eloquently argued by Talal Asad, any attempt to work on a transhistorical definition of religion is 
doomed to fail because it basically denies the historical specificity of religious phenomena. In his article 
“Towards an Anthropology of Islam” as well as in later studies Genealogies of Religion and The 
Formations of the Secular, Asad deconstructs the category of religion by identifying some of “the historical 
shifts that have produced our concept of religion as the concept of a transhistorical essence” (1993: 
29).“There cannot be a universal definition of religion,” says Asad, “not only because its constituent 
elements and relationships are historical specific, but because that definition is itself the historical product 
of discursive processes" (1993: 29). The secular-liberal assumption of a transhistorical presence of religion 
consequently leads to the discreteness of the field of politics, religion, economics and so forth. This 
expectation itself is a historical and cultural product of the Western European experience. Building upon 
the premises of Protestantism, Enlightenment thinkers such as John Locke and Immanuel Kant elaborated 
the principal conditions of a compartmentalized life, the modus vivendi of which, as noted by William 
Connolly, entails a newly crafted space of private religion and faith. But what is important here, as pointed 
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hand, operates on a different level as the meaning of the term din (“religion”) suggests. 
The coherent ultimate meaning intended with “din,” says Muhammad Al-Atlas, is “faith, 
beliefs and practices and teachings adhered to by the Muslims individually and 
collectively as a Community and manifesting itself altogether as an objective whole as 
the Religion called Islam” (184). Accordingly, the sense din embodies is not the same as 
the sense denoted by “religion” as interpreted and understood throughout Western 
religious history (Ibid). Talal Asad explains this discrepancy with reference to Islam 
being a “discursive tradition”261 (1993:1), which enables it to manifest itself as “practice, 
language and sensibility set in social relationships rather than as systems of meaning” 
(Asad 2014: 13).   
The Republican elite were, actually, in favor of creating a secular morality that 
would ideally replace the Islamic one, but they were aware of this project’s 
impracticability, at least immediately. So they decided to set into motion the next best 
thing, which was to redefine Islam.262 The active form of secularism pursued by the state 
did not allow religion to interfere in other realms of life, in particular in politics, but at 
                                                
out by Asad, is that this process did not mark off an already established or experienced exclusive sphere 
called the religious; it, in fact, engendered that exclusiveness in the first place. 
261 Here Asad suggests to use the term “tradition” in the Aristotelian sense as elaborated by Alasdair 
MacIntyre. According to MacIntyre, tradition, which continuously restructures itself in time, “is an 
historically extended, socially embodied argument, an argument precisely in part about the goods which 
constitute that tradition” (2007: 222). The engagement of discourses with the practical aspect is of extreme 
importance because of the dialogical relationship between the two. The continuous interrelation between a 
discourse and practice is secured partly because practices as spiritual exercises are “intended to affect a 
modification and a transformation in the subject who practice them” (Hadot: 6). Such transformations 
inevitably affect the discourse the subjects partake in which is, in turn, projected onto the practice and ad 
infinitum. 
262 Though I should note that Ataturk did not reveal his plans about religion even after the proclamation of 
the republic. He asked for the support of religious leaders during the war of independence. In the letters he 
wrote to them he praises Islam and the role of such figures (Mustafa Kara: 83-85). In 1923 he even 
preached a sermon in a mosque in Balıkesir, arguing that Islam was a perfect religion on account of being a 
rational religion (Soileau: 240). Furthermore, the 1924 Constitution declares Islam to be the official 
religion of the state. Though, that clause was deleted in 1928. 
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the same time allowed the state to regulate religiosity, specifically the Islamic one.263 As 
noted by Christopher Dole, “Turkey's history of secular reform was as much as about 
structural differentiation (of religious from political institutions) as it was about control 
and regulation” (11). Conceptualized largely as a system of belief, dissociated from 
practices, the state offered a supposedly “enlightened” version of Islam that would be 
promoted by governmental tools such as the newly founded Directorate of Religious 
Affairs (1924),264 a Divinity School first at Istanbul University (1925-1933), then at 
Ankara University (1949), and later Imam-Hatip schools that were founded in order to 
train religious officials.   
The most important feature of the state's attempts to regulate Islam is the 
redefinition of it as a private matter along the lines of Western conceptualization of 
religion. It is thought that as long as it does not manifest itself in the public sphere, Islam 
would, at least, be tolerated. The elites knew that the transformation of people into the 
envisioned ideal citizen, who was not defined by religiosity, required time as well as 
effort on both sides. They were well aware that the masses would continue to be pious no 
                                                
263 Different from American secularism, which “has historically provided ‘freedom of religion’ for people 
feeling religious persecution,” Turkish secularism (laïcité), modeled after the French one, is defined by its 
promotion of “‘freedom from religion.’” (Cagaptay: 45).  
264 The mission of DRA was stated in the 1924 constitution as the administration of “the affairs related to 
faith and worship of the religion of Islam” (diyanet.gov.tr) but as Hakan Yavuz draws attention, its mission 
expanded in time: “from simply supervising faith and worship to 'taking necessary steps to secure the 
loyalty of Muslims to the national ideas' of the Republic. Law 633 of 1963 redefined the task of the DRA in 
terms of 'conducting the affairs of belief, worship, and enlightening society on religious matters and the 
moral aspects of the Islamic religion.' The new law added the concepts of morality and 'enlightening 
society' on religious issues. In other words, the state sought to create a moral order based on Islamic values. 
The 1982 constitution went even further and asked the DRA to 'carry out its mission within the framework 
of the principle of secularism and with the goal of achieving national solidarity and integration'” (24). 
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matter what but the rationale was that, if one was pious she was encouraged, or urged, to 
practice her religion at home.265 
Of course, the state was not the sole player in the secularization process (Dole: 
12) and the applications of the reforms, not only the ones pertaining to secularism, have 
engendered identities and sensibilities that were not foreseen either by the political cadre 
of the period under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal or by the opposition which had to, 
for the most part, operate underground.266 In time more and more people have forged 
hybrid forms of morality that are not exclusively defined by secularism or Islam. This has 
been partly due to the fact that secularism, defined as “the marginalization of religion's 
public role, was no longer an externally or state-imposed force but became a societal 
force that was internalized by a considerable number of nominal or pious Muslims” 
(Tezcur: 70). 
 Contemporary readings of Mevlana in Turkey are inevitably affected by the above-
mentioned social engineering, causing in an increase in the already assorted 
representations. As aptly observed by Chelebi Husam, “Mevlana's words are like a 
mirror: everybody sees something in that mirror, but what they see is themselves.” (qtd. 
in Soileau: 303). The history of Turkish representation of Mevlana attests to this remark. 
                                                
265 Some of the reforms implemented within the first decade of the Republic, such as the closure of the 
Islamic courts and Islamic schools, the enactment of compulsory “modern” dress codes and the adoption of 
the Swiss Civil Code) precipitated the effacement of Islam from the public domain. 
266 Even though the early Republican reforms are consequential in the creation of later generations 
configuration of religion in their lives, the state's stance towards religion and its involvement in religious 
affairs have shown variances in accordance with the political atmosphere of the period. Specifically, the 
political ascent of conservative parties such as Demokrat Party (Democratic Party) in the 1950s, Adalet 
Partisi (Justice Party) in the 1960s and 70s, Anavatan Partisi (Homeland Party) in the 1980s precipitated a 
more intense integration of “orthodox Islam” into the “nation-state's projects of rationalization, 
homogenization, and disciplinization” (Gurbey: 41). Additionally, with the ever-increasing impact of 
globalization as well as neo-liberal policies, the state's controlling power over religion or morality 
weakened to a significant degree. 
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Because representations of Mevlana show interesting variances in accordance with the 
ideological stance of the representer, the new readings carry the marks of the new 
secularist interpretation of morality. Turkish humanists, for instance, portrayed Mevlana 
as a humanist poet who sang the beauty and fraternity of human beings in the most 
exquisite manner. Or, the Turkish-Islamists insisted on describing Mevlana as a 
“Turkish” sage instrumental in the Islamization of Anatolian Turks.  
 Indeed, for much of the twentieth century, these two predominant representations—
the humanist and the Turkish-Islamist—competed with one another. Today, however, 
both of these have given way to other interpretative concerns that focus on the nature of 
Mevlana’s religious beliefs and, perhaps with more immediacy, that of his 
“Muslimhood.” This specific reading is as political as the humanist and the Turkish-
Islamist one. With the political ascent of the so-called Islamists, first the Milli Görüş 
(National Vision) ideology under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan and then its 
transformed continuation, the Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi or AKP (Justice and 
Development Party) under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has disconcerted if 
not alarmed the more secular-wise sensitive section of society.267 Faced with an Islam 
openly promoted by the politicians as well as the supporters of these socio-political 
movements, people, who have felt left out, have developed several coping mechanisms 
one of which is presenting an alternative interpretation of Islam that unequivocally agrees 
                                                
267 The ousting of Erbakan's Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) from a coalition government in 1997 and its 
consequent ban from politics led the younger generation of Islamists to re-craft their Islamist politics in a 
new party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, or AKP (The Justice and Development Party) along the lines of 
neo-liberalism. The AKP was founded in August 2001 and gained a landslide victory in the November 
2002 elections. Even though AKP denies being an Islamist party, it is generally identified both 
internationally and domestically as such. 
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with the founding principles of the Republic. This specific interpretation describes 
religion, hence Islam, along the liberal model as a private matter.268 Their discourse on 
the idealized Islam entails the Kantian distinction between religion as cult and religion as 
moral action. While the former “seeks favors from God through prayer and offerings to 
bring healing and wealth to its followers,” the latter “commands human beings to change 
their behavior in order to lead a better life” (Turner: 5). Needless to say the distinction 
comes along with hierarchization in favor of the latter, which secularists claim to adopt. 
Also, interpretation of religion as moral action precipitates an easier transition to a New 
Age approach to religion, one which is ultimately utilitarian on account of its insistence 
on seeing religion as a tool in the enhancement of one’s self.    
 The secularists regard Mevlana, though not Sufism per se, as the embodiment of 
this ideal Islam which is privatized, progressive, reformed, not ritual-based, and in tune 
with secular morality. Mevlana is the perfect candidate for them because his poems not 
only valorize universal humanistic themes that are shared by secular morality, but also he 
has recently become a phenomenon on his own in the Western world, which many 
members of the secular-minded group look up to in their lives. The unprecedented 
popularity that Mevlana has gained in recent years among this socio-economically 
diverse group of people was both taken advantage of, and bolstered, by Elif Shafak with 
her novel Aşk (Love).  
 In Aşk, Shafak touches upon some of the sensitive issues with which these secular 
urbanites are concerned, but the novel’s Turkish and English versions give such issues 
                                                
268 The visibility of piety in the public sphere has been considered by some, at least until recently, a 
transgression of secularist values. Some fanatic secularists even go as far as saying that public display of 
piety is an imposition on the part of religious people on other people. 
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particular emphases. The venting of a minor character, Sarhoş Süleyman (Suleiman the 
Drunk), is emblematic in this regard: Süleyman exclaims that he is “sick and tired of 
bigots” because “they are convinced that they have God on their side and therefore look 
down on everyone else” (165).269 In the English version, however, “Suleiman” claims to 
detest “all religions” and directs his criticism towards all religious people: “You know, 
this is exactly why I abhor religion. All sorts of them! religious people are so confident of 
having God by their side that they think they are superior to everyone else” (127). In the 
Turkish version, Süleyman’s criticism is directed specifically towards “bağnazlar” 
(bigots). This seemingly minor difference is significant because in the US the 
juxtaposition of religion and spirituality, and the consequent devalorization of religion is 
getting more and more prominent. Whereas in Turkey, direct criticism against religion, in 
particular against Islam, in a novel as mainstream as Aşk can be rather contentious.270 
Besides, it is incompatible with the premise of the novel, which artlessly distinguishes 
Muslims as good and bad. By using the word “bağnazlar,” Shafak, once again, draws 
attention to this distinction, which has been in use as a trope since the early Republican 
period. What is more, public figures, specifically among the secularists, avoid adopting a 
negative approach toward religion and religious people, partly because it is a remnant of 
the strict early Republican attitude towards religion that led to the alienation of a 
considerable segment of the population. The rhetoric is now focused on the adverse 
influences of not religion, or to be more specific Islam, but on the incorrect interpretation 
                                                
269 “Zaten bu yüzden bağnazlardan bıktım usandım! Tanrı’yı yanlarına aldıklarından o kadar eminler ki, 
geri kalan herkese tepeden bakıyorlar” (165).  
270 In fact, Shafak was put on trial in 2007 for “insulting Turkishness” through characters in her novel The 
Bastard of Istanbul by referring to “the Armenian genocide.” She was acquitted but this trial was a case in 
point showing the repercussions of dealing with such sensitive issues.  
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and execution of it. In this regard, Shafak’s replacement of “religious people” with 
“bigot” speaks within and to the Turkish context.   
 Another delicate issue regards the place of women in society. Traditionally 
Islamists tend not to wish to see women active in the public sphere. They are believed to 
prefer seeing women at home, performing their motherly and wifely duties. In the novel, 
Mevlana, unlike Islamists, encourages women to participate in social life.271 Kimya, for 
instance, after proving herself to be a curious and intelligent girl, becomes one of the 
students of Mevlana. Though Kimya was not an exception; after her, Mevlana accepts to 
train his daughter-in-law Fatma and her sister Hediye, as well. Mevlana’s praise of them 
is noteworthy due to the message it conveys: 
This extremely hardworking and smart girl reminds me of my most beautiful 
Kimya. In time Fatma has become “my right eye” and Hediye “my left eye.” 
Whenever I need to perform a duty in the public, these eyes guided me. Who says 
girls cannot be just as good students as boys? My dear Kimya had already proved 
what girls could achieve. Out of respect for her memory, I arrange sema sessions 
not only for men but also for women as well and advise Sufi sisters to continue this 
                                                
271 In parallel to Mevlana’s egalitarian views on women, the outer novel further champions the liberation of 
women through the story of Ella Rubinstein, who, thanks to her relationship with Aziz, acknowledges the 
shackles that has bound her to a rather stagnant domestic life. Eventually she gets rid of those shackles and 
embraces the infinite possibilities open to her. I cannot say that in Turkey the outer story resonated as 
successfully as the inner story; most readers focus on the latter at the expense of ignoring the former story. 
I contend that Shafak’s utilization of Western woman is consistent with a trope in Ottoman/Turkish literary 
tradition, in which Western women are depicted as some sort of damsels in distress saved by morally 
superior Ottoman/Turkish Muslim men. In the case of Aşk, the savior is not Turkish but on account of 
being a Muslim, Aziz, still more or less, fits into the scheme.    
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tradition. Let no one think that women are inferior to men: it is humans, not Allah, 
who discriminate and prefer one over the other!” (405)272 
In this passage Shafak deploys Rumi to challenge the prevalent discrimination against 
women. Mevlana’s recognition of the caliber of girls to the point of trusting them, not his 
sons or any other men, to help him perform his public duties is noteworthy, if not 
inconceivable. What is more, he not only praises their intellectual qualities but also 
encourages them to become active Sufis. Even today it is not common to see a woman 
perform the Mevlevi sema but in the novel Mevlana tells female Sufis to perform it. His 
justification of it is equally interesting because he acquits religion from the current 
subjugation of women by pointing at the latter’s social basis. The passage as a whole 
speaks both to the Islamists and secularists by emphasizing Mevlana’s respect for 
women. As a Muslim to be emulated in every respect, his esteem for women is simply 
exemplary for contemporary readers of all sorts. 
 Shafak’s stance in the Turkish version is more pronounced compared to the 
English, probably because discrimination against women is a bigger problem in Turkey. 
The entire passage in the English reads as “Bright and inquisitive, [Fatima] reminded me 
of Kimya. I taught her the Qur’an. She became so dear to me that I started referring to her 
as my right eye and her sister Hediyya as my left eye. That is the one thing dear Kimya 
proved to me long ago: that girls are just as good students as boys, if not even better. I 
                                                
272 I prefer to make literal translations of the Turkish version into English so as to better display the 
nuances. The original Turkish reads as: “Bu son derece çalışkan ve akıllı kız bana güzeller güzeli Kimya’yı 
hatırlatır.  Zamanla Fatma ‘sağ gözüm’ oldu, kız kardeşi Hediye ise ‘sol gözüm’. Ne zaman toplum içinde 
bir vazife ifa etmem gerekse, bu gözler bana rehber oldu. Kim demiş kızlar erkekler kadar iyi talebe olamaz 
diye? Sevgili Kimya kızların başarısını kanıtlamıştı zaten. Ben de onun ruhuna hürmeten sadece erkekler 
için değil, kadınlar için de sema ayinleri düzenliyorum ve Sufi bacılara bu adeti devam ettirmelerini salık 
veriyorum. Sakın ola bir kadının erkekten geri yahut eksik olduğunu sanmasınlar! Ayrımcılık yapıp insanı 
insana üstün tutmak biz kullara özgüdür; yoksa Allah’a değil.” (404-5) 
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arrange sema sessions for women and advise Sufi sisters to continue this tradition” (342). 
This version serves the purpose of showing how an exemplary Muslim would treat and 
esteem women, but it does not mention how Rumi uses these girls to help him in the 
public domain or how Allah does not actually discriminate or prefer men over women. 
The emphasis on the intellectual capacity and capabilities are more conspicuous.  
 Shafak touches upon the issue of women in Islam by means of Şems as well. As 
mentioned previously in this chapter, Şems talks about the possibility of interpreting the 
Qur’an at a level that does not let men subjugate or beat women (245). While that 
passage certainly speaks to a Western audience who consider Islam a misogynist religion, 
it also addresses concerns that are voiced in Turkey, where many people still use Islam as 
an excuse to restraint women. Once again, Shafak speaks to both the secularists and the 
Islamists in her attempt of refuting the basis of that justification by referring to the very 
core of Islam itself.273  
 Another key notion that deserves our attention regards the approach toward the 
practical aspect of religion. Shafak criticizes, this time by means of Şems, the 
fetishization of religious rituals at the expense of more profound and fundamental aspects 
of religious or spiritual life. Within the American context this distinction does not 
resonate well. In some ways it parallels the religious vs. spiritualist dichotomy but does 
not directly speak to the concerns of the Western audience. In the both Turkish and 
English version, such passages function as criticism targeting the literalist Muslims who 
does not venture to go beyond the literal meaning of the word of God. In the extreme 
                                                
273 However, the source that she uses in the Turkish version to propose an alternative translation of a 
specific section of the Qur’anic chapter al-Nisa, is itself quite controversial. Shafak uses Yaşar Nuri 
Öztürk’s translation to make her point but the Islamist circles have serious issues with Öztürk’s 
interpretation of Islam and the Qur’an.  
 206 
cases, such people justify their intolerance or violent acts with reference to Islam. In the 
Turkish context, however, there is an additional level that immediately engages the novel 
with a debate that is organically tied to the secularist interpretation of religion. In such 
passages Şems not only criticizes Islamists for neglecting the spiritual aspect in their 
overindulgence in the practical aspect, but also valorizes the secularists' status, either as 
non-practicing Muslims or simply as “moral” human beings, because of their 
appreciation of “more profound” spiritual aspects, in some ways reminiscent of the 
Kantian distinction between religion as cult and religion as moral action. 
 One of the most significant articulations of the secularist morality is its emphasis on 
the “purity of heart” as opposed to observance of religious practice. More than once Şems 
stresses the purity of heart as the foundation of piety. In order to prove his point, he 
recounts the story of Moses and the shepherd in which Moses reprimands the latter for 
praying in a blasphemous manner but was reprimanded in return by God for tampering 
with the blasphemous but passionate and sincere prayer of the shepherd that God 
nonetheless liked (77). Şems underlines the cruciality of purity of heart in his list as well. 
Rule seventeen reads in the Turkish version as “Real filth is in the inside, not on the 
outside; it is in the heart, not on the garment. Any stain other than that, no matter how 
bad it seems, can be washed off, can be cleansed with water. The only dirt that is not 
washed off is the grudge and malevolence that congeal in one’s heart” (146).274  Şems 
                                                
274 Esas kirlilik, dışta değil içte, kisvede değil kalpte olur. Onun dışındaki her leke ne kadar kötü görünürse 
görünsün, yıkandı mı temizlenir, suyla arınır. Yıkamakla cıkmayan tek pislik kalplerde yağ bağlamış haset 
ve art niyettir.” The English version is slightly different than the Turkish version with its additional 
emphasis on love. It also further underlines the insufficiency of rituals in the purification of one.  It reads 
as: “Real filth is the one inside. The rest simply washes off. There is only one type of dirt that cannot be 
cleansed with pure waters, and that is the stain of hatred and bigotry contaminating the soul. You can purify 
your body through abstinence and fasting, but only love will purify your heart” (111). 
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articulates this rule as a response to the warning of an hermaphrodite owner of a brothel 
in Konya to stay away from the environs of the brothel, as it is, in her words, “the worst 
and the dirtiest place in town” (“şehrin en beter, en pis yeri”) (146). Consequently, Şems 
recognizes a fellow pure heart (temiz kalp) in Çöl Gülü (Desert Rose) who works as a 
prostitute at that brothel (147).        
  Another common characteristic of the secularist criticism of practicing Muslims 
concerns the quality of the latter's practice. It is usually insinuated that most people do 
not execute religious duties in the right spirit, that is, having filled with love or 
compassion. Nonobservant “secularists” or “nominal Muslims,” on the other hand, can be 
already filled with love and compassion for all humanity, which is the universal basis of 
all religions including Islam. That is why Şems considers a Christian hermit that he met 
in Damascus more Muslim than many who claim to be so (356). The valorization of love-
infused faith over religious practice is expressed in another instance, again, by Şems. The 
purity of heart, of course, goes hand in hand with “love” as the quote below indicates: 
So much fear, so many misgivings and injunctions ... There are those who fast 
throughout Ramadan without missing a day, sacrifice a sheep every Eid as an 
atonement for his sins, make the pilgrimage to Mecca, pray five times a day on his 
prayer rug but there is no place for love or compassion in his heart. O fool, what’s 
the use of all of this? Can there be faith without love? Is it possible to have faith 
by constantly muttering and complaining, without loving and being loved? If 
there is no love, “worship” (ibadet) is merely a seven-lettered word, a hollowed 
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out husk. One should have faith with love and in love, his love for God and love 
for people should rumble in his veins. (228)275 
This passage directly aims those who obsess over practice at the expense of overlooking 
the supposed real point of Islam, that is, having a pure heart which enables one to be 
filled with love, the very basis of faith. Once again, Shafak employs such passages to 
play up the distinction between the literalist and the more profound Muslims, but within 
the Turkish context it also mirrors the criticism directed by secularists toward Islamists.   
 As much as there is disagreement on the correct execution of what is commanded 
by Islam, there is controversy on what is forbidden as well. In such discussions usually 
drinking alcohol constitutes a major problem. Shafak touches upon this issue as well. In 
“Sweet Blasphemy” (Aşk Şeriatı [Sharia of Love] in the Turkish version) Şems asks 
Mevlana to go to the tavern and fetch some wine for them.276 Mevlana, a respected 
scholar and preacher, is aware that it is part of the test that Shams conducts on him. So 
Mevlana says okay and heads for the tavern, where Suleiman the Drunk argues that 
people who drink wine are not evil and do not deserve to be scorned. He, then, asks 
Mevlana why wine was forbidden. Mevlana’s reply to this question reads as: 
 I think one should avoid alcohol. With that in mind, one should not forget that we 
cannot hold responsible neither wine nor the tavern owner for what we do. We 
                                                
275 “Bunca korku, bunca vehim ve yasak … Öyle insanlar var ki, her Ramazan sektirmeden oruç tutar, her 
bayramda günahlarının kefareti icin kınalı koyun keser, hacca umreye gider, gunde beş vakit alnı secdeye 
değer ama yüreğinde ne sevgiye yer vardir, ne de merhamete. Bre adam, ne demeye uğraşır durursun ki? 
Aşksız inanç olur mu? Sevmeden ve sevilmeden, habire bir şeylere söylenip homurdanarak iman etmek 
mümkün mü? Aşk yoksa “ibadet” bir kuru kelimeden, yan yana gelmiş altı harften ibaret. Dışı kabuk, içi 
oyuk. İnsan aşkla ve aşkta iman etmeli; damarlarında gürül gürül hissederek Allah ve insan sevgisini!” 
(228) 
276 Even though this specific incident is recited in other accounts, the resonation of it in contemporary 
Turkey is quite unique. 
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have to get rid of the arrogance, hypocrisy, spite, rigidity and aggression that 
dwells in our selves (nafs) before wine. At the end of the day whoever wants to 
drink will drink and whoever does not will not. No one has the right to impose his 
ways on others. Because there is no compulsion in religion (300).277 
 Mevlana further elaborates on the issue while talking to Şems who asks him to 
drink the wine he has brought from the tavern. Mevlana is trembling but nonetheless 
takes the glass and says: 
 It is important to abide by religious rules. But one should not attach more 
importance to rules than the essence, to fragments than the whole. A person who 
drinks wine should not disdain the person who does not drink and vice versa. I 
drink this glass of wine with this understanding in mind and believe with my 
whole heart that there is sobriety in the drunkenness of love” (304).278 
These specific parts probably do not resonate in the United States as they do in Turkey. 
At one level Şems’s testing Mevlana with wine and Mevlana’s reaction is the perfect 
example to illustrate Mevlana’s complete surrender to Şems and his love but it resonates 
at another level as well. Public consumption of alcohol is still one of the most sensitive 
                                                
277 “Kanaatimce içkiden uzak durmalı. Bununla beraber, unutmamalı, yaptıklarımızdan meyi de 
meyhaneciyi de sorumlu tutamayız. Şaraptan evvel nefslerimizdeki küstahlığı, riyakarlığı, kindarlığı, 
katılığı, saldırganlığı kovmalıyız. Ve en nihayetinde içen içer, içmeyen içmez. Kimsenin kimseyi 
zorlamaya hakkı yoktur. Çünkü dinde zorlama yoktur.” (300). The English version is more or less the 
same: “My friends, wine is not an innocent drink because it brings out the worst in us. I believe it is better 
for us to abstain from drinking. That said, we cannot blame alcohol for what we are responsible for. It is 
our own arrogance and anger that we should be working on. That is more urgent. At the end of the day 
whoever wants to drink will drink and whoever wants to stay away from wine will stay away. We have not 
right to impose our ways on others. There is no compulsion in religion” (241) 
278 “Dinin şartlarına uymak önemlidir. Ama insan kuralları özden, parçaları bütünden daha fazla 
önemsememeli. İçki içen insan içmeyenleri, içki içmeyense içenleri küçümsememeli. Bugün bana ikram 
ettiğin kadehi bu şuurla içiyorum ve tüm kalbimle inanıyorum ki aşk sarhoşluğunda ayıklık var” (304). 
English version, which is quite the same, reads as: “Religious rules and prohibitions are important, but they 
should not be turned into unquestionable taboos. It is with such awareness that I drink the wine you offer 
me today, believing with all my heart that there is a sobriety beyond the drunkenness of love” (246) 
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and divisive issues in the Turkish social and political arena because of its symbolic status 
as an indicator of one's “lifestyle.” Specifically, with the political ascent of Islamists, 
cultural preferences and lifestyles have been extensively politicized (Tezcur: 70). Within 
this polarized and politicized atmosphere secularists began to express their fears and 
anxieties in a discourse shaped by lifestyle choices that usually revolve around the 
practices of consumption of alcohol, wearing miniskirts, and eating food in public during 
Ramadan.279 Shafak, once again, deploys Mevlana to comment on this issue. As an 
exemplary Muslim, he does not approve its consumption and yet he also mentions that 
one has no right in intervening in another’s life choices.    
 The novel includes more examples that speak to secularist sensitivities without 
painting Mevlana as a non-observant Muslim. It situates Mevlana into the discourse of a 
certain kind of religiosity, which the secularists deem appropriate for “enlightened” 
Islam. The congruency of Mevlana’s views with the secularist conceptualization of 
religion enables the novel to connect with the American interpretation of Rumi, the 
epitome of “the good Muslim.”280 In fact, the difference in Aziz’s description of himself 
in the Turkish and the English versions signify the reciprocity of the two interpretations. 
In the English version, Aziz defines himself as spiritual, but not religious: “Now, you 
think I am a religious man. But I am not. I am spiritual, which is different. Religiosity 
and spirituality are not the same thing, and I believe that the gap between the two has 
                                                
279 Controversies regarding lifestyle have become more prominent specifically in 2013 after AKP 
prohibition of retail sale of alcohol between 10 PM and 6 AM and banning all alcohol advertising and 
promotion. The government defended itself by referring to comparable restrictions in Western countries, 
but accusations dırected against AKP, and specifically Erdoğan for pursuing Islamic policies and imposing 
his own religious agenda on everyone have not waned. 
280 Of course I should add that Elif Shafak does not constitute an exception in her corresponding of 
secularist Rumi with New Age Rumi. The agreement of these two distinct interpretations is also suggested 
by Zülfü Livaneli when he says that he prefers to read the English translations of Mevlana, probably those 
of Coleman Barks. (2010).  
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never been greater than it is today” (145). As mentioned previously in this chapter, this 
distinction is one of the hallmarks of the New Age religiosity. In the Turkish context, 
however, being religious is juxtaposed to a form of religiosity that does not exactly 
correspond to spirituality as understood in the United States. Probably that is why in the 
Turkish version of the novel, the word that Shafak (or the translator) chooses to translate 
“spiritual” is “having faith” (inançlı olmak). The same passage in the Turkish version 
reads as: “You think I am religious, but in fact I am not. Being religious is not the same 
as having faith. The difference between these two concepts probably has never been 
greater than it is today” (187).281 Shafak’s juxtaposition of “being religious” with “having 
faith” is goes to the very root of Turkish secularist religiosity and its relation with Islam 
itself. In its attempts to (re)define the correct and modern interpretation of Islam, 
contemporary Turkish secularism claims to valorize individual morality and seeks to 
liberate religion from its legalistic and ritualistic dimensions. And the distinction implied 
by the juxtaposition above recapitulates this modernist claim.  
 As a cultural translation meant to explore the transformative power of love, Elif 
Shafak’s novel effectively merges Rumi with Mevlana. The Rumi as idealized by Shafak 
is at home both in the United States and in Turkey because  he usually agrees with both 
the New Age and Turkish secularist religiosity rather than challenging them. 
Furthermore, this new Rumi proves to be a useful tool in the condemnation of certain 
Muslims, who happen to fall into the category of the “bad Muslims” within the post-9/11 
Western discourse on Islam because of their literalism, legalism or impurity of heart.  
                                                
281 “Beni dindar biri sanmışsın. Halbuki değilim. Dindar olmakla inançlı olmak aynı şey değil. Bu iki 
kavram arasindaki fark belki de hiç bugün oldugu kadar açılmamıştı” (187).  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The topic of my dissertation often comes up in non-academic settings. During a 
recent reception, I was having a conversation with someone who predictably asked about 
it. Having answered the same question several times before that very evening, I simply 
said, “the representations of Rumi in the Western world” and then added, just in case, 
“Rumi, the thirteenth-century Sufi poet.” The response that I got, perhaps not 
coincidentally, pointed straight at one of the central issues of my dissertation project: 
“Oh, I know Rumi! But he was not one of those Muslims, right?”   
Today, more than ever before, Rumi conjures up diverse images for those who are 
in the least bit familiar with him and his writings. Even the very name “Rumi” means 
little in a geography extending from Central Asia to the Balkans, where Rumi had lived 
and his descendants and followers kept his intellectual and spiritual legacy alive for 
centuries. To his Turkish- and Persian-speaking audience, Rumi was known simply as 
Mevlana/Molana, or “our Master.” I am of the opinion that Mevlana and Rumi are 
distinct interpretations of the same historical person. Both succeed in capturing parts of 
his essence, but neither is complete in any sense of the word; after all, as Chelebi Husam 
al-Din says regarding the different interpretations of Rumi, “thousands of rivers flows 
into the sea, but thousands of rivers can not be the sea” (qtd. in Soileau: 303). 
This dissertation has focused on the latter figure, that is Rumi, who was born not 
in early thirteenth-century Balkh in what is today northern Afghanistan, but rather in the 
imagination of his Western readership in the 1900s.  This Rumi is significant for a 
number of reasons: his creation rests on discourses that are based on the history of 
Sufism’s reception in the West and which, for the most part, do not necessarily have any 
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organic links with the contemporary and parallel development of Mevlana as an imagined 
historical figure in the Muslim world. It is due to this discrepancy between Mevlana and 
Rumi that the latter figure was thought to be “an incidental Muslim” by many in the 
West, where the spiritual currents of the second half of the twentieth century cast him as 
a New Age guru with romantic sensibilities.  
It was only in the early twenty-first century, with the events of 9/11 and the 
consequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq dominating discourses about the Muslim world, 
that the two figures finally met and Rumi was finally “reconciled” with Islam. In this 
politically-charged setting, Rumi was actively promoted as the “ideal Muslim.” I contend 
that his “ideality” is largely a factor of the compatibility of Rumi’s spirituality with 
Western values that are deemed to be universal. The issue of universality is at stake 
because it potentially carries the power to silence cultural and religious differences for 
the sake of an idealized form of correspondence between cultures.282  
Adopting this perspective in the examination of the translations of Rumi—be it in 
the form of literal, collaborative or cultural—raises issues that can be discussed with 
reference to the debate on universality at a time when centers of cultural hegemony 
almost only accept what is palatable to their taste and values. For this reason, increasingly 
a similar language is employed, both within and outside the said centers of cultural 
hegemony, that emphasizes the same values, concerns, and sensivities. In this respect, I 
agree with Seyla Benhabib on the urgency to “understand how claims to universality can 
                                                
282 That is why the distinction made by Gayatri Spivak between global and planetary is crucial. According 
to Spivak, global imposes homogenization and uniformity, while planetary is attentive to cultural specifities 
and emergent identities (2003: 72).  
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reason can be reconciled with the diversity of life-forms” (2007: 9).  
The case of Rumi reveals the appeal and success of the insistence to find, and 
bring to the fore, the assumed universals. Combined with the hegemonic power of the 
locus of production, such readings, along with the values they highlight, exert 
unpredictable influence on the rest of the world. Having emerged in the West, Rumi’s 
image now travels widely in the world: in Turkey, he formed new bonds with, and even 
transformed, Mevlana as seen in Elif Shafak’s best-selling novel The Forty Rules of Love. 
The new Mevlana is the product of various components that inevitably include 
speicifities peculiar to Turkey, but the impact of (the American) Rumi on (the Turkish) 
Mevalana has to be identified and analyzed.  
One of the goals of this dissertation has been to show the ways in which the 
contested field of Rumi studies can shed light on the convoluted mechanism of politics of 
representation in literature and translation. Furthermore, it aims to contribute to a 
“planetary” understanding of Comparative Literature as espoused by Gayatri Spivak 
(2003: 101-102). I believe that the critical exploration of the increasing imposition of a 
globalized-yet-Western understanding of Rumi requires a planetary vision. Analyzing the 
dynamic engagement of representations and discourses that are conventionally examined 
in the insularity of diverse disciplines has proved to be rewarding in ways that I had not 
foreseen and hope to further explore in the future.  
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